habeas corpus challenge in Tennessee

2018“Use of the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction long after the sentence on the original conviction has expired.” Id. at 23 .

2018The petitioner’s sentence for the challenged convictions has been served and has expired, and the “[u]se of the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tenn. 2004).

2013The court in Hickman concluded that “when the restraint on a petitioner’s liberty is merely a collateral consequence of the challenged judgment, habeas corpus is not an appropriate avenue for seeking relief.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 (“Use of the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction long after the sentence on the original conviction has expired.”); see also Benson, 153 S.W.3d at 32 .

2011The court in Hickman concluded that “when the restraint on a petitioner’s liberty is merely a collateral consequence of the challenged judgment, habeas corpus is not an appropriate avenue for seeking relief.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 (“Use of the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction long after the sentence on the original conviction has expired.”); see also Benson, 153 S.W.3d at 32 ; May v. Carlton, Warden, 245 S.W.3d 340, 353 (Tenn. 2008).

2011The court in Hickman concluded that “when the restraint on a petitioner’s liberty is merely a collateral consequence of the challenged judgment, habeas corpus is not an appropriate avenue for seeking relief.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 (“Use of the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction long after the sentence on the original conviction has expired.”); see also Benson, 153 S.W.3d at 32 ; May v. Carlton, Warden, 245 S.W.3d 340, 353 (Tenn. 2008).

2011The court in Hickman concluded that “when the restraint on a petitioner’s liberty is merely a collateral consequence of the challenged judgment, habeas corpus is not an appropriate avenue for seeking relief.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23 (“Use of the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction long after the sentence on the original conviction has expired.”); see also Benson, 153 S.W.3d at 32 ; May v. Carlton, Warden, 245 S.W.3d 340, 353 (Tenn. 2008).

2014See Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998) (recognizing that an indictment may be so deficient that it fails to “clothe the court with jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction” and may entitle the petitioner to habeas corpus relief).

2004Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998).

2016See Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261 .

2014Moreover, “[h]abeas corpus relief does not lie to address a conviction after the sentence on the conviction has been fully served.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tenn. 2007).

2003By merely stating the habeas corpus claim as an alternative claim for relief in his post-conviction petition, the petitioner has failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Code section 29-21-107(a) and provisions (1), (3), and (4) of subsection 29-21-107(b). “[T]he procedural provisions of the [habeas corpus] statutes are mandatory and must be followed scrupulously.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993).

2003The habeas corpus claim is also, however, lacking in its substantive merit. “[T]he writ of [habeas corpus] will issue in Tennessee only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant's sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 164 ).

2011See, e.g., McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 800 (granting post-conviction relief where trial court sentenced defendant pursuant to 1982 sentencing act for offenses committed in 1989 and therefore subject to the 1989 sentencing act). .

2011See, e.g., McConnell, 12 S.W.3d at 800 (granting post- conviction relief where trial court sentenced defendant pursuant to 1982 sentencing act for offenses committed in 1989 and therefore subject to the 1989 sentencing act). -16- CONCLUSION Defendant’s four sentences for his four aggravated rape convictions are illegal because, in direct contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-523, each of the judgment orders indicates that Defendant is eligible for early release on parole (by the designation “Multiple 35% Range 2” offender) instead of indicating that he must serve his entire s

2004Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000) (“[W]hether to grant the petition [for habeas corpus relief] is a question of law that we review de novo.”); State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) (question of law reviewed on appeal de novo).

2004Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000) (“[W]hether to grant the petition [for habeas corpus relief] is a question of law that we review de novo.”); State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) (question of law reviewed on appeal de novo).

2004Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000) (“[W]hether to grant the petition [for habeas corpus relief] is a question of law that we review de novo.”); State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) (question of law reviewed on appeal de novo).

2004Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000) (“[W]hether to grant the petition [for habeas corpus relief] is a question of law that we review de novo.”); State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) (question of law reviewed on appeal de novo).

