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33 California opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Leighgreen2 sentences2014(People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 869 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 ]; see People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 615-616 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 ]; People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 223 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 235, p. 382 [both trial judges and appellate courts are authorized and required to apply Dillon analysis].) Thus, we do not disagree that a trial court can, in an exceptional case, reduce the degree of a crime to avoid imposing an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual sentence. 2014(People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 869 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 ]; see People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 615-616 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 ]; People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 223 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 235, p. 382 [both trial judges and appellate courts are authorized and required to apply Dillon analysis].) Thus, we do not disagree that a trial court can, in an exceptional case, reduce the degree of a crime to avoid imposing an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual sentence. | 2 | 3 |
Andalon v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989As noted in Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 608 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ], “The import of Justus is clear: Dillon is not the harbinger of a boundless new tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 1989As noted in Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 608 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ], “The import of Justus is clear: Dillon is not the harbinger of a boundless new tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. | 2 | 2 |
Cortez v. MacIasgreen2 sentences1985(See, e.g., Cortez v. Macias (1980) 110 Cal. App.3d 640, 650 [ 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 ]; Austin v. Regents of University of California (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 354, 361 [ 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 ], Jefferson, J., dis.) [8] Such a requirement however undercuts the very foundation upon which the Dillon case rested. 1985(See, e.g., Cortez v. Macias (1980) 110 Cal. App.3d 640, 650 [ 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 ]; Austin v. Regents of University of California (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 354, 361 [ 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 ], Jefferson, J., dis.) [8] Such a requirement however undercuts the very foundation upon which the Dillon case rested. | 2 | 2 |
Justus v. Atchisongreen2 sentences1989Courts have generally held that “some type of sensory perception of the impact contemporaneous with the accident is necessary to meet the Dillon requirement.” (Arauz v. Gerhardt (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 937, 949 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 619 ].) Although plaintiffs argue that the decision in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ] is not determinative, or that its viability is in question since the Ochoa decision, it is not only as factually similar to the instant case as any available in California, but the statements of law therein are controlling. 1989Courts have generally held that “some type of sensory perception of the impact contemporaneous with the accident is necessary to meet the Dillon requirement.” (Arauz v. Gerhardt (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 937, 949 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 619 ].) Although plaintiffs argue that the decision in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ] is not determinative, or that its viability is in question since the Ochoa decision, it is not only as factually similar to the instant case as any available in California, but the statements of law therein are controlling. | 1 | 7 |
Ochoa v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021A ‘bright line in this area of the law is essential.’” (Thing, at p. 664.) The Thing court replaced the Dillon factors with three requirements to support a bystander NIED claim: “[A] plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing [a] negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond tha 2021A ‘bright line in this area of the law is essential.’” (Thing, at p. 664.) The Thing court replaced the Dillon factors with three requirements to support a bystander NIED claim: “[A] plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing [a] negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond tha | 1 | 4 |
Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Centergreen2 sentences1986(See e.g., Jansen v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 22, 24-25 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 883 ].) The Supreme Court appeared to have endorsed that approach in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], by confining the tort solely to circumstances where the Dillon factors were present. 1986(See e.g., Jansen v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 22, 24-25 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 883 ].) The Supreme Court appeared to have endorsed that approach in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ], by confining the tort solely to circumstances where the Dillon factors were present. | 1 | 4 |
