blatant violation (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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blatant violation in Indiana

514 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2026 17 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (66)

CaseFollowedCited
Wilson v. Stategreen
ind · 1987 · cited in 32 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1991–2020
2 sentences

2016To be fundamental error, the error “must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind. 1987).

2015Put another way, “the error ‘must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind. 1987)). [10] Under Indiana Evidence Rule 702, if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1407-CR-318 | Ma

2932
Jewell v. Stategreen
ind · 2008 · cited in 33 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2024
2 sentences

2024Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JC-996 | January 31, 2024 Page 25 of 42 [45] “On rare occasions, appellate courts may analyze an issue under the fundamental error doctrine to examine an otherwise procedurally defaulted claim.” Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d at 1214 . “[T]his review is extremely narrow and ‘available only when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.’” Id. (quoting Jewell v. State,

2021See Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind. 2008) (“[F]undamental error is extremely narrow and available only when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation is so prejudicial to the [defendant’s] rights as to make a fair trial impossible.”).

2333
Mathews v. Stategreen
ind · 2006 · cited in 18 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2025
2 sentences

2025Specifically, the State argues that “[q]uestions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental rights and, as such, may be raised for the first time on appeal, or even by this [C]ourt sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Howell v. State, 97 N.E.3d 253, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied). [20] Under the fundamental error doctrine, we may review an issue raised by a party for the first time on appeal if the alleged error “‘constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’” Halliburton,

2019Specifically, he would have had to show “a blatant violation of basic principles, [that] the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and [that] the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006).

1818
Adrian Durden v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2018 · cited in 24 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2018–2026
2 sentences

2026An error is fundamental error when the error “made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Id. at 652 (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014)).

2025Willoughby v. State, 244 N.E.3d 473 , 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. [18] Indeed, to demonstrate fundamental error, an appellant must show that the alleged error “made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (emphases added; quotation marks omitted).

1624
Benson v. Stategreen
ind · 2002 · cited in 22 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2020
2 sentences

2020To qualify as fundamental error, “an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible” and must “constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). [11] Indiana Evidence Rule 702(a) provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an Court of Appeal

2019To qualify as fundamental error, the " 'error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible' and must 'constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.' " Id. (quoting Benson v. State , 762 N.E.2d 748 , 755 (Ind. 2002) ). [7] In Indiana, a crime may not be proven based solely on a confession.

1622
Maul v. Stategreen
ind · 2000 · cited in 13 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2001–2019
2 sentences

2019To rise to the level of fundamental error, an error “must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (citing Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2000)).

2019To rise to the level of fundamental error, an error “must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. (citing Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2000) (citations omitted)). [8] Shelton contends that the hearsay statements of Dr. Sharma were the centerpiece of the State’s arguments “that [he] failed to take the pain medications so he could be evaluated and that he could work any job,” which he asserts serve as the primary bases upon which the court foun

1213
Townsend v. Stategreen
ind · 1994 · cited in 17 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1995–2009
2 sentences

2009To qualify as 'fundamental error,' the error must be a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Townsend v. State, 632 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ind.1994)).

2009To qualify as `fundamental error,' the error must be a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Townsend v. State, 632 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ind.1994)).

1117
Barany v. Stategreen
ind · 1995 · cited in 11 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1999–2012
2 sentences

2002To constitute fundamental error, the error “ ‘must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.’ ” Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987)); see also Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ind.l995)(defin-ing fundamental error as error “so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible”).

2002To constitute fundamental error, the error "`must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.'" Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987)); see also Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ind.1995) (defining fundamental error as error "so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible").

1111
Randy L. Knapp v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2014 · cited in 13 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026
2 sentences

2026An error is fundamental error when the error “made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Id. at 652 (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014)).

2025“An error is fundamental, and thus reviewable on appeal, if it ‘made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’” Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652 (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted in original).

1013
S.M. v. Elkhart County Office of Family & Childrengreen
indctapp · 1999 · cited in 11 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2020
2 sentences

2006"In order for this court to overturn a trial court ruling based on fundamental error, the error must have been `a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, and the harm or potential for harm therefrom must be substantial and appear clearly and prospectively.'" S.M. v. Elkhart County Office of Family & Children, 706 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Reynolds v. State, 460 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ind. 1984)).

2000To overturn a trial court ruling based on fundamental error, we must conclude that the error was “a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, and the harm or potential for harm therefrom must be substantial and appear clearly and prospectively.” S.M. v. Elkhart County Office of Family and Children, 706 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

1011
Brown v. Stategreen
ind · 2003 · cited in 9 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2020
2 sentences

2014“To constitute fundamental error, the error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind. 2003) (citation and quotations omitted).

