administrative exhaustion requirement (Oregon) · Go Syfert
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administrative exhaustion requirement in Oregon

8 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 2019–2026 7 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Tuckenberry v. Board of Parolegreen
or · 2019 · cited in 8 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2019–2026
2 sentences

2024See id. (relaxing the administrative exhaustion requirement in light of the facts that (1) it was at least unclear that a registrant was allowed to raise the issue before the board; (2) “the issue is one of public interest, in that inaccu- rate classification of sex offenders undermines the purpose of the SONL statute, which is to help law enforcement pre- vent future sex crimes by enabling them to direct resources toward past sex offenders who present the highest risk of committing new sex crimes”; and (3) “raising the issue to the board would have been futile,” as the board had rejected it i

2024See id. (relaxing the administrative exhaustion requirement in light of the facts that (1) it was at least unclear that a registrant was allowed to raise the issue before the board; (2) “the issue is one of public interest, in that inaccu- rate classification of sex offenders undermines the purpose of the SONL statute, which is to help law enforcement pre- vent future sex crimes by enabling them to direct resources toward past sex offenders who present the highest risk of committing new sex crimes”; and (3) “raising the issue to the board would have been futile,” as the board had rejected it i

58
Stewart v. Board of Parolegreen
orctapp · 2021 · cited in 2 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2023–2024
2 sentences

2024Petitioner and the board dispute the type of review we would engage in if we set aside the administrative-ex- haustion requirement; specifically, they dispute whether petitioner would be limited to plain-error review under Stewart v. Board of Parole, 312 Or App 32, 35 , 492 P3d 1283 (2021).

2023See Stewart, 312 Or App at 35 (“Even if we were to conclude that the exhaus- tion requirement should be relaxed under Tuckenberry, such that only preservation-of-error principles were in play, neither of the first two assigned errors is ‘obvious and not reasonably in dispute’ so as to qualify as plain error.”); but see also Tuckenberry, 365 Or at 642 (proceeding to regu- lar review after relaxing the administrative exhaustion requirement); Forbus v. Board of Parole, 309 Or App 296, 301 , 482 P3d 95 (2021) (same).

12
Mullenaux v. STATE, BY AND THROUGH OR., ETC.green
or · 1982 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026Cite as 349 Or App 17 (2026) 21 Embedded in the administrative exhaustion doc- trine is the requirement, itself prudential, that the specific issues being argued on judicial review were themselves exhausted; that is, “a party must have objected before the agency to errors he asserts on judicial review.” Marbet, 277 Or at 456 ; see also Mullanaux, 293 Or at 541 (“A party does not exhaust his administrative remedies simply by stepping through the motions of the administrative process without affording the agency an opportunity to rule on the sub- stance of the dispute.”).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Tuckenberry v. Board of Parolegreen
or · 2019 · cited in 8 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2019–2026
2 sentences

2024See id. (relaxing the administrative exhaustion requirement in light of the facts that (1) it was at least unclear that a registrant was allowed to raise the issue before the board; (2) “the issue is one of public interest, in that inaccu- rate classification of sex offenders undermines the purpose of the SONL statute, which is to help law enforcement pre- vent future sex crimes by enabling them to direct resources toward past sex offenders who present the highest risk of committing new sex crimes”; and (3) “raising the issue to the board would have been futile,” as the board had rejected it i

2024See id. (relaxing the administrative exhaustion requirement in light of the facts that (1) it was at least unclear that a registrant was allowed to raise the issue before the board; (2) “the issue is one of public interest, in that inaccu- rate classification of sex offenders undermines the purpose of the SONL statute, which is to help law enforcement pre- vent future sex crimes by enabling them to direct resources toward past sex offenders who present the highest risk of committing new sex crimes”; and (3) “raising the issue to the board would have been futile,” as the board had rejected it i

18

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Forbus v. Board of Parole green
orctapp · 2021
2 sentences

2023See Stewart, 312 Or App at 35 (“Even if we were to conclude that the exhaus- tion requirement should be relaxed under Tuckenberry, such that only preservation-of-error principles were in play, neither of the first two assigned errors is ‘obvious and not reasonably in dispute’ so as to qualify as plain error.”); but see also Tuckenberry, 365 Or at 642 (proceeding to regu- lar review after relaxing the administrative exhaustion requirement); Forbus v. Board of Parole, 309 Or App 296, 301 , 482 P3d 95 (2021) (same).