Arauz v. Gerhardtgreen2 sentences1989Courts have generally held that “some type of sensory perception of the impact contemporaneous with the accident is necessary to meet the Dillon requirement.” (Arauz v. Gerhardt (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 937, 949 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 619 ].) Although plaintiffs argue that the decision in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ] is not determinative, or that its viability is in question since the Ochoa decision, it is not only as factually similar to the instant case as any available in California, but the statements of law therein are controlling. 1989Courts have generally held that “some type of sensory perception of the impact contemporaneous with the accident is necessary to meet the Dillon requirement.” (Arauz v. Gerhardt (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 937, 949 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 619 ].) Although plaintiffs argue that the decision in Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 565 P.2d 122 ] is not determinative, or that its viability is in question since the Ochoa decision, it is not only as factually similar to the instant case as any available in California, but the statements of law therein are controlling. | 1 | 3 |
Krouse v. Grahamgreen2 sentences1978Finally, in Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 562 P.2d 1022 ], where the husband sought recovery for the emotional trauma incident to his witnessing his wife’s death, the court approved Archibald v. Braverman, supra, as follows: “We confirm the propriety of the expression in Archibald, supra, that the Dillon requirement of‘sensory *565 and contemporaneous observance of the accident’ does not require a visual perception of the impact causing the death or injury. 1978Finally, in Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 562 P.2d 1022 ], where the husband sought recovery for the emotional trauma incident to his witnessing his wife’s death, the court approved Archibald v. Braverman, supra, as follows: “We confirm the propriety of the expression in Archibald, supra, that the Dillon requirement of‘sensory *565 and contemporaneous observance of the accident’ does not require a visual perception of the impact causing the death or injury. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Munozgreen2 sentences1986Neither People v. Munoz (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 999 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 271 ], nor People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ], suggests that the Dillon analysis is properly the function of the trier of fact, though Leigh holds that the analysis is not solely within the province of the appellate court: “[N]othing in Dillon . . . precludes the trial court from performing such a function. 1986Neither People v. Munoz (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 999 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 271 ], nor People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ], suggests that the Dillon analysis is properly the function of the trier of fact, though Leigh holds that the analysis is not solely within the province of the appellate court: “[N]othing in Dillon . . . precludes the trial court from performing such a function. | 1 | 2 |
Hathaway v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1985(See, e.g., Hathaway v. Superior Court (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 728 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 ] [electrocution]; Parsons v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d 506 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 , 5 A.L.R.4th 826 ] [car accident]; Nazaroff v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 553 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 ] [drowning]; Powers v. Sissoev (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 865 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 ] [car accident]; Archibald v. Braverman (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 253 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 ] [explosion].) One case, Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center (1973) 31 Cal. App.3d 22 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 ] has required that the chi 1985(See, e.g., Hathaway v. Superior Court (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 728 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 ] [electrocution]; Parsons v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d 506 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 , 5 A.L.R.4th 826 ] [car accident]; Nazaroff v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 553 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 ] [drowning]; Powers v. Sissoev (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 865 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 ] [car accident]; Archibald v. Braverman (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 253 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 ] [explosion].) One case, Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center (1973) 31 Cal. App.3d 22 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 ] has required that the chi | 1 | 2 |
People v. Colegreen2 sentences2014(People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 869 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 ]; see People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 615-616 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 ]; People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 223 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 235, p. 382 [both trial judges and appellate courts are authorized and required to apply Dillon analysis].) Thus, we do not disagree that a trial court can, in an exceptional case, reduce the degree of a crime to avoid imposing an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual sentence. 