habeas corpus hearing in Texas

2025Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 670 ; Jordan, 54 S.W.3d at 786 ; see also Ludwig v. State, No. 08-22-00078-CR, 2023 WL 2658039 , at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (recognizing the abrogation of the habeas corpus exception invoked by use of a “functional” writ alone; but observing—as the Court of Criminal Appeals did in Jordan—that “[n]othing prevents the probationer from filing an Article 11.08 or 11.09 writ application after the State has filed a motion to revoke[.]”).

2022A. Applicable Law “The habeas corpus exception essentially involves the litigation of a writ of habeas corpus at the probation revocation proceedings.” Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 669 .

2025The habeas corpus exception provides a probationer the opportunity to litigate at the revocation hearing “any claims that would be cognizable on a writ of habeas corpus.” Jordan, 54 S.W.3d at 785 .

2025Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 670 ; Jordan, 54 S.W.3d at 786 ; see also Ludwig v. State, No. 08-22-00078-CR, 2023 WL 2658039 , at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (recognizing the abrogation of the habeas corpus exception invoked by use of a “functional” writ alone; but observing—as the Court of Criminal Appeals did in Jordan—that “[n]othing prevents the probationer from filing an Article 11.08 or 11.09 writ application after the State has filed a motion to revoke[.]”).

2002See Ex Parte Zavala, 900 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.) (citing Ex Parte Plumb, 595 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)).

2000See Ex parte Zavala, 900 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Plumb, 595 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)).

2019Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. Crim.

2010See id. ; Ex parte Williams , 200 S.W.3d 819 , 820 n.2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, no pet.); see also Cid v. State , No. 13-00-325-CR, 2001 WL 1002481 , at *2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 21, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

2010STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW "In a habeas corpus hearing, the burden of proof is on the petitioner." State v. Cabrera, 24 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref'd).

2010Standard of Review and Applicable Law "In a habeas corpus hearing, the burden of proof is on the petitioner." State v. Cabrera , 24 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref'd).

2007Use of a habeas corpus hearing to develop facts not shown in the existing record is illustrated in Ex parte Preston , 833 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (op. on rehearing).

2007Use of a habeas corpus hearing to develop facts not shown in the existing record is illustrated in Ex parte Preston , 833 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (op. on rehearing).

2002See Ex Parte Zavala, 900 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.) (citing Ex Parte Plumb, 595 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)).

2000See Ex parte Zavala, 900 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Plumb, 595 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)).

2008App. 1992), and Franks v. State , 90 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (trial judge’s testimony from a recusal hearing should not have been admitted into evidence at trial)); see also Kemp v. State , 846 S.W.2d 289 , 305 n.9 (“In Hensarling v. State , 829 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Crim.

2004See In re Bruce, 112 S.W.3d 635 , 642 n. 1 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (where a different judge presided over the habeas corpus hearing, trial judge who had not officially recused himself from the case when the State called him as a witness was not “stepping down from the bench” and testifying as a witness in the very same proceeding over which he was currently presiding) (citing Hensarling v. State, 829 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), and Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (trial judge’s testimony from a recusal hearing shou

2008App. 1992), and Franks v. State , 90 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (trial judge’s testimony from a recusal hearing should not have been admitted into evidence at trial)); see also Kemp v. State , 846 S.W.2d 289 , 305 n.9 (“In Hensarling v. State , 829 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Crim.

2004See In re Bruce, 112 S.W.3d 635 , 642 n. 1 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (where a different judge presided over the habeas corpus hearing, trial judge who had not officially recused himself from the case when the State called him as a witness was not “stepping down from the bench” and testifying as a witness in the very same proceeding over which he was currently presiding) (citing Hensarling v. State, 829 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), and Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (trial judge’s testimony from a recusal hearing shou

2008See In re Bruce , 112 S.W.3d 635 , 642 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (where a different judge presided over the habeas corpus hearing, trial judge who had not officially recused himself from the case when the State called him as a witness was not "stepping down from the bench" and testifying as a witness in the very same proceeding over which he was currently presiding) (citing Hensarling v. State , 829 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Crim.

2004See In re Bruce, 112 S.W.3d 635 , 642 n. 1 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (where a different judge presided over the habeas corpus hearing, trial judge who had not officially recused himself from the case when the State called him as a witness was not “stepping down from the bench” and testifying as a witness in the very same proceeding over which he was currently presiding) (citing Hensarling v. State, 829 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), and Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (trial judge’s testimony from a recusal hearing shou

2008See In re Bruce , 112 S.W.3d 635 , 642 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (where a different judge presided over the habeas corpus hearing, trial judge who had not officially recused himself from the case when the State called him as a witness was not "stepping down from the bench" and testifying as a witness in the very same proceeding over which he was currently presiding) (citing Hensarling v. State , 829 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Crim.

2004See In re Bruce, 112 S.W.3d 635 , 642 n. 1 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2003, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (where a different judge presided over the habeas corpus hearing, trial judge who had not officially recused himself from the case when the State called him as a witness was not “stepping down from the bench” and testifying as a witness in the very same proceeding over which he was currently presiding) (citing Hensarling v. State, 829 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), and Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771, 781 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (trial judge’s testimony from a recusal hearing shou

2003Ex Parte Primrose , 950 S.W.2d 775, 777-78 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d).

2003Ex Parte Primrose , 950 S.W.2d 775, 777-78 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref'd).

