8 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1983–1993 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lovegreen2 sentences1993It should be made effective, but ought not to be extended by the courts to cases where there has been no injury to the relation of the parties by the betrayal of the confidence reposed. [ Id., p 193.] More recently, in People v Love, supra, pp 700, 701 (opinion of CAVANAGH, J.), this Court reiterated the fundamental rule: "Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that `the public... has a right to every man's evidence.' *575 As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted `only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or ex 1993It should be made effective, but ought not to be extended by the courts to cases where there has been no injury to the relation of the parties by the betrayal of the confidence reposed. [Id., p 193.] More recently, in People v Love, supra, pp 700, 701 (opinion of Cavanagh, J.), this Court reiterated the fundamental rule: "Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’ As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or exclu | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Nixongreen2 sentences1986Accord, United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 709-710 ; 94 S Ct 3090 ; 41 L Ed 2d 1039 (1974).” Thus, in this case, a reliable pursuit of the truth was actually furthered when the testimony of defendant’s wife was admitted. 1986Accord, United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 709-710 ; 94 S Ct 3090 ; 41 L Ed 2d 1039 (1974).” Thus, in this case, a reliable pursuit of the truth was actually furthered when the testimony of defendant’s wife was admitted. | 2 | 2 |
Elkins v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992"Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general principle only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” [Id. at 710, n 18, quoting Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 234 ; 80 S Ct 1437 ; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).] MCR 2.302(C) provides in relevant part: Protective Orders. 1992"Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general principle only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” [Id. at 710, n 18, quoting Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 234 ; 80 S Ct 1437 ; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).] MCR 2.302(C) provides in relevant part: Protective Orders. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Hamachergreen2 sentences1993See also People v Hamacher, supra, p 188 (dissenting opinion of BOYLE, J.).] With these principles in mind and our primary focus on the language used in the Michigan statute, we conclude that MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162, does not apply in the circumstances presented. 1993See also People v Hamacher, supra, p 188 (dissenting opinion of Boyle, J.).] With these principles in mind and our primary focus on the language used in the Michigan statuté, we conclude that MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162, does not apply in the circumstances presented. | 1 | 1 |
O'Toole v. Ohio German Fire Insurance Co.green2 sentences1989Therefore we have consistently recognized that privileges must be strictly construed and accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” [Love, supra, pp 700-701 (opinion of Cavanagh, J.); p 712 (opinion of Boyle, J.); see also O’Toole v Ohio German Fire Ins Co, 159 Mich 187, 193 ; 123 NW 795 (1909).] A The majority’s construction of the statute is that the statute is unambiguous and that the exceptions to the p 1989Therefore we have consistently recognized that privileges must be strictly construed and accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” [Love, supra, pp 700-701 (opinion of Cavanagh, J.); p 712 (opinion of Boyle, J.); see also O’Toole v Ohio German Fire Ins Co, 159 Mich 187, 193 ; 123 NW 795 (1909).] A The majority’s construction of the statute is that the statute is unambiguous and that the exceptions to the p | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Trammel v. United States
green
2 sentences1993It should be made effective, but ought not to be extended by the courts to cases where there has been no injury to the relation of the parties by the betrayal of the confidence reposed. [Id., p 193.] More recently, in People v Love, supra, pp 700, 701 (opinion of Cavanagh, J.), this Court reiterated the fundamental rule: "Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’ As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or exclu 1993It should be made effective, but ought not to be extended by the courts to cases where there has been no injury to the relation of the parties by the betrayal of the confidence reposed. [Id., p 193.] More recently, in People v Love, supra, pp 700, 701 (opinion of Cavanagh, J.), this Court reiterated the fundamental rule: "Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’ As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or exclu | 3 | 1986–1993 |
In Re Culhane's Estate
green
2 sentences1992On motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and on reasonable notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may issue any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.... [3] The government has not asserted a privilege. [4] Compare People v Love, 425 Mich 691 ; 391 NW2d 738 (1986) (spousal privilege) with People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557 ; 208 NW2d 504 (1973) (restriction on the use of the juvenile record). [5] MCL 487.329; MSA 23.710(29), the statute's current 1992On motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and on reasonable notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may issue any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.... [3] The government has not asserted a privilege. [4] Compare People v Love, 425 Mich 691 ; 391 NW2d 738 (1986) (spousal privilege) with People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557 ; 208 NW2d 504 (1973) (restriction on the use of the juvenile record). [5] MCL 487.329; MSA 23.710(29), the statute's current | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. McFarlin
green
2 sentences1992On motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and on reasonable notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may issue any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.... [3] The government has not asserted a privilege. [4] Compare People v Love, 425 Mich 691 ; 391 NW2d 738 (1986) (spousal privilege) with People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557 ; 208 NW2d 504 (1973) (restriction on the use of the juvenile record). [5] MCL 487.329; MSA 23.710(29), the statute's current 1992On motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and on reasonable notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may issue any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.... [3] The government has not asserted a privilege. [4] Compare People v Love, 425 Mich 691 ; 391 NW2d 738 (1986) (spousal privilege) with People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557 ; 208 NW2d 504 (1973) (restriction on the use of the juvenile record). [5] MCL 487.329; MSA 23.710(29), the statute's current | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.