2014(People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 869 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 ]; see People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 615-616 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 ]; People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 223 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 235, p. 382 [both trial judges and appellate courts are authorized and required to apply Dillon analysis].) Thus, we do not disagree that a trial court can, in an exceptional case, reduce the degree of a crime to avoid imposing an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual sentence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Moragreen2 sentences2014(People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 869 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 ]; see People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 615-616 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 ]; People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 223 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 235, p. 382 [both trial judges and appellate courts are authorized and required to apply Dillon analysis].) Thus, we do not disagree that a trial court can, in an exceptional case, reduce the degree of a crime to avoid imposing an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual sentence. 2014(People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 869 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 ]; see People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 615-616 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 99 ]; People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 217, 223 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 61 ]; 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Punishment, § 235, p. 382 [both trial judges and appellate courts are authorized and required to apply Dillon analysis].) Thus, we do not disagree that a trial court can, in an exceptional case, reduce the degree of a crime to avoid imposing an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual sentence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thompsongreen2 sentences1995(See People v. Thompson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 299, 308-309 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 ] [driver of car from which firebombs were thrown at residence at midnight; affirming sentence of life without parole upon a Dillon analysis].) According to defendant’s own statement he did not know whether Minard was dead or alive. 1995(See People v. Thompson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 299, 308-309 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 ] [driver of car from which firebombs were thrown at residence at midnight; affirming sentence of life without parole upon a Dillon analysis].) According to defendant’s own statement he did not know whether Minard was dead or alive. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hootongreen2 sentences1995However, neither Dillon nor its progeny suggests the trial court has a duty at every probation and sentencing hearing to put an analysis of the Dillon factors on the record. *30 In People v. Hooton (1959) 53 Cal.2d 85, 88 [ 346 P.2d 199 ], the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, but the first jury failed to reach a verdict on the penalty. 1995However, neither Dillon nor its progeny suggests the trial court has a duty at every probation and sentencing hearing to put an analysis of the Dillon factors on the record. *30 In People v. Hooton (1959) 53 Cal.2d 85, 88 [ 346 P.2d 199 ], the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, but the first jury failed to reach a verdict on the penalty. | 1 | 1 |
Hedlund v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989The second, fourth, and fifth factors may be disposed of quickly: certainty of injury is usually a jury question, particularly since we no longer require physical manifestations of mental distress ( Hedlund v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 695, 706, fn. 8 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 , 669 P.2d 41 , 41 A.L.R.4th 1063 ]); moral blame almost always militates in favor of recovery; and the policy of preventing future harm favors the plaintiff, but only slightly since, in most cases, any Dillon claim is simply added to the primary victim's complaint. 1989The second, fourth, and fifth factors may be disposed of quickly: certainty of injury is usually a jury question, particularly since we no longer require physical manifestations of mental distress ( Hedlund v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 695, 706, fn. 8 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 , 669 P.2d 41 , 41 A.L.R.4th 1063 ]); moral blame almost always militates in favor of recovery; and the policy of preventing future harm favors the plaintiff, but only slightly since, in most cases, any Dillon claim is simply added to the primary victim's complaint. | 1 | 1 |
| Austin v. Regents of University of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Lynchred | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dillon v. Legg
green
2 sentences1989As we have seen, however, a shock caused by ‘learning of the accident from others after its occurrence’ ( 68 Cal.2d at p. 741 ) will not support a cause of action under Dillon . [Citation.]” ( 19 Cal.3d at p. 585 .) The Justus court took into consideration the “ever-present possibility of emotional distress” arising from complications of childbirth, refusing to extend the Dillon rule into the “operating amphitheater” under the circumstances. 1989We should follow Dillon and its progeny and maintain the rational and traditional rule that reasonable foreseeability is the basis for determining liability. ( 68 Cal.2d at p. 740 .) “In order to limit the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, the law of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to defendant at the time were reasonably forseeable.” (Id. at p. 739, italics added.) As Dillon instructed, there is “no good reason why the general rules of tort law, including the concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeabi | 7 | 1978–1989 |
Thing v. La Chusa
green
2 sentences2021A ‘bright line in this area of the law is essential.’” (Thing, at p. 664.) The Thing court replaced the Dillon factors with three requirements to support a bystander NIED claim: “[A] plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing [a] negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond tha 2021A ‘bright line in this area of the law is essential.’” (Thing, at p. 664.) The Thing court replaced the Dillon factors with three requirements to support a bystander NIED claim: “[A] plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing [a] negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond tha | 4 | 1990–2021 |
