Porter motion in Ohio

2002Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 558 , 653 N.E.2d 366 (after appeal was dismissed, trial court had jurisdiction to rule on previously filed Civ.R. 60[B] motion); Pegan v. Crawmer (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 103 , 666 N.E.2d 1091 (domestic relations court could proceed with hearing and custody determination on second postjudgment motion to modify custody after the court of appeals had resolved the appeal concerning the dismissal of the first motion).

2002Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 558 , 653 N.E.2d 366 (after appeal was dismissed, trial court had jurisdiction to rule on previously filed Civ.R. 60[B] motion); Pegan v. Crawmer (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 103 , 666 N.E.2d 1091 (domestic relations court could proceed with hearing and custody determination on second postjudgment motion to modify custody after the court of appeals had resolved the appeal concerning the dismissal of the first motion).

2002Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 558 , 653 N.E.2d 366 (after appeal was dismissed, trial court had jurisdiction to rule on previously filed Civ.R. 60[B] motion); Pegan v. Crawmer (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 103 , 666 N.E.2d 1091 (domestic relations court could proceed with hearing and custody determination on second postjudgment motion to modify custody after the court of appeals had resolved the appeal concerning the dismissal of the first motion).

2002Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 558 , 653 N.E.2d 366 (after appeal was dismissed, trial court had jurisdiction to rule on previously filed Civ.R. 60[B] motion); Pegan v. Crawmer (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 103 , 666 N.E.2d 1091 (domestic relations court could proceed with hearing and custody determination on second postjudgment motion to modify custody after the court of appeals had resolved the appeal concerning the dismissal of the first motion).

2002Neff v. Corrigan (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 12, 16 , 661 N.E.2d 170 (“even if the attorney fees matter had been raised in the prior appeals, once those appeals were dismissed, Judge Corrigan possessed jurisdiction to consider Porter’s motion”); State ex rel.

2002Neff v. Corrigan (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 12, 16 , 661 N.E.2d 170 (“even if the attorney fees matter had been raised in the prior appeals, once those appeals were dismissed, Judge Corrigan possessed jurisdiction to consider Porter’s motion”); State ex rel.

2019Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2019 AP 03 0010 8 {¶18} In his brief, Appellant cites State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59 , 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984), in support of his position Officer Porter’s detention of him exceeded the constitutionally permissible scope.

2019Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2019 AP 03 0010 8 {¶18} In his brief, Appellant cites State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59 , 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984), in support of his position Officer Porter’s detention of him exceeded the constitutionally permissible scope.

2008The ground for Porter's motion was that his sentence violated the *Page 3 United States Supreme Court's holding in Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296 . 1 The trial court denied Porter's motion. {¶ 8} On August 10, 2006, Porter filed a pro se motion for delayed appeal.

2008GRENDELL, P.J., MARY JANE TRAPP, J., concur. 1 We note that Porter's motion for postconviction relief was filed prior to the Supreme Court of Ohio's announcement of its decision in State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 . *Page 1

2004(C.A.D.C. 1981), 663 F.2d 253 , 268-269 , certiorari denied 455 U.S. 928 , 102 S.Ct. 1293 ("[i]t is well established that the law does not look to a conspiracy in a vacuum to determine injury, but instead looks to overt acts of the conspiracy to determine whether it caused any injury"). {¶ 78} Here, because the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Reed pertaining to Porter's claim of a fraudulent transfer between Saez and Reed, and in this appeal Porter has not contested this determination by the trial court, see paragraph 54, supra, we therefore conclude no fraudulent transfer occ

2004(C.A.D.C. 1981), 663 F.2d 253 , 268-269 , certiorari denied 455 U.S. 928 , 102 S.Ct. 1293 ("[i]t is well established that the law does not look to a conspiracy in a vacuum to determine injury, but instead looks to overt acts of the conspiracy to determine whether it caused any injury"). {¶ 78} Here, because the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Reed pertaining to Porter's claim of a fraudulent transfer between Saez and Reed, and in this appeal Porter has not contested this determination by the trial court, see paragraph 54, supra, we therefore conclude no fraudulent transfer occ

2004(C.A.D.C. 1981), 663 F.2d 253 , 268-269 , certiorari denied 455 U.S. 928 , 102 S.Ct. 1293 ("[i]t is well established that the law does not look to a conspiracy in a vacuum to determine injury, but instead looks to overt acts of the conspiracy to determine whether it caused any injury"). {¶ 78} Here, because the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Reed pertaining to Porter's claim of a fraudulent transfer between Saez and Reed, and in this appeal Porter has not contested this determination by the trial court, see paragraph 54, supra, we therefore conclude no fraudulent transfer occ

2004"App.R. 26 provides a mechanism by which a party may prevent miscarriages of justice that could arise when an appellate court makes an obvious error or renders an unsupportable decision under the law." State v. Owens (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 334 , 336 , dismissed, appeal not allowed, 77 Ohio St.3d 1487 . {¶ 3} In Matthews v. Matthews (1981), 5 Ohio App.3d 140 , 143 , this court stated that "App.R. 26 * * * includes no guidelines to be used in the determination of whether a decision is to be reconsidered and changed.

2004"App.R. 26 provides a mechanism by which a party may prevent miscarriages of justice that could arise when an appellate court makes an obvious error or renders an unsupportable decision under the law." State v. Owens (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 334 , 336 , dismissed, appeal not allowed, 77 Ohio St.3d 1487 . {¶ 3} In Matthews v. Matthews (1981), 5 Ohio App.3d 140 , 143 , this court stated that "App.R. 26 * * * includes no guidelines to be used in the determination of whether a decision is to be reconsidered and changed.

1996Enyart v. O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655 , 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 . {¶ 14} Appellant contends that Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to consider Porter’s motion to withdraw consent of the beneficiaries to the Borgh estate to attorney fees paid to appellant.

1996Enyart v. O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655 , 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 . {¶ 14} Appellant contends that Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to consider Porter’s motion to withdraw consent of the beneficiaries to the Borgh estate to attorney fees paid to appellant.

1974C. 2945.59,. *72 While we are satisfied that upon the particular facts of this ease, where the nature of the defense and defendants own testimony made his credibility the major issue, the Ohio rule permits the type of limited rebuttal response actually made by the state and that no error prejudicial to defendant intervened, yet we are not to be read as condoning flanking attacks on State v. Hector, supra. The state should understand that it always embarks upon this course at its peril, and the moment the impeachment process by evidence of prior or subsequent offenses passes the fine line separ