consideration of the statutory factors in New York

2018Where, as here, such claim is untimely, "[t]he Court of Claims is vested with broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for permission to file a late claim following the consideration of the statutory factors enumerated in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6)" ( Matter of Robinson v State of New York , 35 AD3d 948, 949 [2006]; see Matter of Martinez v State of New York , 62 AD3d [*2]1225, 1226 [2009]), and "its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion" ( Matter of Barnes v State of New York , 158 AD3d 961 , 962 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2008“The Court of Claims is vested with broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for permission to file a late claim following the consideration of the statutory factors enumerated in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6)” (Matter of Gonzalez v State of New York, 299 AD2d 675, 675 [2002] [citation omitted]; accord Matter of Robinson v State of New York, 35 AD3d 948, 949 [2006]).

2008“The Court of Claims is vested with broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for permission to file a late claim following the consideration of the statutory factors enumerated in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6)” (Matter of Gonzalez v State of New York, 299 AD2d 675, 675 [2002] [citation omitted]; accord Matter of Robinson v State of New York, 35 AD3d 948, 949 [2006]).

2006“The Court of Claims is vested with broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for permission to file a late claim following the consideration of the statutory factors enumerated in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6)” (Matter of Gonzalez v State of New York, 299 AD2d 675, 675 [2002] [citation omitted]).

2008While no single statutory factor is considered controlling, the denial of an application will not be disturbed where “the excuse offered for the delay is inadequate and the proposed claim is of questionable merit” (Matter of Gonzalez v State of New York, 299 AD2d at 675 ; see Matter of P.A. v State of New York, 277 AD2d 671, 672 [2000]).

2002The Court of Claims is vested with broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for permission to file a late claim following the consideration of the statutory factors enumerated in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) (see Matter of P.A. v State of New York, 277 AD2d 671, 672 ).

2006This Court has declined to disturb the denial of such an application where “the excuse offered for the delay is inadequate and the proposed claim is of questionable merit” (Matter of Perez v State of New York, 293 AD2d 918, 919 [2002]; see Matter of Brown v State of New York, 6 AD3d 756, 757 [2004]).

2002Indeed, this Court has held that the denial of such an application will not be disturbed “when the excuse offered for the delay is inadequate and the proposed claim is of questionable merit” (Matter of Perez v State of New York, 293 AD2d 918, 919 ).

2025"Where, as here, such claim is untimely, the Court of Claims is vested with broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for permission to file a late claim following the consideration of the statutory factors enumerated in Court of Claims Act § 10 (6), and its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion" ( Matter of Barnes v State of New York , 161 AD3d at 1325-1326 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Langner v State of New York , 65 AD3d 780, 782-783 [3d Dept 2009]).

2018No single statutory factor is deemed controlling ( see id. ; Matter of Thomas v State of New York , 272 AD2d 650, 651 [2000]).

2006This Court has declined to disturb the denial of such an application where “the excuse offered for the delay is inadequate and the proposed claim is of questionable merit” (Matter of Perez v State of New York, 293 AD2d 918, 919 [2002]; see Matter of Brown v State of New York, 6 AD3d 756, 757 [2004]).

1994In reviewing the statute as a whole and noting that user unit systems have been found to be acceptable methods of allocating rents, "[t]he fact that the occupancy or use of a particular property, on occasion, might result in a disproportionate cost compared to that of other properties does not compel the conclusion that the 'user unit’ classification is irrational or inequitable” (Arcuri v Village of Remsen, 202 AD2d 991, 992). "[T]here is no irrationality in the assumption, for example, that a two-family dwelling unit will produce twice the sewage of a one-family dwelling unit” (supra, at 992

1994In reviewing the statute as a whole and noting that user unit systems have been found to be acceptable methods of allocating rents, "[t]he fact that the occupancy or use of a particular property, on occasion, might result in a disproportionate cost compared to that of other properties does not compel the conclusion that the 'user unit’ classification is irrational or inequitable” (Arcuri v Village of Remsen, 202 AD2d 991, 992). "[T]here is no irrationality in the assumption, for example, that a two-family dwelling unit will produce twice the sewage of a one-family dwelling unit” (supra, at 992

1994In reviewing the statute as a whole and noting that user unit systems have been found to be acceptable methods of allocating rents, "[t]he fact that the occupancy or use of a particular property, on occasion, might result in a disproportionate cost compared to that of other properties does not compel the conclusion that the 'user unit’ classification is irrational or inequitable” (Arcuri v Village of Remsen, 202 AD2d 991, 992). "[T]here is no irrationality in the assumption, for example, that a two-family dwelling unit will produce twice the sewage of a one-family dwelling unit” (supra, at 992