Watkins motion in Ohio

2025Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 2019-Ohio-1329 , in which we observed that a writ of prohibition may be issued when a judge having general jurisdiction takes an action that exceeds the bounds of the court’s statutory authority because a particular statute patently and unambiguously has divested the court of jurisdiction over that matter, id. at ¶ 13.

2025Novak, L.L.P. v. Ambrose, 2019-Ohio-1329, in which we observed that a writ of prohibition 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO may be issued when a judge having general jurisdiction takes an action that exceeds the bounds of the court’s statutory authority because a particular statute patently and unambiguously has divested the court of jurisdiction over that matter, id. at ¶ 13.

2021Butler No. CA2019-02-037, 2019-Ohio-4515, ¶ 15 , quoting State v. Woltz, 4th Dist.

2021This is because, contrary to Watkins' assertions otherwise, it is well-established that "[a] defendant is bound by his counsel's waiver of speedy trial rights, even though the waiver might have been executed without his consent." State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2002-Ohio-7017, ¶ 33 ; see also State v. McBreen, 54 Ohio St.2d 315, 319 (1978) (trial counsel has "the authority to execute the waivers of time provisions for the purpose of trial preparation" even absent the defendant's approval); State v. Vaughn, 106 Ohio App.3d 775, 786 (12th -8- Preble CA2020-03-005 Dist.1995) ("speedy-trial wa

2021This is because, contrary to Watkins' assertions otherwise, it is well-established that "[a] defendant is bound by his counsel's waiver of speedy trial rights, even though the waiver might have been executed without his consent." State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2002-Ohio-7017, ¶ 33 ; see also State v. McBreen, 54 Ohio St.2d 315, 319 (1978) (trial counsel has "the authority to execute the waivers of time provisions for the purpose of trial preparation" even absent the defendant's approval); State v. Vaughn, 106 Ohio App.3d 775, 786 (12th -8- Preble CA2020-03-005 Dist.1995) ("speedy-trial wa

2020Id. {¶ 52} Allstate argued Watkins misrepresented the value of his personal property on the inventory of destroyed property, and this misrepresentation provided a valid basis to deny Watkins’ claim in its entirety under the policy’s fraud provision.

2020Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 164 , 656 N.E.2d 1288 (1995). 27. {¶ 50} Neither Allstate nor Watkins challenge the validity of the nunc pro tunc entry.

2020Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 164 , 656 N.E.2d 1288 (1995). 27. {¶ 50} Neither Allstate nor Watkins challenge the validity of the nunc pro tunc entry.

2020Lucas No. L-13-1163, 2013-Ohio-5625 at ¶ 24, citing Zoppo, 71 Ohio St.3d 552 , at paragraph one of the syllabus {¶ 67} In conducting our own review of the record, and construing that evidence most favorably for Watkins, we find the testimony of Watkins, Price and Miller-Rankin clearly demonstrated issues of fact regarding Allstate’s claim of reasonable justification in denying Watkins’ claim for dwelling coverage and personal property coverage.

2020(Citation omitted.) Reece, 2004-Ohio-5668, ¶ 30 . {¶ 75} Having thoroughly reviewed the evidence proffered by Allstate in support of its summary judgment motion as to bad faith, we find genuine issues of fact remain regarding reasonable justification to deny Watkins’ claim for coverage for his personal property and dwelling.

2018Specifically, Watkins claims the trial court "[did n]ot consider * * * youth as a factor in its sentence * * *, constitut[ing] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of [Watkins'] rights established under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and violat[ing] Ohio's sentencing statutes to wit: R.C. 2929.11 [thru 2929].14." {¶ 48} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) sets forth the standard of review for all felony sentences. - 16 - Clermont CA2017-03-013 State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1 ; accord State v. Crawford, 12th Dist.

2018Specifically, Watkins claims the trial court "[did n]ot consider * * * youth as a factor in its sentence * * *, constitut[ing] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of [Watkins'] rights established under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and violat[ing] Ohio's sentencing statutes to wit: R.C. 2929.11 [thru 2929].14." {¶ 48} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) sets forth the standard of review for all felony sentences. - 16 - Clermont CA2017-03-013 State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1 ; accord State v. Crawford, 12th Dist.

2018Montgomery No. 20226, 2005-Ohio-6546, ¶ 8 ; State v. Whiteside, 6 Ohio App.3d 30, 37 (3d Dist.1982). {¶ 43} Therefore, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to review the juvenile court's bindover order for error – constitutional or otherwise – it did not err in denying Watkins' motion to withdraw his pleas of no contest to provide time for such review. {¶ 44} Accordingly, Watkins' fifth assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 45} Assignment of Error No. 4: {¶ 46} THE TRIAL COURT'S SENTENCE ORDERING DEFENDANT TO SERVE TWO CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF FOUR YEARS VIOLATES DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UND

2018We find no merit to Watkins' claims. -4- Butler CA2017-05-066 {¶ 12} Initially, as it relates to Watkins' claim that the trial court improperly recast his motion as a petition for postconviction relief, it is now well-established that "[c]ourts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged." State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2008- Ohio-545, ¶ 12.

2012An abuse of discretion “‘implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the following facts can be considered when determining whether a continuance should have been granted: “the length of delay requested, prior continuances, inconvenience, the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant contributed to the delay, and other relevant factors.” State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107

2012An abuse of discretion “‘implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the following facts can be considered when determining whether a continuance should have been granted: “the length of delay requested, prior continuances, inconvenience, the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant contributed to the delay, and other relevant factors.” State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107

2012An abuse of discretion “‘implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the following facts can be considered when determining whether a continuance should have been granted: “the length of delay requested, prior continuances, inconvenience, the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant contributed to the delay, and other relevant factors.” State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107

2012An abuse of discretion “‘implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the following facts can be considered when determining whether a continuance should have been granted: “the length of delay requested, prior continuances, inconvenience, the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant contributed to the delay, and other relevant factors.” State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 107

2008Id. at 321-22 (citing Anted v. Olde Worlde Products Inc. , 9 Ohio St. 3d 144 , 147 (1984)).

2008Mannion v. Sandel , 91 Ohio St. 3d 318 , 321 (2001). {¶ 13} This Court must first determine whether the trial court's order denying Ms. Watkins's motion for new trial is specific enough to permit a determination of whether it abused its discretion.

2008Id. at 321-22 (citing Anted v. Olde Worlde Products Inc. , 9 Ohio St. 3d 144 , 147 (1984)).