Mobaldi v. Regents of University of California
green
2 sentences1988Relying on the holdings in Ledger, supra, 164 Cal. App.3d 625 , and Mobaldi, supra, 55 Cal. App.3d 573 , he asserts that he should have been allowed the opportunity to show that he met the "closely related" prong of the Dillon test by proof that he and his partner had a de facto marriage. 1988Relying on the holdings in Ledger, supra, 164 Cal. App.3d 625 , and Mobaldi, supra, 55 Cal. App.3d 573 , he asserts that he should have been allowed the opportunity to show that he met the "closely related" prong of the Dillon test by proof that he and his partner had a de facto marriage. | 4 | 1980–1988 |
Drew v. Drake
green
2 sentences1985Construing the third Dillon guideline to require a “family relationship” between the plaintiff and the decedent, the Court of Appeal observed, “[t]o allow persons standing in a ‘meaningful relationship’ (to use a contemporary colloquialism) to recover for emotional distress resulting in physical injury would abandon the Dillon requirement that ‘[t]he courts . . . mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and unexpected. ’ ...” (Id., at pp. 557-558.) In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Poché chastised the majority for drawing a “bright line distinction” between those persons formal 1983To allow persons standing in a ‘meaningful relationship’ (to use a contemporary colloquialism) to recover for emotional distress resulting in physical injury would abandon the Dillon requirement that ‘[t]he courts . . . mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and unexpected.’ [Citation omitted.]” (Id., at p. 557.) The court in Drew v. Drake, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d 555 distinguished Mobaldi v. Regents of University of California, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 573 , on the basis that, in Mobaldi , the doctor treating the child victim knew of the foster parent relationship between the victim | 3 | 1983–1985 |
Archibald v. Braverman
green
2 sentences1985The Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that all three Dillon factors had been satisfied. ( 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 256 .) As to the second factor, the court noted that “[a] plaintiff claiming damages for emotional trauma as a result of injury to a third party must either be present at the time of the accident [citation] or the shock sustained by the plaintiff must be fairly contemporaneous with the accident rather than follow when the plaintiff is informed of the whole matter at a later date. [Citation.] Manifestly, the shock of seeing a child severely inju 1985The Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that all three Dillon factors had been satisfied. ( 275 Cal. App.2d at p. 256 .) As to the second factor, the court noted that "[a] plaintiff claiming damages for emotional trauma as a result of injury to a third party must either be present at the time of the accident [citation] or the shock sustained by the plaintiff must be fairly contemporaneous with the accident rather than follow when the plaintiff is informed of the whole matter at a later date. [Citation.] Manifestly, the shock of seeing a child severely inj | 3 | 1975–1985 |
People v. Laboa
green
2 sentences1986(Id., at p. 488.) In contrast, in People v. Laboa (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 115 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 181 ], the court applied the Dillon analysis and concluded that a defendant’s life sentence for first degree felony murder was not grossly disproportionate to his individual culpability, even though he did not fire the fatal shot, and *1246 even though the shooting was accidental. 1986(Id., at p. 488.) In contrast, in People v. Laboa (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 115 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 181 ], the court applied the Dillon analysis and concluded that a defendant’s life sentence for first degree felony murder was not grossly disproportionate to his individual culpability, even though he did not fire the fatal shot, and *1246 even though the shooting was accidental. | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
green
2 sentences1986However, this cauterization of “the incursion of pure foreseeability . . . was not to be.” (Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 608 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ].) Instead, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 616 P.2d 813 ]. 1986However, this cauterization of “the incursion of pure foreseeability . . . was not to be.” (Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 608 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 899 ].) Instead, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 831 , 616 P.2d 813 ]. | 2 | 1984–1986 |
Powers v. Sissoev
green
2 sentences1985(See, e.g., Hathaway v. Superior Court (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 728 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 ] [electrocution]; Parsons v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d 506 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 , 5 A.L.R.4th 826 ] [car accident]; Nazaroff v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 553 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 ] [drowning]; Powers v. Sissoev (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 865 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 ] [car accident]; Archibald v. Braverman (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 253 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 ] [explosion].) One case, Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center (1973) 31 Cal. App.3d 22 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 ] has required that the chi 1985(See, e.g., Hathaway v. Superior Court (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 728 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 ] [electrocution]; Parsons v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d 506 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 , 5 A.L.R.4th 826 ] [car accident]; Nazaroff v. Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 553 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 ] [drowning]; Powers v. Sissoev (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 865 [ 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 ] [car accident]; Archibald v. Braverman (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 253 [ 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 ] [explosion].) One case, Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center (1973) 31 Cal. App.3d 22 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 ] has required that the chi | 2 | 1980–1985 |
