8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCall v. PacifiCare of California, Inc.green2 sentences2003Id. at 1193-94; 42 C.F.R. § 405 (g), (h) (providing that a final decision of the Secretary on a claim “arising under” Medicare can be reviewed only in an action brought in federal district court, and then only after exhausting administrative remedies). 2003Id. at 1193-94; 42 C.F.R. § 405 (g), (h) (providing that a final decision of the Secretary on a claim "arising under" Medicare can be reviewed only in an action brought in federal district court, and then only after exhausting administrative remedies). | 2 | 2 |
Illinois Council on Long Term Care v. Millergreen1 sentence2011Council on Long Term Care v. Miller, 579 F.Supp. 1140, 1147 (N.D.Ill.1983) ("This court holds... that implementation of the state's amendment to its reimbursement plan before acceptance by the Secretary was not in violation of federal law."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico, P. C.
green
2 sentences2018(While the secretary may have discretion to choose to hold a hearing even in the absence of a request—a question we need not resolve—it would not be accurate to state that he or she has discretion in granting a hearing where one is requested, because he or she has no choice in the matter.). 13 {41} The primary consideration in construing the statute is the plain meaning of “opportunity for a public hearing.” See Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996- NMSC-035, ¶ 44, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 (“Our understanding of legislative intent is based primarily on the language of the statute, 2018(While the secretary may have discretion to choose to hold a hearing even in the absence of a request—a question we need not resolve—it would not be accurate to state that he or she has discretion in granting a hearing where one is requested, because he or she has no choice in the matter.). 13 {41} The primary consideration in construing the statute is the plain meaning of “opportunity for a public hearing.” See Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996- NMSC-035, ¶ 44, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 (“Our understanding of legislative intent is based primarily on the language of the statute, | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Smith v. City of Santa Fe
green
2 sentences2015“Under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, where relief is available from an administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed.” Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 26 , 142 N.M. 786 , 171 P.3d 300 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 2015“Under the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, where relief is available from an administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed.” Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 26 , 142 N.M. 786 , 171 P.3d 300 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Gallegos v. State
green
1 sentence1993After a bench trial, the federal district court found that Moya-Martinez was not indifferent to Archibeque's rights and dismissed all claims against her. [2] In Silva , the federal district court found that the Secretary and other corrections personnel had "failed to operate by standards and procedures required by the [Duran] [C]onsent [D]ecree." Id. at 473 , 745 P.2d at 381 . [3] Even if Silva could be read as holding that the Secretary's immunity was waived under Section 41-4-6, it would be factually distinguishable from the instant case for the same reason that Castillo is distinguishable. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Silva v. State
green
2 sentences1993Id. at 477-78 , 745 P.2d at 385-86 . 1993After a bench trial, the federal district court found that Moya-Martinez was not indifferent to Archibeque's rights and dismissed all claims against her. [2] In Silva , the federal district court found that the Secretary and other corrections personnel had "failed to operate by standards and procedures required by the [Duran] [C]onsent [D]ecree." Id. at 473 , 745 P.2d at 381 . [3] Even if Silva could be read as holding that the Secretary's immunity was waived under Section 41-4-6, it would be factually distinguishable from the instant case for the same reason that Castillo is distinguishable. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.