1983McLaughlin v. State, supra, at 660.

1979In allowing the testimony, the trial court relied upon McLaughlin v. State, 512 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tenn.Cr.App.1974), where this court spoke of: “(T)he rule that in an extradition proceeding the courts are not bound by the same rigid rules of evidence as in a criminal trial, and the evidence should be construed liberally in favor of the demanding state.” The habeas corpus hearing was not designed to determine guilt but only whether the arrest of the petitioner for extradition was proper.

2005We review this matter because “the sufficiency of an indictment can be reviewable as a habeas corpus claim.” See Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319 (Tenn. 2000).

2004While the trial court erred to the extent that it determined that this issue was not reviewable as a habeas corpus claim, see Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319 (Tenn. 2000) (reviewing habeas corpus claim that original attempt indictment was insufficient for failing to allege overt act), that does not mean that the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

2026Daugherty v. Rose, 71 S.W.2d 685, 685 (Tenn. 1934). -5- With the trial court having issued the writ and set the matter for a summary hearing, the question became who was authorized to represent the State at that proceeding.

2025“T]he filing of a motion to correct a final sentencing judgment that is beyond the reach of either Rules 35 or 36, a post-conviction relief petition, or a habeas corpus claim, merely begs alms from a trial court whose jurisdiction is depleted.” Cox v. State, 53 S.W.3d 287, 293 (Tenn. Crim.

2017This court has recently stated, in State v. David Reed, that “a trial court’s failure to award post-judgment jail credits at the time it revokes a defendant’s probation may be an appealable error,” although it does not render the sentence illegal. 2016 WL 1223409 , at *2 (citing State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2015)); see also Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 449-52 (Tenn. 2011) (discussing the difference between clerical errors, appealable errors, and fatal errors).

2017This court has recently stated, in State v. David Reed, that “a trial court’s failure to award post-judgment jail credits at the time it revokes a defendant’s probation may be an appealable error,” although it does not render the sentence illegal. 2016 WL 1223409 , at *2 (citing State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2015)); see also Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445, 449-52 (Tenn. 2011) (discussing the difference between clerical errors, appealable errors, and fatal errors).

2014See Davis v. State, 261 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Tenn. Crim.

2013The Petitioner contends that his claim is valid as a habeas corpus claim and asks this Court to remand the case “to the habeas court for an evidentiary hearing to determine that the petitioner is in fact due community corrections credit for which he has been denied.” The State concedes that “[t]he trial court’s failure to award community corrections credit is a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief” but asserts that the Petitioner, nevertheless, is not entitled to habeas relief, citing Jackson v. Parker, 366 S.W.3d 186, 190-91 (Tenn. Crim.

2012Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); see also Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992).

2007Additionally, it appears that our supreme court has already rejected the complaints currently made by the Petitioner in Benson v. State, in which the supreme court held “[t]he sentences complained of were served and expired before the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition to challenge them.”3 153 S.W.3d at 32.

2003The habeas corpus claim is also, however, lacking in its substantive merit. “[T]he writ of [habeas corpus] will issue in Tennessee only when it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant's sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 164 ).

2003“A void judgment is one in which the judgment is facially -14- invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment or because the defendant's sentence has expired.” Taylor v. State, 955 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999).

2003Dillehay v. White, 398 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tenn. 1966) (holding that a defendant released upon her own recognizance could nevertheless pursue a habeas corpus claim under the principle of "constructive confinement" because she was subject to immediate incarceration should her appeal be dismissed).

2001In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991), the United States Supreme Court ruled that because there was no right to post-judgment counsel, attorney error which might have led to a default of a habeas corpus claim in state court could not serve to excuse the default in a later federal habeas proceeding.

2001Our supreme court, in House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 712 (Tenn. 1995), reached the same result, holding that because there was no right to effective post-conviction counsel, the ineffectiveness of counsel in a prior post-conviction proceeding could not be considered in determining the applicability of previous determination and waiver as procedural bars.