2013To constitute fundamental error, “the error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind. 2003). 4 Derry specifically claims that the trial court rejected the plea agreement because it was presented after the plea bargain deadline had expired and fundamental error resulted when the trial court imposed a harsher sentence than the one-year sentence on work release that the State had recommended.

99
Spears v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2004 · cited in 8 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2006–2017
2 sentences

2017To be considered fundamental error, an error must “constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm, or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Spears v. State, 811 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 2 Over eighteen months elapsed between the filing of the charging information and the start of his jury trial.

2016To be considered fundamental, an error “ ‘must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm, or potential for harm must be substantial, and the re- *1202 suiting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.”’ Id. at 210-11 (quoting Spears v. State, 811 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind.Ct.App.2004)).

88
Lehman v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2010 · cited in 10 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2020
2 sentences

2020Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

2019Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

710
Davis v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2005 · cited in 7 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2007–2017
2 sentences

2014A party’s failure to object at trial results in waiver, unless error is fundamental, i.e. “a blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair.” Davis v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans denied.

2013First, we note that a party's failure to object at trial results in waiver, unless error is fundamental, i.e. “a blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair.” Davis v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

77
Hart v. Stategreen
ind · 1991 · cited in 10 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1992–2009
2 sentences

2009To be fundamental, an error must be "a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant." Id. (quoting Hart v. State, 578 N.E.2d 336, 337 (Ind.1991)).

2008To qualify as ‘fundamental error,’ the error must be a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Hart v. State, 578 N.E.2d 336, 337 (Ind.1991)).

610
Reginald Harris v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2017 · cited in 9 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2020
2 sentences

2020See Hall v. State, 108 N.E.3d 351, 355 (Ind. Ct App. 2018). [25] To prove fundamental error, one must “‘show that the trial court should have raised the issue sua sponte due to a blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, undeniable harm or potential for harm, and prejudice that makes a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1112 | August 31, 2020 Page 13 of 29 fair trial impossible.’” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 162 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Harris v. State, 76 N.E.3d 137, 140 (Ind. 2017)).

2018To prove fundamental error, Shoaf must “‘show that the trial court should have raised the issue sua sponte due to a blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, undeniable harm or potential for harm, and prejudice that makes a fair trial impossible.’” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 162 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Harris v. State, 76 N.E.3d 137, 140 (Ind. 2017)).

69
Charlton v. Stategreen
ind · 1998 · cited in 9 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1999–2007
2 sentences

2001In Charlton v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (Ind.1998), the court stated: Fundamental error is a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant and, thereby, depriving the defendant of fundamental due process.

2001“Fundamental error is a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant and, thereby, depriving the defendant of fundamental due process.” Id.

69
Daniel Brewington v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2014 · cited in 7 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2019
2 sentences

2019Fundamental error allows us to “address an error that made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm[.]” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

2019Fundamental error allows this court to “address an error that made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm[.]” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotations and alterations omitted), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 970 (2015).

67
Pope v. Stategreen
ind · 2000 · cited in 6 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2020
2 sentences

2020Pope v. State, 737 N.E.2d 374, 380 (Ind. 2000).

2017Pope v. State, 737 N.E.2d 374, 380 (Ind. 2000).

66
Whiting v. Stategreen
ind · 2012 · cited in 6 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2025
2 sentences

2025However, our Supreme Court declined to extend the fundamental-error exception to procedural defaults under the exhaustion rule, as doing so would “both weaken the exhaustion rule and utilize fundamental error not as a ‘narrow exception’ but as Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2330 | May 15, 2025 Page 7 of 12 the general rule.” Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012).

2020For an appellate court to overturn a trial court ruling based on fundamental error, “‘the error [must have been] so egregious and abhorrent to fundamental due process that the trial judge should or should not have acted, irrespective of the parties’ failure to object or otherwise preserve the error for appeal.’” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158 , 1167 n.8 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012)). [21] Here, Father has failed to identify the harm that made a fair hearing impossible.

56
Boatright v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 6 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2003–2019
56
Ford v. Stategreen
ind · 1998 · cited in 5 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2016
55
Reynolds v. Stategreen
ind · 1984 · cited in 8 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1985–2019
2 sentences

2006"In order for this court to overturn a trial court ruling based on fundamental error, the error must have been `a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, and the harm or potential for harm therefrom must be substantial and appear clearly and prospectively.'" S.M. v. Elkhart County Office of Family & Children, 706 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Reynolds v. State, 460 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ind. 1984)).

1999In order for this court to overturn a trial court ruling based on fundamental error, the error must have been “a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, and the harm or potential for harm therefrom must be substantial and appear clearly and prospectively.” Reynolds v. State, 460 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ind.1984) (emphasis added).