2023See Stewart, 312 Or App at 35 (“Even if we were to conclude that the exhaus- tion requirement should be relaxed under Tuckenberry, such that only preservation-of-error principles were in play, neither of the first two assigned errors is ‘obvious and not reasonably in dispute’ so as to qualify as plain error.”); but see also Tuckenberry, 365 Or at 642 (proceeding to regu- lar review after relaxing the administrative exhaustion requirement); Forbus v. Board of Parole, 309 Or App 296, 301 , 482 P3d 95 (2021) (same).

32023–2023
Application of Portland General Elec. Co. green
or · 1977
1 sentence

2026Cite as 349 Or App 17 (2026) 21 Embedded in the administrative exhaustion doc- trine is the requirement, itself prudential, that the specific issues being argued on judicial review were themselves exhausted; that is, “a party must have objected before the agency to errors he asserts on judicial review.” Marbet, 277 Or at 456 ; see also Mullanaux, 293 Or at 541 (“A party does not exhaust his administrative remedies simply by stepping through the motions of the administrative process without affording the agency an opportunity to rule on the sub- stance of the dispute.”).

12026–2026
cluster 10850331 neutral
·
1 sentence

2026Cite as 349 Or App 17 (2026) 21 Embedded in the administrative exhaustion doc- trine is the requirement, itself prudential, that the specific issues being argued on judicial review were themselves exhausted; that is, “a party must have objected before the agency to errors he asserts on judicial review.” Marbet, 277 Or at 456 ; see also Mullanaux, 293 Or at 541 (“A party does not exhaust his administrative remedies simply by stepping through the motions of the administrative process without affording the agency an opportunity to rule on the sub- stance of the dispute.”).

12026–2026
Obray v. Board of Parole neutral
orctapp · 2024
1 sentence

2024Instead, he asserts that the board erred by disregarding his time in the community without committing a sex offense and con- tends that the error resulted in an “artificially inflated sex offender classification level.” Petitioner acknowledges that Nonprecedential Memo Op: 330 Or App 623 (2024) 625 he did not raise this issue to the board and asks us to relax or set aside the administrative-exhaustion requirement, as we have authority to do under Tuckenberry v. Board of Parole, 365 Or 640, 647 , 451 P3d 227 (2019).

12024–2024
Penn v. Board of Parole green
or · 2019
1 sentence

2019Held: The administrative exhaustion requirement in ORS 144.335(1) incorporates flexible, prudential exhaustion principles, and under those prudential principles, the court would consider petitioner’s claims, not specifically raised before the board; on the merits, petitioner’s claim that the board lacked statutory authority to impose the special condition regulating petitioner’s “intimate” relationships and encounters was completely resolved in petitioner’s favor by the court’s holding in a companion case, Penn v. Board of Parole, 365 Or 640 , 451 P3d 589 (2019).

12019–2019

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 163A.100 (6) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335 (4) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.482 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 34 (1983–2025) TX 11 (2005–2021) GA 11 (2006–2017) MD 9 (1982–2025) OR 8 (2019–2026) WA 5 (2007–2019) IN 4 (2010–2013) PA 4 (1983–2022) CT 4 (1999–2026) CO 4 (2016–2026) ID 3 (2022–2024) OH 3 (2004–2023) AK 3 (1989–1999) MO 3 (1986–2020) NM 3 (2005–2006) FL 3 (2010–2024) WI 2 (2010–2026) UT 2 (2022–2024) MI 2 (2021–2024) NY 2 (1987–1998) SD 2 (2003–2005)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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