blatant violation in New York

2007As to the third and final way a special relationship may be formed, liability founded on a municipality’s assumption of positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant, and dangerous safety violation has been recognized only in rare circumstances, as when a municipality, having actual knowledge of a blatant violation of safety laws, nevertheless provides affirmative assurances of safety on which the injured plaintiff relies (see Garrett v Holiday Inns, supra [town, having actual knowledge of fire and safety law violations, nevertheless affirmatively certified the premises as saf

1979The court declared Runkel and Schuster to be applicable "because of the city’s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and its failure to do anything about it at a time when the inspector was directly on hand as the peril heightened.” ( 28 NY2d 66, 71 , supra.) The court distinguished its earlier opinion in Motyka ( 15 NY2d 134 , supra), where the statutory duty was held not to enure to the benefit of the injured plaintiff.

2007The municipality’s failure to act in the face of a hazard—even a blatantly dangerous one, such as a disabled car stalled in the middle of a highway on a moonless, foggy night—is insufficient, in and of itself, to establish a special relationship under this test (see Pinkney v City of New York, 50 AD2d 928 [1975], affd 40 NY2d 1004 [1976]; see also De La Paz v City of New York, 294 AD2d 327 [2002]).

2007The municipality’s failure to act in the face of a hazard—even a blatantly dangerous one, such as a disabled car stalled in the middle of a highway on a moonless, foggy night—is insufficient, in and of itself, to establish a special relationship under this test (see Pinkney v City of New York, 50 AD2d 928 [1975], affd 40 NY2d 1004 [1976]; see also De La Paz v City of New York, 294 AD2d 327 [2002]).

2007As to the third and final way a special relationship may be formed, liability founded on a municipality’s assumption of positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant, and dangerous safety violation has been recognized only in rare circumstances, as when a municipality, having actual knowledge of a blatant violation of safety laws, nevertheless provides affirmative assurances of safety on which the injured plaintiff relies (see Garrett v Holiday Inns, supra [town, having actual knowledge of fire and safety law violations, nevertheless affirmatively certified the premises as saf

2005Williamson ( 316 US 535, 541 [1942]), in holding that Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act violated the Equal Protection Clause since it applied to perpetrators of certain kinds of larceny and not others, the Court termed the right to marry, along with the right to procreate, among the “basic civil rights of man.” Then, in Loving v Virginia ( 388 US 1 [1967]), the Supreme Court struck down miscegenation laws, which had prohibited marriage between Caucasians and individuals of other races. 2 While the analysis employed in Loving primarily focused upon the invidious racial discriminati

2003In addition, an affidavit of service provided by a process server who attempted to serve Telfort at an address in Brooklyn, stating that the address was Telfort’s “last known residence address” was insufficient to support “nail and mail” service pursuant to CPLR 308 (4) (Gurevitch v Goodman, 269 AD2d 355 [2000]; see Gibson v Salvatore, 102 AD2d 861, 862 [1984]).

1979Agreeing with the cases which held that an inspector’s failure to ascertain the existence of a violation imposed no liability on the city (Young v State of New York, 278 App Div 997 , affd 304 NY 677 ; Infosino v City of New York, 25 AD2d 841 , mot for lv to app den 18 NY2d 583 ; Whitney v City of New York, 27 AD2d 528 ), the court held that here a blatant violation existed and the inspector wrongly adjudged the trench to be safe.

1979Agreeing with the cases which held that an inspector’s failure to ascertain the existence of a violation imposed no liability on the city (Young v State of New York, 278 App Div 997 , affd 304 NY 677 ; Infosino v City of New York, 25 AD2d 841 , mot for lv to app den 18 NY2d 583 ; Whitney v City of New York, 27 AD2d 528 ), the court held that here a blatant violation existed and the inspector wrongly adjudged the trench to be safe.

1979Agreeing with the cases which held that an inspector’s failure to ascertain the existence of a violation imposed no liability on the city (Young v State of New York, 278 App Div 997 , affd 304 NY 677 ; Infosino v City of New York, 25 AD2d 841 , mot for lv to app den 18 NY2d 583 ; Whitney v City of New York, 27 AD2d 528 ), the court held that here a blatant violation existed and the inspector wrongly adjudged the trench to be safe.

1979Agreeing with the cases which held that an inspector’s failure to ascertain the existence of a violation imposed no liability on the city (Young v State of New York, 278 App Div 997 , affd 304 NY 677 ; Infosino v City of New York, 25 AD2d 841 , mot for lv to app den 18 NY2d 583 ; Whitney v City of New York, 27 AD2d 528 ), the court held that here a blatant violation existed and the inspector wrongly adjudged the trench to be safe.

1979The court declared Runkel and Schuster to be applicable "because of the city’s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and its failure to do anything about it at a time when the inspector was directly on hand as the peril heightened.” ( 28 NY2d 66, 71 , supra.) The court distinguished its earlier opinion in Motyka ( 15 NY2d 134 , supra), where the statutory duty was held not to enure to the benefit of the injured plaintiff.

1971In Runkel v. City of New York ( 282 App. Div. 173 ), the city was sued for injuries occurring to children who were playing in a dilapidated house which could be found an inherently dangerous instrumentality.

1969The issue is not whether the guilt of the defendant was demonstrated in spite of the misconduct at the end of the trial, but whether the blatant violation of due process can be tolerated (cf. People v. Mleczko, 298 N. Y. 153, 163 ; People v. Feldt, 26 A D 2d 743, 744).

1964The conduct of the officers in this ease, despite their good intentions, amounted to a blatant violation of Fourth Amendment rights, and I see no alternative but to invoke the exclusionary rule mandated by Mapp ( 367 U. S. 643 , supra) and reverse the defendant’s conviction.