continuing crime doctrine in Indiana

2019Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-47 | August 27, 2019 Page 8 of 11 [19] The continuing crime doctrine is a category of Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy and applies when “actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied).

2018As we have explained: “The continuing crime doctrine essentially provides that actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “[T]he continuing crime doctrine reflects a category of Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy.” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

2026Cf. Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding the continuing crime doctrine does not apply to factual situations where a defendant is charged with two or more “distinct chargeable crimes”).

2020Appellate counsel also raised a claim that multiple convictions were barred by the continuing crime doctrine, a category of double jeopardy that prohibits convicting a defendant “multiple times for the same continuous offense.”4 Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 736-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); see Miske, 2015 WL 2329120 at *6-8.

2020In questioning the existence of the rule, the State relies on a statement by our supreme court in Sistrunk v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1051, 1054 (Ind. 2015), that “our recognition in Richardson of the 4 “The continuing crime doctrine essentially provides that actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2018However, “the purpose of the continuing crime doctrine is to prevent the State from charging a defendant twice for the same continuous offense.” Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2020Continuing Crime Doctrine [41] Nix argues that his offenses of domestic battery and battery with moderate bodily injury were essentially “a single transaction,” Appellant’s Br. p. 11, and concludes his conviction for domestic battery should be vacated under the continuing crime doctrine. [42] The continuing crime doctrine, also known as the continuous crime doctrine, “is a rule of statutory construction and common law limited to situations where a defendant has been charged multiple times with the same offense.” Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2015). “‘The continuous crime doctrine

2019“The continuing crime doctrine essentially provides that actions that are sufficient in Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2120 | June 21, 2019 Page 12 of 18 themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. [27] One count of armed robbery was charged for the crime against Terry McCarter.

2020Continuing Crime Doctrine [41] Nix argues that his offenses of domestic battery and battery with moderate bodily injury were essentially “a single transaction,” Appellant’s Br. p. 11, and concludes his conviction for domestic battery should be vacated under the continuing crime doctrine. [42] The continuing crime doctrine, also known as the continuous crime doctrine, “is a rule of statutory construction and common law limited to situations where a defendant has been charged multiple times with the same offense.” Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2015). “‘The continuous crime doctrine

2020Continuing Crime Doctrine [41] Nix argues that his offenses of domestic battery and battery with moderate bodily injury were essentially “a single transaction,” Appellant’s Br. p. 11, and concludes his conviction for domestic battery should be vacated under the continuing crime doctrine. [42] The continuing crime doctrine, also known as the continuous crime doctrine, “is a rule of statutory construction and common law limited to situations where a defendant has been charged multiple times with the same offense.” Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2015). “‘The continuous crime doctrine

2014“The continuing crime doctrine essentially provides that actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Buchanan v. State, 913 N.E.2d 712, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied), trans. denied.

2013The continuing crime doctrine provides that “actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Buchanan v. State, 913 N.E.2d 712, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

2018It seems clear to us that the point of the continuing-crime rule is to allow only one punishment for what is a single decision to commit a single offense such that “a defendant’s conduct amounts only to a single chargeable crime.” Koch v. State, 952 N.E.2d 359, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

2017We disagree. [8] The continuing crime doctrine “reflects a category of Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy[,]” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), and “defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts only to a single chargeable crime and prevents the State from charging a defendant twice for the same continuous offense[,]” Koch v. State, 952 N.E.2d 359, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

2016The State, while not conceding the point, seems implicitly to agree. [24] The continuing crime doctrine “‘reflects a category of Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy.’” Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)), trans. denied.

2014In Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, a case cited by S.L., we reversed three of Chavez’s convictions for Class C felony child molesting applying the continuing crime doctrine.

2010"The continuing crime doctrine essentially provides that actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction." Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citing Nunn v. State, 695 N.E.2d 124, 125 (Ind. Ct.App.1998)), trans. denied.

2010"The continuing crime doctrine essentially provides that actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction." Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citing Nunn v. State, 695 N.E.2d 124, 125 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)), trans. denied.

2015The parties focus on whether Hill’s convictions violate double jeopardy principles, see Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 50-54 (Ind.1999), or the continuing crime doctrine, see Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 500-01 (Ind.1999).

2011Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), reh'g denied. *374 "Crimes such as kidnapping and the lesser included offense of confinement are defined under the continuing crime doctrine." Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 500 (Ind.1999).

2020See Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (convictions for rape and criminal deviate conduct did not violate continuing crime doctrine; Firestone committed different acts at different times); cf. Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (three convictions for domestic battery violated continuing crime doctrine; Gomez was charged with grabbing victim, pulling her hair, and pushing her against the wall, but those acts occurred during one short, uninterrupted attack).

