8 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1952–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lesley v. Kitegreen2 sentences1953The powers of a municipality by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162, 197 (1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Public Service Commission, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911), sec. 237. 1952The powers of a municipality 4 by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia et al., 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162 , 197 .(1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. et al., v. P. S. C. et al., 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (fifth ed., 1911), sec. 237. | 2 | 2 |
American Aniline Products, Inc. v. Lock Havengreen2 sentences1953The powers of a municipality by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162, 197 (1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Public Service Commission, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911), sec. 237. 1952The powers of a municipality 4 by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia et al., 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162 , 197 .(1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. et al., v. P. S. C. et al., 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (fifth ed., 1911), sec. 237. | 2 | 2 |
Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. P. S. C.green2 sentences1953The powers of a municipality by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162, 197 (1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Public Service Commission, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911), sec. 237. 1952The powers of a municipality 4 by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia et al., 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162 , 197 .(1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. et al., v. P. S. C. et al., 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (fifth ed., 1911), sec. 237. | 2 | 2 |
Appeal of Whelengreen2 sentences1953The powers of a municipality by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162, 197 (1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Public Service Commission, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911), sec. 237. 1952The powers of a municipality 4 by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia et al., 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162 , 197 .(1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. et al., v. P. S. C. et al., 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (fifth ed., 1911), sec. 237. | 1 | 2 |
Sinn v. Burdgreen2 sentences2008Sinn, 404 A.2d at 685 (adopting the Dillon rule for emotional distress). 2008Sinn, 404 A.2d at 685 (adopting the Dillon rule for emotional distress). | 1 | 1 |
Straub v. Fisher and Paykel Health Caregreen2 sentences2008See Straub, 990 P.2d at 390 {“Shepard is a California case in which the Dillon rule [] was extended from negligent infliction of emotional distress to include strict liability. 2008See Straub, 990 P.2d at 390 {“Shepard is a California case in which the Dillon rule [] was extended from negligent infliction of emotional distress to include strict liability. | 1 | 1 |
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitalsgreen2 sentences1988Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-7 , 167 Call. 1988Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-7 , 167 Call. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wentz v. Philadelphia
green
2 sentences1953The powers of a municipality by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162, 197 (1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Public Service Commission, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911), sec. 237. 1952The powers of a municipality 4 by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia et al., 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162 , 197 .(1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. et al., v. P. S. C. et al., 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (fifth ed., 1911), sec. 237. | 2 | 1952–1953 |
Valley Dep. and Tr. Co. of Belle Vernon
green
2 sentences1953The powers of a municipality by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162, 197 (1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. v. Public Service Commission, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed., 1911), sec. 237. 1952The powers of a municipality 4 by the familiar rule, sometimes characterized as Dillon’s rule, are to be strictly construed: Valley Deposit and Trust Company of Belle Vernon, 311 Pa. 495 (1933); Wentz v. Philadelphia et al., 301 Pa. 261 (1930); American Aniline Products, Inc., v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 423 (1927); Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274 (1899); Appeal of Whelen, 108 Pa. 162 , 197 .(1884); Pittsburgh Railways Co. et al., v. P. S. C. et al., 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 65, 66 (1934); Dillon, Municipal Corporations (fifth ed., 1911), sec. 237. | 2 | 1952–1953 |
Thing v. La Chusa
green
2 sentences1996In Thing v. LaChusa, 48 Cal.3d 644 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 (1989), the California Supreme Court modified the Dillon test and replaced it with three somewhat different elements of proof as to the observation of the injury and the precise type of resultant injury. 1996In Thing v. LaChusa, 48 Cal.3d 644 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 (1989), the California Supreme Court modified the Dillon test and replaced it with three somewhat different elements of proof as to the observation of the injury and the precise type of resultant injury. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hathaway v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1982In the Hathaway court’s discussion of Molien, the current role of the Dillon test is analyzed: “It thus appears that the liability limiting criteria contained in Dillon are still applicable to bystander cases where emotional trauma is suffered by plaintiffs.” Hathaway, 169 Cal.Rptr. at 440 . 1982In the Hathaway court’s discussion of Molien, the current role of the Dillon test is analyzed: “It thus appears that the liability limiting criteria contained in Dillon are still applicable to bystander cases where emotional trauma is suffered by plaintiffs.” Hathaway, 169 Cal.Rptr. at 440 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Cortez v. MacIas
green
2 sentences1982The court reiterated the Dillon rule and distinguished Molien by noting that “the tortious con duct of defendant ... [in Molien] was directed at plaintiff as well as his wife.” Cortez, 167 Cal.Rptr. at 909 . 1982The court reiterated the Dillon rule and distinguished Molien by noting that “the tortious con duct of defendant ... [in Molien] was directed at plaintiff as well as his wife.” Cortez, 167 Cal.Rptr. at 909 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co.
green
2 sentences1979The Dillon factors and large parts of that opinion were adopted verbatim by the court in D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., Inc., 31 Conn.Super. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973). 1979The Dillon factors and large parts of that opinion were adopted verbatim by the court in D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., Inc., 31 Conn.Super. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Schurk v. Christensen
green
2 sentences1979In Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash.2d 652 , 497 P.2d 937 (1972) (en banc), that court denied recovery by a mother who claimed mental distress arising out of being informed that her 5-year-old daughter had been sexually molested by a teenage boy over a period of months. 1979In Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash.2d 652 , 497 P.2d 937 (1972) (en banc), that court denied recovery by a mother who claimed mental distress arising out of being informed that her 5-year-old daughter had been sexually molested by a teenage boy over a period of months. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Butler v. United States Steel Corp.
green
2 sentences1976The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board and the court below both relied on the case of Butler v. United States Steel Corporation, 205 Pa. Superior Ct. 508 , 211 A.2d 35 (1964), which held that the statute of limitations provided by Section 315 begins to run from the date the employee is disabled and definitely knows that he is totally disabled from anthracosilicosis. 1976The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board and the court below both relied on the case of Butler v. United States Steel Corporation, 205 Pa. Superior Ct. 508 , 211 A.2d 35 (1964), which held that the statute of limitations provided by Section 315 begins to run from the date the employee is disabled and definitely knows that he is totally disabled from anthracosilicosis. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.