Porter claim in California

2025The general size, weight, and usage of a baseball bat are common knowledge, and prosecutors are permitted to make “comments drawn from common experience, history, or literature.” (Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 742 .) Porter also asserts that the prosecutor’s argument “evok[ed] disturbing images of baseball bats being wielded” by mobs but fails to offer any explanation for this argument.

2025They also contend Porter’s interpretation is contrary to legislative intent, as section 23123.5(a) was enacted to mitigate distracted driving stemming from technological advances in wireless telephones and in response to the court’s decision in Spriggs, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 150 .

2025They also contend Porter’s interpretation is contrary to legislative intent, as section 23123.5(a) was enacted to mitigate distracted driving stemming from technological advances in wireless telephones and in response to the court’s decision in Spriggs, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 150 .

2023As shown by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Curiel, the mental state required for that theory, as established in its earlier decision in People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 (McCoy), remains the law after the enactment of Senate Bill 1437. ( Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 63–68; see also, Berry-Vierwinden, supra, [2023 Cal. Lexis 943 at pp. *19-*20 [“After the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in McCoy, it was unmistakable that a direct aider and abettor’s ‘mental state is her own; she is liable for her mens rea, not the other person’s.’ ”].) Porter has therefore failed to refute our conclusio

2023As shown by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Curiel, the mental state required for that theory, as established in its earlier decision in People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 (McCoy), remains the law after the enactment of Senate Bill 1437. ( Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 63–68; see also, Berry-Vierwinden, supra, [2023 Cal. Lexis 943 at pp. *19-*20 [“After the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in McCoy, it was unmistakable that a direct aider and abettor’s ‘mental state is her own; she is liable for her mens rea, not the other person’s.’ ”].) Porter has therefore failed to refute our conclusio

2014Ross v. California (1968) 391 U.S. 470 [bringing defendant handcuffed into courtroom in jury’s presence had “no harmful effect . . . since the jury knew defendant was in custody”].) Because the jurors’ potential brief observation of Porter in restraints and jail clothing outside the courtroom was not likely to have created any significant prejudice, and because the court’s custody instruction was sufficient to alleviate any potential prejudice, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Porter’s motion for a mistrial.10 (See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 434 [denial of mistrial

2014(Cf. Stevens, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 638 [“ ‘jurors are quite aware that the defendant appearing before them did not arrive there by choice or happenstance’ ”].) As to Porter’s claim of instructional error, the Court of Appeal in Jacobs rejected the argument that a sua sponte instruction on restraints is required when jurors briefly observe a defendant being transported to court in restraints. ( Jacobs, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1140–1141.) The Jacobs court reasoned that the rationale behind the sua sponte instruction requirement was “to alleviate the potential prejudice arising from the n

2014(See Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 596 [standard for implied malice]; Butler, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1008–1009 [same].) It is not reasonably probable that anything in Dr. Podboy’s testimony (based on the contents of his report) would have altered the conclusion Porter acted with express or implied malice and thus was guilty of murder.

1971The Supreme Court’s characterization of the witness’ testimony in Green is equally applicable to that of Mischell Hutchinson: “A dispassionate appraisal of the foregoing testimony, which we previously characterized as ‘markedly evasive and uncooperative’ [citation], leads to but one conclusion: the trial court could properly disbelieve Porter’s claim that he no longer remembered . ...” (People v. Green, supra, 3 Cal.3d 981, 987 .) Appellants Offered No Evidence to Establish That the District Attorney Excluded Black People From Their Jury Solely Upon the Basis of Race.

1971Porter replied, “Mostly my testimony, I guess.” When counsel asked if he was still unsure of what happened after defendant’s phone call, Porter claimed that “I’m not positive now.” Counsel also caused Porter to testify that taking LSD made him hallucinate and that the effect lasts from 12 to 14 hours; yet when pressed on the point by the court, Porter also claimed that apart from the LSD “I have always had a not very good memory.” A dispassionate appraisal of the foregoing testimony, which we previously characterized as “markedly evasive and uncooperative” ( 70 Cal.2d at p. 657 ), leads to but

1965Contrary to Porter’s claim, the foregoing conclusions reached by us are not in conflict with our holding in Cahill Bros, or the conclusion arrived at in Horn & Barker, Inc. v. Macco Corp. (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 96 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 320 ], which followed Cahill Bros.

1965Contrary to Porter’s claim, the foregoing conclusions reached by us are not in conflict with our holding in Cahill Bros, or the conclusion arrived at in Horn & Barker, Inc. v. Macco Corp. (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 96 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 320 ], which followed Cahill Bros.

1965This was in accord with Porter’s motion that “Concurrently only with the dismissal of said action” against Porter, the court “dismiss its Cross-Complaint and its Amended Cross-Complaint on the ground that the issues therein pleaded will have become moot.” On May 9, 1960, the summary judgment was affirmed on appeal by this court in Nizuk v. Gorges (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 699 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]. 7 On September 19, 1960, counsel representing Great Western of Oakland and Great Western of San Francisco in action No. 464221 demanded in writing that Porter “appear for and defend them in the said litig

1965This was in accord with Porter’s motion that “Concurrently only with the dismissal of said action” against Porter, the court “dismiss its Cross-Complaint and its Amended Cross-Complaint on the ground that the issues therein pleaded will have become moot.” On May 9, 1960, the summary judgment was affirmed on appeal by this court in Nizuk v. Gorges (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 699 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]. 7 On September 19, 1960, counsel representing Great Western of Oakland and Great Western of San Francisco in action No. 464221 demanded in writing that Porter “appear for and defend them in the said litig