2019In effect, the doctrine “defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts only to a single chargeable crime.” Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2015). [28] We addressed a similar issue in Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

2020Under the continuous crime doctrine, “‘actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-713 | September 17, 2020 Page 6 of 12 and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Anderson v. State, 15 N.E.3d 147, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). “‘The continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distin

2014Under the continuing crime doctrine, “‘actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Anderson v. State, 15 N.E.3d 147, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 237 , 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied)). “[T]he continuing crime doctrine reflects a category of Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy.” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “[W]hile Indiana’s double jeopardy

2018Frazier v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). [9] While Pacheco-Manzo’s actions may have shared a “singleness of purpose,” his convictions for invasion of privacy do not meet the test for a continuing crime, which also requires a compression of actions and place.

2017See also Frazier v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1257, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding no double jeopardy violation under either the actual evidence test or the continuing crime doctrine where different victims were involved).

2016On remand, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1507-CR-846 | March 14, 2016 Page 5 of 8 we instruct the trial court to vacate one of those convictions.2 See Leggs v. State, 966 N.E.2d 204, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding the defendant’s dual criminal confinement convictions violated the continuing crime doctrine and ordering the trial court to vacate one of the convictions on remand).

2013“The continuing crime doctrine applies when actions ‘sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” 6 Leggs v. State, 966 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

2015The parties focus on whether Hill’s convictions violate double jeopardy principles, see Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 50-54 (Ind.1999), or the continuing crime doctrine, see Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 500-01 (Ind.1999).

2010He cites our supreme court's statement in Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind.2002), that the Indiana provision covers not only the double jeopardy analysis described in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), but also "a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are often described as double jeopardy." Baugh asserts that the continuing crime doctrine 3 is one such common law doctrine, and that it applies here, inasmuch as the evidence "showed that [his] actions constituted one continuous transaction." Appellant's Br. at 11.

2018See Lewis v. State, 43 N.E.3d 689, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that “Lewis’ actions of fleeing by vehicle and then on foot constitute one continuous act of resisting law enforcement, and we hold that convictions on both counts cannot stand”); Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d 383, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a defendant’s fleeing by vehicle and then on foot constitute one continuous act of resisting law enforcement) . [6] We agree that Custer’s actions of fleeing by vehicle and then on foot constitute one continuous act of resisting law enforcement.

2013We have affirmed multiple convictions for resisting law enforcement when, for example, the acts the defendant has committed are “different species,” Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d 383 , (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), disapproved on other grounds by Brock v. State, 955 N.E.2d 195 (Ind. 2011), such as simple flight along with resistance that causes injury to a police officer.

2020“The focus . . . should be on the specific actions alleged.” Heckard v. State, 118 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

2020In questioning the existence of the rule, the State relies on a statement by our supreme court in Sistrunk v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1051, 1054 (Ind. 2015), that “our recognition in Richardson of the 4 “The continuing crime doctrine essentially provides that actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2018Pugh v. State, 52 N.E.3d 955, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied), trans. denied.

2018See Lewis v. State, 43 N.E.3d 689, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that “Lewis’ actions of fleeing by vehicle and then on foot constitute one continuous act of resisting law enforcement, and we hold that convictions on both counts cannot stand”); Arthur v. State, 824 N.E.2d 383, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a defendant’s fleeing by vehicle and then on foot constitute one continuous act of resisting law enforcement) . [6] We agree that Custer’s actions of fleeing by vehicle and then on foot constitute one continuous act of resisting law enforcement.

2017In our opinion on direct appeal, we held “[L.P.’s] testimony established that Kopp molested her on a regular basis over a period of time that began during the summer between the victim’s seventh and eighth grades and continued through her junior year of high Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1701-PC-146 | November 13, 2017 Page 7 of 9 school.” Kopp, 867 N.E.2d 288 at *1.

2017Stowers v. State, 657 N.E.2d 194, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. [9] Kopp argues his appellate counsel, Keys, was ineffective because she erroneously advanced the argument Kopp’s two convictions of Class A felony child molest constituted a violation of the continuing crime doctrine instead of arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.

2017See Stowers, 657 N.E.2d at 200 (appellate counsel is not ineffective for declining to present a claim that would have been meritless). [12] Kopp also argues his appellate counsel was ineffective because she did not argue the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for directed verdict.

2016See Slone v. State, 11 N.E.3d 969, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that to determine whether crimes are a single episode of criminal conduct, focus is on the timing of the offenses and the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature of the crimes).

2015See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S, 299, 301-02, 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (holding that legislative intent determines whether an offense is continuous for purposes of the continuing crime doctrine), .

2015See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S, 299, 301-02, 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (holding that legislative intent determines whether an offense is continuous for purposes of the continuing crime doctrine), .

2015However, we believe that a similar rule, the single larceny rule, better applies to the circumstances of this case. [7] The single larceny rule provides that “when several articles of property are taken at the same time, from the same place, belonging to the same person or to several persons there is but a single ‘larceny,’ i.e. a single offense.” Raines v. State, 514 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Ind.1987).