Deboe v. Horn
green
2 sentences1978In Dillon this court set out the rule that "courts should allow recovery to a mother who suffers emotional trauma and physical injury from witnessing the infliction of death or injury to her child for which the tortfeasor is liable in negligence." (Italics added.) ( 68 Cal.2d at p. 730 .) The Court of Appeal in Deboe v. Horn (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 221 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 ] declined to extend the Dillon rule to include a wife who suffered emotional and physical injury when seeing her husband in the hospital hours after he had been injured in an automobile accident due to defendant's negligence. 1978In Dillon this court set out the rule that "courts should allow recovery to a mother who suffers emotional trauma and physical injury from witnessing the infliction of death or injury to her child for which the tortfeasor is liable in negligence." (Italics added.) ( 68 Cal.2d at p. 730 .) The Court of Appeal in Deboe v. Horn (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 221 [ 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 ] declined to extend the Dillon rule to include a wife who suffered emotional and physical injury when seeing her husband in the hospital hours after he had been injured in an automobile accident due to defendant's negligence. | 2 | 1978–1980 |
People v. Dillon
green
2 sentences2015(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ].) His arguments fail. 2015(People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ].) His arguments fail. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. ORABUENA
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Orabuena, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99-100.) Here, remand is appropriate for the juvenile court to reconsider Dillon's motion to dismiss his section 602 petition so as to exercise the full extent of its discretion, taking evidence offered by Dillon as to his and his parent's financial ability so as to decide whether the circumstances show Dillon successfully completed his program of informal supervision.8 IV. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Dix v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2014(See People v. Mora, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 615 [reduction of sentence under Dillon is the exception, not the rule].) Further, if only resentencing rather than modification of the verdict was involved, resentencing to avoid an unconstitutional sentence would clearly be a “reason rationally related to lawful sentencing.” (Dix, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 456 .) However, it does not flow from these principles that a trial court can resentence where it must also reduce the degree of the offense in order to do so, when a notice of appeal has been filed. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1992(Id. at pp. 1197-1200.) In People v. Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 552 , the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances and was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. 1992(Id. at pp. 1197-1200.) In People v. Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 552 , the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances and was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.
green
2 sentences1989And what if the plaintiff is present at the scene but is nevertheless unaware of the danger or injury to the third person until shortly after the accident has occurred . . . ?” (Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 313 .) As the foregoing sampling of Dillon’s progeny vividly demonstrates, we are no closer to answers today than we were then. 1989And what if the plaintiff is present at the scene but is nevertheless unaware of the danger or injury to the third person until shortly after the accident has occurred ...?" ( Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 313 .) As the foregoing sampling of Dillon's progeny vividly demonstrates, we are no closer to answers today than we were then. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
In Re Reed
green
1 sentence1989(In re Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d *252 at p. 924.) While King did involve “teenagers,” the facts and analysis of that case do not inform as to the tender ages of the two girls involved or fully discuss the Lynch/Dillon factors. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Ledger v. Tippitt green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Almaraz green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Rose green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Kelly green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Parsons v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Nazaroff v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Trapp v. Schuyler Construction green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Haught v. Maceluch green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Leong Ex Rel. Petagno v. Takasaki green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Henry L. Beanland v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Hair v. County of Monterey green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Baxter v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.