Wade rule in Missouri

1975The Court utilized a procedure comparable to that in Jackson v. Denno, saying, 388 U.S. at 239-40 , 87 S.Ct. at 1939: “We come now to the question whether the denial of Wade’s motion to strike the courtroom identification by the bank witnesses at trial because of the absence of his counsel at the lineup required, as the Court of Appeals held, the grant of a new trial at which such evidence is to be excluded.

1967A parallel to the problem of this case is contained in the recent “line-up” cases in the United States Supreme Court, e. g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1939 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 -1164-1166 [14-17]: “We come now to the question whether the denial of Wade’s motion to strike the courtroom identification by the bank witnesses at trial because of the absence of his counsel at the lineup required, as the Court of Appeals held, the grant of a new trial at which such evidence is to be excluded.

2020(Defendant Wade’s motion to dismiss criminal charges was denied and his case proceeded to final judgment and sentencing.) Id. at 431 .

2020Further, although a summary judgment motion is civil in nature and not criminal, even if 1 All rule references are to the Missouri Court Rules (2019) unless otherwise noted. 2 Cooper’s motion had been properly before the court as a motion for summary judgment, denial of that motion would also be unreviewable. (“Generally, a trial court’s denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable.” Matter of Care and Treatment of Lester Bradley v. State, 554 S.W.3d 440 , 450 n.5 (Mo. App. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omit

1977Morris v. State of Missouri, 532 S.W.2d 455, 456-457 [1] (Mo. banc 1976) [overruling Arnold v. State of Missouri, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo.1972) and other earlier opinions].

1977Morris v. State of Missouri, 532 S.W.2d 455, 456-457 [1] (Mo. banc 1976) [overruling Arnold v. State of Missouri, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo.1972) and other earlier opinions].

1972Appellant has not attempted to demonstrate that a similar per se rule as to lineup identification is applicable where the lineup is unnecessarily suggestive, and vio-lative of due process, under Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L. *91 Ed.2d 1199.

1972Appellant has not attempted to demonstrate that a similar per se rule as to lineup identification is applicable where the lineup is unnecessarily suggestive, and vio-lative of due process, under Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L. *91 Ed.2d 1199.

1972My personal opinion is that any confrontation between a suspect and witnesses after an indictment, information or complaint has been filed is a ‘critical state’ under Wade-Gilbert, but that does not seem to be the present law in Missouri.” Subsequent to the submission of this appeal, the United States Supreme Court, on June 7, 1972, in the case of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1881 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 , considered the application of the Wade rule and held, in effect, that *250 the right to counsel, including the right to counsel at a lineup guaranteed by Wade, “attaches only at

1972My personal opinion is that any confrontation between a suspect and witnesses after an indictment, information or complaint has been filed is a ‘critical state’ under Wade-Gilbert, but that does not seem to be the present law in Missouri.” Subsequent to the submission of this appeal, the United States Supreme Court, on June 7, 1972, in the case of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1881 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 , considered the application of the Wade rule and held, in effect, that *250 the right to counsel, including the right to counsel at a lineup guaranteed by Wade, “attaches only at