2015Ex parte Sierra, 514 S.W.2d 760 offense and the only testimony as to the (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Ex parte Runo, 535 circumstances under which the offense S.W.2d 188 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); Ex was committed which was offered, as parte Clark, supra; Ex parte McClellan, well as all other testimony introduced, 545 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Ex we conclude that the bail [**8] of parte Kerr, supra. $100,000 was excessive.

1983Ex Parte Clark, Tex.Cr.App., 537 S.W.2d 40 ; Brians v. State, Tex.App.

2022See Few v. State, 136 S.W.3d 707, 713 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (citing Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 669–70) (holding that, “because the Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus was not litigated at the same hearing as the revocation, the habeas corpus exception d[id] not apply”).

2022See Few v. State, 136 S.W.3d 707, 713 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (citing Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 669–70) (holding that, “because the Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus was not litigated at the same hearing as the revocation, the habeas corpus exception d[id] not apply”).

2010See id. ; Ex parte Williams , 200 S.W.3d 819 , 820 n.2 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, no pet.); see also Cid v. State , No. 13-00-325-CR, 2001 WL 1002481 , at *2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi June 21, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

2010See id.; Ex parte Williams, 200 S.W.3d 819 , 820 n.2 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2006, no pet.); see also Cid v. State, No. 13-00-325-CR, 2001 WL 1002481 , at *2 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi June 21, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

1974See Ex parte Krarup, [Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 173 ] supra, and in this connection, since a felony may not be prosecuted upon an information in Texas, this Court has consistently held that where the demanding state seeks to extradite an accused from Texas for a felony trial based upon an information in the demanding state, there must be a showing at the habeas corpus hearing that the law of the demanding state permits such procedure.

1974Later, in Ex parte Posey, Tex.Cr.App., 453 S.W.2d 833 , this Court reasoned as follows : “It is true that in extradition proceedings it has been held that there is a presumption that the law of the demanding state is the same as the law of Texas in absence of a showing to the contrary, Ex parte Krarup, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 173 and cases there cited, and if the demanding state seeks to extradite an accused from Texas for a felony trial based upon an information in the demanding state there must be a showing, at the habeas corpus hearing, that the law of the demanding state permits such proce

2023See Wright, 506 S.W.3d at 481–82; see also Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tex. Crim.

2018The habeas-corpus exception, to the extent it remains valid, recognizes that “a claim that a sentence is illegal may be raised at any time.” Wright, 506 S.W.3d at 482 .

2015Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim.

2008Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim.

2012Nevertheless, in considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[w]e address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.” We have decided that “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 794 (citations omitted).

2012Nevertheless, in considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, "[w]e address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled." We have decided that "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. " Id. at 794 (citations omitted).

2010See, e.g., Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 148-51 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (affirming $500,000 bail for defendant accused of murdering his wife and attempting to murder his mother-in-law); Richardson v. State, 181 S.W.3d 756, 758-60 (Tex.App.Waco 2005) (affirming $200,000 bail for defendant accused of killing her husband). 4 Most of these cases, however — including all of the authorities submitted by the State 5 — are at least partially distinguishable from Montalvo’s case insofar they involved bail assessed for defendants accused of directly committing murder, and as the

2010See, e.g., Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 148-51 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (affirming $500,000 bail for defendant accused of murdering his wife and attempting to murder his mother-in-law); Richardson v. State, 181 S.W.3d 756, 758-60 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005) (affirming $200,000 bail for defendant accused of killing her husband). [4] *594 Most of these cases, however—including all of the authorities submitted by the State [5] —are at least partially distinguishable from Montalvo's case insofar they involved bail assessed for defendants accused of directly committing murder, and

2003See Parrish , 38 S.W.3d at 834 ; see also State v. Nkwocha , 31 S.W.3d 817, 821 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (reversing trial court’s grant of new trial to habeas petitioner because petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing entitlement to a new trial, when there was no evidence in the record of the habeas hearing that showed petitioner’s inability to obtain documents at first trial was not due to his own lack of diligence).

2003See Parrish, 38 S.W.3d at 834 ; see also State v. Nkwocha, 31 S.W.3d 817, 821 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.) (reversing trial court’s grant of new trial to habeas petitioner because petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing entitlement to a new trial, when there was no evidence in the record of the habeas hearing that showed petitioner’s inability to obtain documents at first trial was not due to his own lack of diligence).

2003See Ex parte Kimes , 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Crim .

2003See Ex parte Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); see also Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (stating that when the constitutionality of a statute is attacked, courts presume the Legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily, and the burden of proving unconstitutionality is therefore on the party challenging the statute).

2010See, e.g., Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 148-51 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (affirming $500,000 bail for defendant accused of murdering his wife and attempting to murder his mother-in-law); Richardson v. State, 181 S.W.3d 756, 758-60 (Tex.App.Waco 2005) (affirming $200,000 bail for defendant accused of killing her husband). 4 Most of these cases, however — including all of the authorities submitted by the State 5 — are at least partially distinguishable from Montalvo’s case insofar they involved bail assessed for defendants accused of directly committing murder, and as the

2010See, e.g., Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 148-51 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (affirming $500,000 bail for defendant accused of murdering his wife and attempting to murder his mother-in-law); Richardson v. State, 181 S.W.3d 756, 758-60 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005) (affirming $200,000 bail for defendant accused of killing her husband). [4] *594 Most of these cases, however—including all of the authorities submitted by the State [5] —are at least partially distinguishable from Montalvo's case insofar they involved bail assessed for defendants accused of directly committing murder, and