8 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baetjer v. New England Alcohol Co.green2 sentences2006In Baetjer v. New England Alcohol Co., 319 Mass. 592, 602 , it was said that “a contracting party cannot be excused [under the doctrine of frustration] where the only ‘frustration’ consists in the fact that known risks assumed by him have turned out to his disadvantage.” Essex-Lincoln Garage, Inc. v. City of Boston, 342 Mass. 719 (Mass. 1961), at 721. 1961In Baetjer v. New England Alcohol Co. 319 Mass. 592, 602, it was said that “a contracting party cannot be excused [under the doctrine of frustration] where the only ‘frustration’ consists in the fact that known risks assumed by him have turned out to his disadvantage.” That is the *722 situation in the instant case. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Sparegreen1 sentence1969See Commonwealth v. Spare, 353 Mass. 263, 265-266 , and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clearygreen1 sentence1967See Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 176 ; Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57-58 ; Commonwealth v. Ellis, 319 Mass. 627, 629-630 ; Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 1134-1139, 1760-1761; The Queen v. Lillyman, [1896] 2 Q. | 1 | 1 |
Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Loringgreen1 sentence1962See Massachusetts Inst. of Technology v. Loring, 327 Mass. 553, 556 ; Restatement : Property, <§ 367 (2); Scott, Trusts (2d ed.) § 27.1. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Essex-Lincoln Garage, Inc. v. City of Boston
green
1 sentence2006In Baetjer v. New England Alcohol Co., 319 Mass. 592, 602 , it was said that “a contracting party cannot be excused [under the doctrine of frustration] where the only ‘frustration’ consists in the fact that known risks assumed by him have turned out to his disadvantage.” Essex-Lincoln Garage, Inc. v. City of Boston, 342 Mass. 719 (Mass. 1961), at 721. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Walker
green
1 sentence1977Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548 , 577 n.20 (1976). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Glover v. Callahan
green
1 sentence1967See Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 176 ; Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57-58 ; Commonwealth v. Ellis, 319 Mass. 627, 629-630 ; Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 1134-1139, 1760-1761; The Queen v. Lillyman, [1896] 2 Q. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Commonwealth v. Ellis
green
1 sentence1967See Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175, 176 ; Glover v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 57-58 ; Commonwealth v. Ellis, 319 Mass. 627, 629-630 ; Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 1134-1139, 1760-1761; The Queen v. Lillyman, [1896] 2 Q. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Thayer v. Rivers
green
1 sentence1962This so called principle of “capture” (Amerige v. Attorney Gen. 324 Mass. 648, 656 ) which, “like some other principles applicable to general powers of appointment, owes its origin to the conception that the grant of a general power is in itself almost tantamount to a grant of ownership” (Old Colony Trust Co. v. Allen, 307 Mass. 40, 42 ) has no application in cases of special powers, where the ineffectively appointed property passes to takers in default of appointment (Thayer v. Rivers, 179 Mass. 280, 290 ; Hooper v. Hooper, 203 Mass. 50, 58-59 ; see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Richardson, 297 Mas | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Hooper v. Hooper
green
1 sentence1962This so called principle of “capture” (Amerige v. Attorney Gen. 324 Mass. 648, 656 ) which, “like some other principles applicable to general powers of appointment, owes its origin to the conception that the grant of a general power is in itself almost tantamount to a grant of ownership” (Old Colony Trust Co. v. Allen, 307 Mass. 40, 42 ) has no application in cases of special powers, where the ineffectively appointed property passes to takers in default of appointment (Thayer v. Rivers, 179 Mass. 280, 290 ; Hooper v. Hooper, 203 Mass. 50, 58-59 ; see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Richardson, 297 Mas | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Allen
green
1 sentence1962This so called principle of “capture” (Amerige v. Attorney Gen. 324 Mass. 648, 656 ) which, “like some other principles applicable to general powers of appointment, owes its origin to the conception that the grant of a general power is in itself almost tantamount to a grant of ownership” (Old Colony Trust Co. v. Allen, 307 Mass. 40, 42 ) has no application in cases of special powers, where the ineffectively appointed property passes to takers in default of appointment (Thayer v. Rivers, 179 Mass. 280, 290 ; Hooper v. Hooper, 203 Mass. 50, 58-59 ; see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Richardson, 297 Mas | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Amerige v. Attorney General
green
1 sentence1962This so called principle of “capture” (Amerige v. Attorney Gen. 324 Mass. 648, 656 ) which, “like some other principles applicable to general powers of appointment, owes its origin to the conception that the grant of a general power is in itself almost tantamount to a grant of ownership” (Old Colony Trust Co. v. Allen, 307 Mass. 40, 42 ) has no application in cases of special powers, where the ineffectively appointed property passes to takers in default of appointment (Thayer v. Rivers, 179 Mass. 280, 290 ; Hooper v. Hooper, 203 Mass. 50, 58-59 ; see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Richardson, 297 Mas | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Woods v. MacDonald
green
1 sentence1961Woods v. MacDonald, 326 Mass. 401, 403 . | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Commonwealth v. Kitchen
green
1 sentence1948Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 299 Mass. 7, 8-9 . | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Freeman v. Mercantile Mutual Accident Ass'n
green
1 sentence1936The provisions in the so called clause of exception in the policy declared on in the first count of the declaration requiring consideration are those applicable to death “caused wholly or partly” by “bodily . . . infirmity,” by “surgical treatment thereof” or by “hernia.” Neither the provision applicable to “bodily . . . infirmity” nor that applicable to “hernia” applies to a hernia sustained “solely through violent external and accidental means,” and resulting in the death of the insured, that is, a hernia which is wholly within the line of causation between such means and the death, “directl | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.