Jones Act claim in New York

2014Servs., 96 AD3d 1186 , 1189 n [2012]; Crepin v Fogarty, 59 AD3d 837, 838 [2009]).

2014Servs., 96 AD3d 1186 , 1189 n [2012]; Crepin v Fogarty, 59 AD3d 837, 838 [2009]).

2014Pludeman v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 NY3d 486, 492-493 [2008]; Banc of Am.

2014Pludeman v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 NY3d 486, 492-493 [2008]; Banc of Am.

2019Although the Court did not, in that regard, expressly state that it was treating the Jones Act claim as one “in admiralty,” it did state that “the Jones Act is to have a uniform application throughout the country, unaffected by ‘local views of common law rules,’” (id. at 244 [citing Panama Railroad Co. v Johnson, 264 US 375, 392 [1924]).

2019Although the Court did not, in that regard, expressly state that it was treating the Jones Act claim as one “in admiralty,” it did state that “the Jones Act is to have a uniform application throughout the country, unaffected by ‘local views of common law rules,’” (id. at 244 [citing Panama Railroad Co. v Johnson, 264 US 375, 392 [1924]).

2009Mindful that “the question of causation in a Jones Act claim turns on whether the acts or omissions of [defendants] contributed to [plaintiffs] injury in even the slightest degree” (id. at 161), we conclude that plaintiffs established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on liability, thereby shifting the burden to defendants to demonstrate the existence of material questions of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2009Mindful that “the question of causation in a Jones Act claim turns on whether the acts or omissions of [defendants] contributed to [plaintiffs] injury in even the slightest degree” (id. at 161), we conclude that plaintiffs established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on liability, thereby shifting the burden to defendants to demonstrate the existence of material questions of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2009Mindful that “the question of causation in a Jones Act claim turns on whether the acts or omissions of [defendants] contributed to [plaintiffs] injury in even the slightest degree” (id. at 161), we conclude that plaintiffs established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on liability, thereby shifting the burden to defendants to demonstrate the existence of material questions of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2009Mindful that “the question of causation in a Jones Act claim turns on whether the acts or omissions of [defendants] contributed to [plaintiffs] injury in even the slightest degree” (id. at 161), we conclude that plaintiffs established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on liability, thereby shifting the burden to defendants to demonstrate the existence of material questions of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2007Plaintiff was not precluded from bringing a Jones Act claim by reason of the fact that he had commenced this action after resolution of his LHWCA claim against defendant (see Southwest Marine, Inc. v Gizoni, 502 US 81, 91 [1991]; cf. Mooney v City of New York, 219 F3d 123, 131 [2d Cir 2000], cert denied 531 US 1145 [2001] [even “a formal award that gives the claimant no more than payments that are analogous to maintenance and cure will not be deemed to settle all of the seaman’s claims and will not bar a Jones Act suit”]).

2007Plaintiff was not precluded from bringing a Jones Act claim by reason of the fact that he had commenced this action after resolution of his LHWCA claim against defendant (see Southwest Marine, Inc. v Gizoni, 502 US 81, 91 [1991]; cf. Mooney v City of New York, 219 F3d 123, 131 [2d Cir 2000], cert denied 531 US 1145 [2001] [even “a formal award that gives the claimant no more than payments that are analogous to maintenance and cure will not be deemed to settle all of the seaman’s claims and will not bar a Jones Act suit”]).

2007Plaintiff was not precluded from bringing a Jones Act claim by reason of the fact that he had commenced this action after resolution of his LHWCA claim against defendant (see Southwest Marine, Inc. v Gizoni, 502 US 81, 91 [1991]; cf. Mooney v City of New York, 219 F3d 123, 131 [2d Cir 2000], cert denied 531 US 1145 [2001] [even “a formal award that gives the claimant no more than payments that are analogous to maintenance and cure will not be deemed to settle all of the seaman’s claims and will not bar a Jones Act suit”]).

2007Plaintiff was not precluded from bringing a Jones Act claim by reason of the fact that he had commenced this action after resolution of his LHWCA claim against defendant (see Southwest Marine, Inc. v Gizoni, 502 US 81, 91 [1991]; cf. Mooney v City of New York, 219 F3d 123, 131 [2d Cir 2000], cert denied 531 US 1145 [2001] [even “a formal award that gives the claimant no more than payments that are analogous to maintenance and cure will not be deemed to settle all of the seaman’s claims and will not bar a Jones Act suit”]).

2000The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed an order which (1) dismissed the Jones Act claim as time barred, and (2) struck the plaintiff’s jury demand for the “remaining maritime cause of action, based upon a claim of unseaworthiness” (Public Adm’r v Gibson & Cushman, supra, at 402).

2000The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed an order which (1) dismissed the Jones Act claim as time barred, and (2) struck the plaintiff’s jury demand for the “remaining maritime cause of action, based upon a claim of unseaworthiness” (Public Adm’r v Gibson & Cushman, supra, at 402).