normally predominant principle in Pennsylvania

2022“Thus, courts should accept testimonial privileges only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 197 (Pa. 1997).

2021“Courts should permit utilization of an evidentiary privilege ‘only to the very limited extent that … excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining - 11 - J-A04015-21 the truth.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 282 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997)).

2020Courts should permit utilization of an evidentiary privilege “only to the very limited extent that ... excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.” Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990)).

2020Courts should permit utilization of an evidentiary privilege “only to the very limited extent that ... excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.” Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990)).

2026“Courts should permit utilization of an evidentiary privilege only to the very limited extent that excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.” BouSamra v. Excela Health, 210 A.3d 967, 975 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted).

2025Thus, we permit utilization of an evidentiary privilege “only to the very limited extent that ... excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.” BouSamra v. Excela Health, 210 A.3d 967, 975 (Pa. 2019).

2011As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted `only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.'" (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 , 100 S.Ct. 906, 912 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)))); accord Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 282 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997).

2011As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted `only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.'" (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 , 100 S.Ct. 906, 912 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)))); accord Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 282 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997).

2018Thus, an evidentiary privilege may contravene truth-seeking only when it serves "a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth." Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation , 918 F.2d 374 , 383 (3d Cir. 1990) ).

2015See Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Taylor, 576 Pa. 622 , 841 A.2d 108, 118 (2004) (Nigro, J., dissenting) (“It is well established that evidentiary privileges . . . are generally disfavored and should be narrowly construed.” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) (discussing clergy-communicant privilege, noting courts should accept privileges “ ‘only to the very limited extent that . . . excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the t

2022Because it “has the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder,” courts construe the attorney-client privilege narrowly to “appl[y] only where necessary to achieve its purpose.” McAleer II, 248 A.3d at 425- 26 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 , 403 (1976)).

2022Because it “has the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder,” courts construe the attorney-client privilege narrowly to “appl[y] only where necessary to achieve its purpose.” McAleer II, 248 A.3d at 425- 26 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).

2023Regarding the respective duties of the parties when a privilege is invoked, we have observed that “[t]he party invoking a privilege must initially set forth facts showing that the privilege has been properly invoked.” Yocabet v. UPMC Presbyterian, 119 A.3d 1012 , 1019 (Pa.Super. 2015) (cleaned up).

2023Regarding the respective duties of the parties when a privilege is invoked, we have observed that “[t]he party invoking a privilege must initially set forth facts showing that the privilege has been properly invoked.” Yocabet v. UPMC Presbyterian, 119 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2015) (cleaned up).

2015See Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Taylor, 576 Pa. 622 , 841 A.2d 108, 118 (2004) (Nigro, J., dissenting) (“It is well established that evidentiary privileges . . . are generally disfavored and should be narrowly construed.” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) (discussing clergy-communicant privilege, noting courts should accept privileges “ ‘only to the very limited extent that . . . excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the t

2015See Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Taylor, 576 Pa. 622 , 841 A.2d 108, 118 (2004) (Nigro, J., dissenting) (“It is well established that evidentiary privileges . . . are generally disfavored and should be narrowly construed.” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) (discussing clergy-communicant privilege, noting courts should accept privileges “ ‘only to the very limited extent that . . . excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the t

2011The attorney-client privilege is a limited evidentiary privilege, and privileges are exceptions to normal evidentiary concepts and rules: Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that "`the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence.'" As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Commonwealth v. Spetzer, 572 Pa. 17 ,

2011The attorney-client privilege is a limited evidentiary privilege, and privileges are exceptions to normal evidentiary concepts and rules: Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that "`the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence.'" As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Commonwealth v. Spetzer, 572 Pa. 17 ,

2002As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted “only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 ... (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

2002As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted “only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 ... (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

2025Nevertheless, our High Court has acknowledged that “[i]It is beyond peradventure that Pennsylvania law protects the attorney-client privilege and recognizes it as the most revered of the common law privileges.” Commonwealth v. Flor, 136 A.3d 150, 158 (Pa. 2016) (cleaned up). [While t]he attorney-client privilege is derived from the common law, [it] is also codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5928, which states: “In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless i

2021In re L.F., 995 A.2d 356 , 360 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2021In re L.F., 995 A.2d 356, 360 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2018"The psychiatrist-patient privilege, which was modeled after the attorney -client privilege, codified a strong public policy that confidential communication made by a patient to his psychiatrist should be absolutely protected from disclosure." Commonwealth v. Fewell, 654 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Pa.Super. 1995).

2017Red Vision, supra at 61 (citation omitted).

2015Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). *62 “The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa.Super. 456 , 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (1976) (en banc).

2015Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). *62 “The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa.Super. 456 , 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (1976) (en banc).

2006Thus, courts should accept testimonial privileges ‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.’ In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46 , 100 S.Ct. 906, 910 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)).” In re Subpoena No. 22, 709 A.2d 385, 388 (Pa. Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 282 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997)); see also, In re Est

2006Thus, courts should accept testimonial privileges ‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.’ In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46 , 100 S.Ct. 906, 910 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)).” In re Subpoena No. 22, 709 A.2d 385, 388 (Pa. Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 282 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997)); see also, In re Est

2006Thus, courts should accept testimonial privileges ‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.’ In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46 , 100 S.Ct. 906, 910 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)).” In re Subpoena No. 22, 709 A.2d 385, 388 (Pa. Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 282 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997)); see also, In re Est

2002Accord, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-710 , 94 S.Ct. 3090 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 ... (1974).

2002Accord, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-710 , 94 S.Ct. 3090 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 ... (1974).

1999See, e.g., Estate of Kofsky, 487 Pa. 473 , 409 A.2d 1358, 1362 (1979)(“its purpose is to foster a confidence between client and advocate that will lead to a trusting and open attorney-client dialogue.”)(footnote omitted).

1999See, e.g., Estate of Kofsky, 487 Pa. 473 , 409 A.2d 1358, 1362 (1979)(“its purpose is to foster a confidence between client and advocate that will lead to a trusting and open attorney-client dialogue.”)(footnote omitted).

1999See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 282 , 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997): “[Exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” Hutchison v. Luddy, 414 Pa.Super. 138, 146 , 606 A.2d 905, 908 (1992)(quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 , 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1648 , 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979)). *39 Thus, courts should accept testimonial privileges “only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally pr