Wade rule in California

1973It held “. . . there is no exception to the Wade rule [United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 236-238 ( 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1162-1163 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 )] for confrontations which occur at preliminary hearings.” (Id., p. 1181.) On the point at issue here the court merely observed, “The trial court was strongly of the view that no reference to the photographic identification could be made before the jury.

1973It held “. . . there is no exception to the Wade rule [United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 236-238 ( 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1162-1163 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 )] for confrontations which occur at preliminary hearings.” (Id., p. 1181.) On the point at issue here the court merely observed, “The trial court was strongly of the view that no reference to the photographic identification could be made before the jury.

2022Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1); Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706-707 [“harassment focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee”; harassment “refers to bias that is expressed or communicated through interpersonal relations in the workplace”].) Wade’s claim of harassment against Starbucks and Guthrie is based on a “hostile work environment” theory, which applies “where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to

2022Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1); Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706-707 [“harassment focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee”; harassment “refers to bias that is expressed or communicated through interpersonal relations in the workplace”].) Wade’s claim of harassment against Starbucks and Guthrie is based on a “hostile work environment” theory, which applies “where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to

2022Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1); Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706-707 [“harassment focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee”; harassment “refers to bias that is expressed or communicated through interpersonal relations in the workplace”].) Wade’s claim of harassment against Starbucks and Guthrie is based on a “hostile work environment” theory, which applies “where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to

2022Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1); Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706-707 [“harassment focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee”; harassment “refers to bias that is expressed or communicated through interpersonal relations in the workplace”].) Wade’s claim of harassment against Starbucks and Guthrie is based on a “hostile work environment” theory, which applies “where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to

2022Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1); Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706-707 [“harassment focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee”; harassment “refers to bias that is expressed or communicated through interpersonal relations in the workplace”].) Wade’s claim of harassment against Starbucks and Guthrie is based on a “hostile work environment” theory, which applies “where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to

2022These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” ’ ” (Fuentes v. AutoZone, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227 (AutoZone).) “ ‘[W]hile an employee need not prove tangible job detriment to establish a [FEHA] harassment claim, the absence of such detriment requires a commensurately higher showing that the sexually harassing conduct was pervasive and destructive of the working environment.’ ” (Fisher, supra,

2022Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1); Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706-707 [“harassment focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee”; harassment “refers to bias that is expressed or communicated through interpersonal relations in the workplace”].) Wade’s claim of harassment against Starbucks and Guthrie is based on a “hostile work environment” theory, which applies “where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to

1971Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures `to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.' (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel's function and role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases with

1971Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures `to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.' (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel's function and role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases with

1971Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures `to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.' (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel's function and role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases with

1971Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures `to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.' (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel's function and role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases with

1971Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures `to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.' (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel's function and role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases with

1971Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures `to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.' (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel's function and role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases with

1971Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures `to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.' (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel's function and role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases with

1971Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures `to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.' (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel's function and role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases with

1970(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 711 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 ]; see Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 274 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1187 , 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957 ].) Citing People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 447 P.2d 106 ], defendant’s appellate counsel contends that defendant should have been given separate counsel at the lineup.

1970(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 711 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 ]; see Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 274 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1187 , 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957 ].) Citing People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 447 P.2d 106 ], defendant’s appellate counsel contends that defendant should have been given separate counsel at the lineup.

1970(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 711 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 ]; see Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 274 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1187 , 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957 ].) Citing People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 447 P.2d 106 ], defendant’s appellate counsel contends that defendant should have been given separate counsel at the lineup.

1970(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 711 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 ]; see Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 274 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1187 , 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957 ].) Citing People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 447 P.2d 106 ], defendant’s appellate counsel contends that defendant should have been given separate counsel at the lineup.

1970(People v. Armstrong, 268 Cal.App.2d 324, 326 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Rodriguez, 266 Cal.App.2d 766, 769-770 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 310 ].) No contention is made on appeal that trial counsel’s not making a Wade objection constituted inadequate representation under the doctrine of People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 386 P.2d 487 ], probably due to the appreciation that counsel had a tactical choice to make in that regard.

1970(People v. Armstrong, 268 Cal.App.2d 324, 326 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Rodriguez, 266 Cal.App.2d 766, 769-770 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 310 ].) No contention is made on appeal that trial counsel’s not making a Wade objection constituted inadequate representation under the doctrine of People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 386 P.2d 487 ], probably due to the appreciation that counsel had a tactical choice to make in that regard.

1970(Compare People v. Menchaca, 264 Cal. App.2d 642, 644-645 [ 70 Cal. Rptr. 843 ].) Wade itself provides examples of the types of suggestive lineups that the Wade rule was formulated to prevent: A six-man lineup consisting of only one Oriental, the defendant; one black-haired person among light-haired persons; a tall defendant with short men; a youthful defendant with men over 40 years of age. ( United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218, 232 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1160 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 ].) In Foster v. California (1969) 394 U.S. 440 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ], the defendant was nearly 6 feet

1970(Compare People v. Menchaca, 264 Cal. App.2d 642, 644-645 [ 70 Cal. Rptr. 843 ].) Wade itself provides examples of the types of suggestive lineups that the Wade rule was formulated to prevent: A six-man lineup consisting of only one Oriental, the defendant; one black-haired person among light-haired persons; a tall defendant with short men; a youthful defendant with men over 40 years of age. ( United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218, 232 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1160 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 ].) In Foster v. California (1969) 394 U.S. 440 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ], the defendant was nearly 6 feet

1970(People v. Armstrong, 268 Cal.App.2d 324, 326 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Rodriguez, 266 Cal.App.2d 766, 769-770 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 310 ].) No contention is made on appeal that trial counsel’s not making a Wade objection constituted inadequate representation under the doctrine of People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 386 P.2d 487 ], probably due to the appreciation that counsel had a tactical choice to make in that regard.

1970(People v. Armstrong, 268 Cal.App.2d 324, 326 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Rodriguez, 266 Cal.App.2d 766, 769-770 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 310 ].) No contention is made on appeal that trial counsel’s not making a Wade objection constituted inadequate representation under the doctrine of People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 386 P.2d 487 ], probably due to the appreciation that counsel had a tactical choice to make in that regard.

1970(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 711 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 ]; see Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 274 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1187 , 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957 ].) Citing People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 447 P.2d 106 ], defendant’s appellate counsel contends that defendant should have been given separate counsel at the lineup.

1970(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 711 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 ]; see Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 274 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1187 , 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957 ].) Citing People v. Chacon (1968) 69 Cal.2d 765 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 10 , 447 P.2d 106 ], defendant’s appellate counsel contends that defendant should have been given separate counsel at the lineup.

1969Although directed to requested instructions, the warning of People v. Wilson, 66 Cal.2d 749 at p. 763 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 156 , 427 P.2d 820 ], may well be in order: “Doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions should be resolved in favor of the accused. ’ ’ The Attorney' General attempts to excuse the failure to give the instruction on diminished capacity on the theory that since the defendant denied the killing, the instruction was unnecessary.

1969Although directed to requested instructions, the warning of People v. Wilson, 66 Cal.2d 749 at p. 763 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 156 , 427 P.2d 820 ], may well be in order: “Doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions should be resolved in favor of the accused. ’ ’ The Attorney' General attempts to excuse the failure to give the instruction on diminished capacity on the theory that since the defendant denied the killing, the instruction was unnecessary.