youth offender parole hearing in California

2026(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 277 ; People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193 , 197-198 (Sands).) The statute “offers opportunities for early release to certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 , 838 (Hardin).) With certain exceptions, people convicted of an offense committed when they were 25 or younger “shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing” during their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the sentence originally imposed. (§ 3051, subds. (b)(1)-

2026(Ortega, at p. 1256.) On appeal, the court, 9 citing Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 , held: “The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP.” (Ortega, at p. 1260.) “Here, the trial court sentenced Ortega to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 42 years, which would have made him eligible for parole at age 59.

2026(People v. Palaghiuc, supra, C043780.) As of January 1, 2020, defendants who committed crimes when they were 25 years old or younger are generally eligible for a youth offender parole hearing after specified periods, depending on their sentence. (§ 3051.) However, the statute excludes those defendants who, like defendant here, were sentenced to LWOP for crimes they committed when they were 18 to 25 years old. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4).) In 2023, defendant filed an in propria persona motion for appointment of counsel and requested a proceeding to preserve mitigating evidence for use in a future you

2026(Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 458 .) The motion should establish the defendant’s eligibility for “a youth offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred.” (Ibid.) 4.

2026“When it comes to criminal sentencing, the United States and California Supreme Courts have found the line drawn between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a rational one.” (Murray, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 464 8 [finding a rational basis for § 3051’s provision of a youth offender parole hearing to LWOP offenders who were under 18 at the time of their offense but not to those who were 18 or older]; see, e.g., Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 [“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing”]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 [“The age of 18 i

2026So we don’t look at whether or not she is actually paroled; we look at whether or not she actually has a parole hearing date, and she actually does have a parole hearing date next year.” The court observed that, “in Franklin, the defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life, and the California Supreme Court held that because Section 3051 entitles Franklin to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, his sentence, quote, ‘is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent,’ thus gives no rise to any, quote, ‘Miller[6] claim.’” “Under the Heard analysis, what Heard address

2025Citing Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 75 (Graham), the court found that Ortega “has ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’ As such, Petitioner was not sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP and is therefore ineligible for relief.” In October 2023, Ortega filed a notice of appeal. 2 2 We take judicial notice that after Ortega filed the instant appeal, he was provided with a youth offender parole hearing.

2024In support of his claim, he leverages the high court’s pronouncement made in the context of an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment challenge that “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers.” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 69 .) Defendant observes that because he was convicted of sexual offenses and sentenced under the One Strike law, he is categorically ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing. (§ 3051(h).) Had he been convicted of murder instead of O

2025(See, e.g., Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 369 [“a sentence of 50 3 years to life is functionally equivalent to LWOP”]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612 [“sentence of 23 years plus 80 years to life”]; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 , 1047 [67 years, plus 40 years to life]; People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 440 [10 years, plus 130 years to life].) More important, given that Arroyo has not shown he is excluded from a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051, his equal protection claim is moot.

2025(See, e.g., Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 369 [“a sentence of 50 3 years to life is functionally equivalent to LWOP”]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612 [“sentence of 23 years plus 80 years to life”]; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040 , 1047 [67 years, plus 40 years to life]; People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435 , 440 [10 years, plus 130 years to life].) More important, given that Arroyo has not shown he is excluded from a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051, his equal protection claim is moot.

2019Because **914 Franklin was eligible for such a hearing, we held that his Eighth Amendment challenge was rendered moot, and affirmed his sentence. ( Franklin , at pp. 280, 286, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) We also held that sections 3051 and 4801 contemplated "that information regarding the juvenile offender's characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate" consideration by the Board of Parole Hearings (Board). ( Franklin , at p. 283, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) Because assembling such informat

2019Because **914 Franklin was eligible for such a hearing, we held that his Eighth Amendment challenge was rendered moot, and affirmed his sentence. ( Franklin , at pp. 280, 286, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) We also held that sections 3051 and 4801 contemplated "that information regarding the juvenile offender's characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate" consideration by the Board of Parole Hearings (Board). ( Franklin , at p. 283, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 370 P.3d 1053 .) Because assembling such informat

2024In that case, we concluded there were “several rational bases” that would justify section 3051’s differential treatment of youthful offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, including (1) the Legislature’s potentially rational intent that section 3051 be a limited response to the precise issues identified by the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 ; (2) the potentially rational conclusion that providing a youth offender parole hearing to an 5 offender who is not entitled to parole at all appears absurd; and (3) the fact that the Legislatur

2022(People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 267-268 .) In 2013, the Legislature added section 3051, which established a youth offender parole hearing procedure “for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was under 18 years of age at the time of his or her controlling offense.” (Former § 3051, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) As originally enacted, juveniles sentenced to LWOP were not eligible for youth offender parole hearings.

