8 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Glassgreen2 sentences2026People v Glass, 464 Mich 266, 278-279 ; 627 NW2d 261 (2001) (“There is no state constitutional right to indictment by grand jury; rather, indictment by grand jury is an alternative charging procedure created by the Legislature.”). 2026People v Glass, 464 Mich 266, 278-279 ; 627 NW2d 261 (2001) (“There is no state constitutional right to indictment by grand jury; rather, indictment by grand jury is an alternative charging procedure created by the Legislature.”). | 2 | 2 |
Kuhn v. Department of Treasurygreen1 sentence2024In the process, the majority opinion leaves later Legislatures free to adopt and amend as they please under this (holding that the plain meaning of the textual requirement in Article 2, § 9 to file a referendum “within 90 days” of a legislative session did not justify “outright legislative defeat,” beyond acceptable “hindrance[s],” of the right to referendum by filing a referendum prior to the close of session); Kuhn, 384 Mich at 385-386 (reasoning that “[w]e may not stretch the language ratified by the people so as to allow revenue statutes to avoid the possibility of referendum by reference | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stoddardgreen2 sentences2014We cannot therefore conclude that a decision to forego the abstract offer contained in Miranda embodies an implied rejection of a specific opportunity to confer with a known lawyer.” [Bender, 452 Mich at 612 n 16 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), quoting State v Stoddard, 206 Conn 157, 168; 537 A2d 446 (1988) (quotation marks omitted).] Finally, in response to today’s majority, I reiterate my response to the Bender dissent’s assertion that the Michigan Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination provides no greater protection than the Fifth Amendment: “when interpreting art 1, § 17, there is 2014We cannot therefore conclude that a decision to forego the abstract offer contained in Miranda embodies an implied rejection of a specific opportunity to confer with a known lawyer.” [Bender, 452 Mich at 612 n 16 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), quoting State v Stoddard, 206 Conn 157, 168; 537 A2d 446 (1988) (quotation marks omitted).] Finally, in response to today’s majority, I reiterate my response to the Bender dissent’s assertion that the Michigan Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination provides no greater protection than the Fifth Amendment: “when interpreting art 1, § 17, there is | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Department of Public Healthgreen1 sentence1995Smith, supra, p 648 (Boyle, J.); Marlin, supra, p 338 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence2018Second, contrary to defendant’s argument, we conclude that our Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, 472 Mich at 168 , overruling the “balancing of interests approach” to analyzing double jeopardy challenges, applies retroactively to defendant’s case. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Bender
green
2 sentences2014We cannot therefore conclude that a decision to forego the abstract offer contained in Miranda embodies an implied rejection of a specific opportunity to confer with a known lawyer.” [Bender, 452 Mich at 612 n 16 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), quoting State v Stoddard, 206 Conn 157, 168; 537 A2d 446 (1988) (quotation marks omitted).] Finally, in response to today’s majority, I reiterate my response to the Bender dissent’s assertion that the Michigan Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination provides no greater protection than the Fifth Amendment: “when interpreting art 1, § 17, there is 2014We cannot therefore conclude that a decision to forego the abstract offer contained in Miranda embodies an implied rejection of a specific opportunity to confer with a known lawyer.” [Bender, 452 Mich at 612 n 16 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), quoting State v Stoddard, 206 Conn 157, 168; 537 A2d 446 (1988) (quotation marks omitted).] Finally, in response to today’s majority, I reiterate my response to the Bender dissent’s assertion that the Michigan Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination provides no greater protection than the Fifth Amendment: “when interpreting art 1, § 17, there is | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Boyd v. Civil Service Commission
green
2 sentences2004This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. [3] In turn, we assess the circuit court’s review of a CSC decision to “ ‘determine whether the lower court applied correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended *699 or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency’s factual findings.’ ” Hanlon v Civil Service Comm, 253 Mich App 710, 7 2004This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. [3] In turn, we assess the circuit court’s review of a CSC decision to “ ‘determine whether the lower court applied correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended *699 or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency’s factual findings.’ ” Hanlon v Civil Service Comm, 253 Mich App 710, 7 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Hanlon v. Civil Service Commission
green
2 sentences2004This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. [3] In turn, we assess the circuit court’s review of a CSC decision to “ ‘determine whether the lower court applied correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended *699 or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency’s factual findings.’ ” Hanlon v Civil Service Comm, 253 Mich App 710, 7 2004This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. [3] In turn, we assess the circuit court’s review of a CSC decision to “ ‘determine whether the lower court applied correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended *699 or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency’s factual findings.’ ” Hanlon v Civil Service Comm, 253 Mich App 710, 7 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
green
2 sentences1982The Court interpreted the Michigan Constitution on the principle, since abandoned in Erie R Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64 ; 58 S Ct 817 ; 82 L Ed 1188 (1938), that federal courts would make independent determinations of questions of general jurisprudence. 1982The Court interpreted the Michigan Constitution on the principle, since abandoned in Erie R Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64 ; 58 S Ct 817 ; 82 L Ed 1188 (1938), that federal courts would make independent determinations of questions of general jurisprudence. | 1 | 1982–1982 |