48
James v. Stategreen
ind · 1993 · cited in 7 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1993–2019
2 sentences

2019Fundamental error is “a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, and the harm or potential for harm therefrom must be substantial and apparent.” James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind. 1993).

2017To be “fundamental,” error must be “a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, and the harm or potential for harm therefrom must be substantial and apparent.” James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind. 1993).

47
Carden v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2007 · cited in 5 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2013–2020
45
Carltez Taylor v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2017 · cited in 5 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2018–2020
45
Brown v. Stategreen
ind · 1998 · cited in 5 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2018
45
Warriner v. Stategreen
ind · 1982 · cited in 5 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1985–2016
45
Ritchie v. Stategreen
ind · 2004 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2013–2018
44
Etienne v. Stategreen
ind · 1999 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2012
44
Baker v. Stategreen
ind · 2011 · cited in 12 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2018
2 sentences

2014As noted above, to be considered “fundamental,” the error must represent a blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant and “thereby depriving the defendant of fundamental due process.” Id. at 1178 .

2013To be considered “fundamental,” the error must represent a blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant and “thereby depriving the defendant of fundamental due process.” Id. at 1178 .

312
Bruce Ryan v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2014 · cited in 11 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2024
2 sentences

2020Id. at 668 . [22] To show prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that the alleged misconduct (1) constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process; (2) presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm; and (3) made a fair trial impossible.

2017Stated another way, the defendant must show that, given the circumstances, the trial court erred when it did not raise the issue sua sponte because the alleged error was a blatant violation of due process and presented “an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Id. [13] Our Supreme Court has cautioned against the use of show-up identifications because of their inherent suggestiveness, see Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Ind. 1990), but identification evidence gathered via a show-up procedure is “not subject to a per se rule of exclusion[,]” Gordon, 981 N.E.2d at 1218 .

311
Brown v. Stategreen
ind · 2010 · cited in 11 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2023
2 sentences

2023The fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous-objection requirement applies only “when the error Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-917| April 24, 2023 Page 12 of 17 constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quotation omitted).

2012Nothing in this issue is “a blatant violation of basic principles,” or shows 4 that “the harm or potential for harm is substantial.” Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 207 .

311
Mitchell v. Stategreen
ind · 2000 · cited in 8 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2001–2018
2 sentences

2018He therefore argues that the admission of the messages constituted fundamental error. [7] To qualify as fundamental error, “an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Ind. 2000). “[T]he error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. [8] Hauk argues that the text messages constitute inadmissible hearsay, and the State does not disagree.

2018He therefore argues that the admission of the messages constituted fundamental error. [7] To qualify as fundamental error, “an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 (Ind. 2000). “[T]he error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. [8] Hauk argues that the text messages constitute inadmissible hearsay, and the State does not disagree.

38
Absher v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2007 · cited in 6 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2013–2019
36
Delmar Kelly v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2019 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2019–2024
34
Commitment of A.L. v. Wishard Health Services, Midtown Community Mental Health Centergreen
indctapp · 2010 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024
34
Marquise Lee v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2015 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2023
34
Geiger v. Stategreen
indctapp · 1999 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2001–2013
34
Matter of Commitment of Gerkegreen
indctapp · 1998 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2010–2024
33

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
Willey v. State green
ind · 1999
52001–2015
Bryan Gavin v. State of Indiana green
indctapp · 2015
42017–2018
Ward v. State green
ind · 1988
41993–1995
Phillips v. State green
ind · 1978
41978–1985
Howard v. State green
indctapp · 2004
32005–2018
Perez v. State green
indctapp · 2007
32010–2016
Sandifur v. State green
indctapp · 2004
32007–2012
Ried v. State green
indctapp · 1993
31994–1995
Ried v. State green
ind · 1993
31994–1995
Reynolds v. State green
indctapp · 1989
31990–1993
Nelson v. State green
ind · 1980
31985–1990
Burkes v. State green
ind · 1983
31985–1988
Cutter v. State green
ind · 2000
22018–2019
Lewis v. United States green
scotus · 2015
22019–2019

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (75) IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (51) IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (30) IN § Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (28) IN § Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (23) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (23) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 (21) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5 (20) IN § Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2 (19) IN § Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 (19) IN § Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (17) IN § Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2 (16)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IN 514 (1970–2026) CA 10 (1978–2026) NY 8 (1964–2007) WA 8 (1982–2024) NJ 6 (1991–2021) IL 4 (1996–2020) PA 4 (1977–2024) HI 2 (2007–2009) TX 2 (2015–2015) AZ 2 (1989–2026) NM 2 (2025–2025) OH 2 (1999–2004) LA 2 (2001–2001) SD 2 (2001–2024) GA 2 (1999–2001) MS 2 (2000–2006)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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