2023(Sands, at p. 205.) Defendant argues that youthful Three Strike offenders are similarly situated to youthful offenders who were not sentenced under the Three Strikes law, including first degree murderers, and he argues there is no rational basis to deny a youth offender parole hearing to youthful Three Strike offenders while providing that benefit to “the worst [youthful] offenders.” He relies on People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183 , which held that the statutory exclusion of youthful offenders sentenced under the One Strike law violates equal protection because there is no rational ba

2023For ease of reference, we shall refer to those under 18 years as “juveniles” and to those between the ages of 18 and 26 years as “young adults.” Kenneth first challenges the constitutionality of the sections under which he was sentenced to LWOP (§§ 190.2, 190.5), arguing that their “retention of mandatory LWOPs for [young adult] offenders [who commit special circumstances murder] . . . deprives such offenders of equal protection.” He also challenges section 3051, the statute addressing eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing (a challenge we discuss below), as violating constitutional e

2021It determined the defendant was “entitled to remand for an opportunity to supplement the record with information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1131 .) Our Supreme Court held the trial court must provide a defendant “and the prosecution an opportunity to supplement the record” with information and “the trial court may exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” (Id. at pp.

2021“Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable basis for concluding, as defendant argues, that defendant was denied a sufficient opportunity to put on the record the kinds of information that . . . sections 3051 and 4801, subdivision (c) deem relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.” (People v. Woods, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088-1089, italics added; accord, People v. Medrano (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 961 , 963; cf. People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1131-1132 ; In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, 807 ; People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 .) Defendant says nothing

2022The age was raised to 23 years by an amendment that became effective on January 1, 2016.” (In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 981, fn. 6 ; see Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1.) “The section was later extended to offenders who were ‘under age 26 when they committed their crimes.’” (People 16 v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743 , 748; see Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1.) Thus, at the time of Smith’s plea, section 3051 provided that defendants like Smith who were under 23 years old when they committed their crimes would be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during their 25th year of incarcerat

2022(Edwards, at p. 194.) Section 3051 sets out that parole mechanism, which provides young persons convicted of serious offenses “‘the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has 14 shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity.’” (In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 980 .) “A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed when the person was 25 years of age or younger and for which the sentence is a life term of 25 years to life shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth-offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration

2018It is the intent of the Legislature to create a process by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful opportunity for release established." (See Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.) Section 3051, subdivision (a)(1) provides, "A youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by the Board of Parole Hearings for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was under 23 years of age at the time of his or her controlling offense." 6 The prisoner's " 'controlling offense' " is "the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longe

2018It is the intent of the Legislature to create a process by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful opportunity for release established." (See Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.) Section 3051, subdivision (a)(1) provides, "A youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by the Board of Parole Hearings for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was under 23 years of age at the time of his or her controlling offense." 6 The prisoner's " 'controlling offense' " is "the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longe

2026“When it comes to criminal sentencing, the United States and California Supreme Courts have found the line drawn between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a rational one.” (Murray, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 464 8 [finding a rational basis for § 3051’s provision of a youth offender parole hearing to LWOP offenders who were under 18 at the time of their offense but not to those who were 18 or older]; see, e.g., Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 [“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing”]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 [“The age of 18 i

2022Code, § 667.61) from youth 3 arguably unsound as a matter of policy to adhere to the bright line rule articulated in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 , the Legislature acted rationally in deciding that individuals sentenced to life without parole for a special-circumstance murder committed while still a minor (16 or 17 years old) were entitled to a youth offender parole hearing but young adults who committed the same offense after turning 18 were not.

2023In Gutierrez, our Supreme Court found “no constitutional infirmity” in section 190.5 (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1361 ), construing it to give the court the discretion “to sentence a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstance murder to life without parole or to 25 years to life, with no presumption in favor of [LWOP].” (Id. at p. 1360.) Moreover, after the enactment of the youth offender parole hearing statute (§ 3051), in practical terms, there is no such thing as LWOP for a defendant who committed a crime as a juvenile, because section 3051 “effectively reforms the

2022(Guerrero I, supra, B292313.) However, we remanded the matter for resentencing, explaining that, while the availability of a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051, subdivision (b)(4), mooted any Eighth Amendment challenge to Guerrero’s life without parole sentence under Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 , 3 section 190.5, subdivision (b), 2 Section 190.5, subdivision (b), prescribes, in the court’s discretion, a sentence of 25 years to life or life without parole for a 16- or 17-year-old offender found guilty of special-circumstance murder. 3 In Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 the Supre

2020Neither the entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation process ‘disturb[s] the finality of state convictions.’ [Citation.]” (In re Cook, at p. 451.)4 4 Alonzo contends In re Cook misquoted Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) __ U.S. __ [ 136 S.Ct. 718, 736 ], in that Montgomery did not rule on the finality of a judgment or the availability of postjudgment relief.

