acknowledgment doctrine in Pennsylvania

2024We initially - 20 - J-S30003-23 explained that “there can be no more clear and unequivocal acknowledgement of a debt than payment[,]” and that “[i]n order for a partial payment to toll the statute of limitations, the payment must constitute a constructive acknowledgement of the debt from which a promise to pay the balance may be inferred.” Id. at 990 (citing Huntingdon Finance Corp. v. Newtown Artesian Water Co., 659 A.2d 1052, 1054-55 (Pa. Super. 1995)).

2018Huntingdon Fin.Corp v, Newtown Artesian Water Co., 659 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Pa.Super. 1995) However, Plaintiff herein failed to identify/allege facts from which a jury could infer Defendant's constructive acknowledgement of the debt.

2024Id. at 1054-55 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (holding appellee unquestionably acknowledged its obligation with respect to principal of debt; there can be no more clear and unequivocal acknowledgment of debt than actual payment, thus removing statute of limitations with respect to principal; however, this acknowledgment does not extend to corresponding interest on underlying debt; appellant does not cite to any place in record where appellee acknowledged duty to pay contested interest; appellee’s payment was exact - 17 - J-E01005-24 amount of principal owed; thus, appellee’s payment of pr

2018Gurenlian v. Gurenlian, 595 A.2d 145, 151 (Pa.Super. 1991). 2015-09486-0033 Opinion, Page 5 Thus, in order to succeed under the acknowledgment doctrine, a plaintiff must show actual evidence, not just conjecture, which would allow the court to infer a promise to pay the remaining debt or an acknowledgement of the entire balance.

2008“To toll the statute of limitations, there must be a clear and unequivocal acknowledgement of the debt, and a specification of the amount or reference to something by which the amount can be definitely ascertained, coupled with an express or implied promise to pay.” Markee v. Reyburn, 258 Pa. 277, 282 , 101 A. 993, 994 (1917) (citing Ward v. Jack, 172 Pa. 416 , 33 A. 577 (1896)).

1994In support of its present contention that defendant owes $20,367.19, the amount of interest that accrued on the overdue payments of principal between 1984 and December 28, 1990, plaintiff notes that under the acknowledgment doctrine “a debt which is time barred may be ‘revived’ by an acknowledgment by the debtor ...” Plaintiff’s brief at 7 (quoting Gee v. CBS Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 633 (E.D.

1994The acknowledgment doctrine provides that “the expiration of the statutory period does not bar the claim if the plaintiff can prove an acknowledgment, a new promise, or part payment made by the defendant either before or after the statute has run.” Gee, supra at 633.

1994See Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co. v. Delhi-Warnock Building Association, 357 Pa. 307, 313-314 , 53 A.2d 597, 600 (1947) (noting payment must be voluntary act of debtor).

1994See Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co. v. Delhi-Warnock Building Association, 357 Pa. 307, 313-314 , 53 A.2d 597, 600 (1947) (noting payment must be voluntary act of debtor).

1969In Altsman v. Kelly, 336 Pa. 481, 488 (1939), the record of a prior action on the same cause in which the trial court entered a compulsory nonsuit, and a motion to remove the nonsuit was withdrawn by leave of court, the Supreme Court held the motion to remove compulsory nonsuit to be a discontinuance which did not constitute either an adjudication of the party’s right of action or an acknowledgment that the claim was not good in law.