2019Neither the entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation process "disturb[s] the finality of state convictions." ( Montgomery , supra , 577 U.S. at p. ----, 136 S.Ct. at p. 736 .) It follows that nothing in that proceeding epends on the pendency of a direct appeal *676 challenging the judgment or this court's remand authority under section 1260.

2025(People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14 ; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 854 ; People v. Gray (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 148 , 168.) A reviewing court may exercise its discretion to reach the merits of an equal protection claim based on a facial challenge that was not raised below, because unlike as-applied constitutional claims, facial challenges involve pure questions of law that are not “correctable only by examining factual findings in the record or remanding to the trial court for further findings.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887 .) Section 3051, subdivis

2025Under rational basis review, courts “consider whether the challenged classification ultimately bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 289 .) Hardin then turned to whether there was a rational basis to exclude persons sentenced to life without parole for a crime committed when they were 18 or older from a youth offender parole hearing.

2024“While this court will not condone unconstitutional variances in the statutory consequences of our criminal laws,” rational basis review requires us to extend substantial respect to the Legislature’s judgments, for “ ‘ “ ‘[o]nly by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.’ ” ’ ” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 889 .) Our legislative bodies may continue to consider the issue and how to balance concerns about the severity of certain crimes with the o

2023(E.g., People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193 , 204 [“The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age.”]; In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456 , 463-464; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326 , 349; People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189 , 196-198; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769 , 779-780.) Most recently, the Second District Court of Appeal recognized “the Legislature acted rationally in deciding that individuals sentenced to life 8. without parole for a special-circumstance murder

2018FACTUAL BACKGROUND In 1991, Williams, then age 21, was convicted of first degree murder under Penal Code section 187 and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 28 *797 years to life. 1 In 1996, while serving his sentence, Williams pleaded guilty to battery on a non-prisoner (§ 4501.5), for which he was sentenced to an eight year consecutive term to be served after the completion of his life term. (§ 1170.1, subd. (c); In re Thompson (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 256 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 192 ( Thomson ).) On December 29, 2016, Williams became eligible for a youth offender parole hearing. ( §§ 3051 and

2018FACTUAL BACKGROUND In 1991, Williams, then age 21, was convicted of first degree murder under Penal Code section 187 and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 28 *797 years to life. 1 In 1996, while serving his sentence, Williams pleaded guilty to battery on a non-prisoner (§ 4501.5), for which he was sentenced to an eight year consecutive term to be served after the completion of his life term. (§ 1170.1, subd. (c); In re Thompson (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 256 , 218 Cal.Rptr. 192 ( Thomson ).) On December 29, 2016, Williams became eligible for a youth offender parole hearing. ( §§ 3051 and

2026(People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 618 .) Defendants who were 25 years old or younger at the time they committed the offense and were convicted of a determinate term are entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during their 15th year of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(1).) “The youth parole eligible date for a person eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under this paragraph shall be the first day of the person’s 15th year of incarceration.” (§ 3051, subd. (b)(1).) The parole board was to “give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the h

2021Relevant law “[T]he California Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), which became effective January 1, 2014, and enacted sections 3051, 3046, subdivision (c), and 4801, subdivision (c), to provide a parole eligibility mechanism for juvenile offenders.” (People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 618 .) “In October 2015, the Legislature amended section 3051, and effective January 1, 2016, anyone who committed his or her 3 It follows that counsel’s concession that defendant was the actual shooter does not amount to an argument against his client. 10 controlling offense be

2025(In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040 , 1054–1055 (Kirchner.) The court explained that section 1170(d) provided “only a selective and qualified remedy … premised on an inquiry that may, but does not necessarily, overlap with the one demanded under Miller.” ( Kirchner, supra, at pp. 1054– 1055.) In response to Kirchner, the Legislature amended section 3051 to add subdivision (b)(4), which provides juveniles sentenced to LWOP a youth offender parole hearing during their 25th year of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4), added by Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.) Nevertheless, the Legislature did not

2025(In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040 , 1054–1055 (Kirchner.) The court explained that section 1170(d) provided “only a selective and qualified remedy … premised on an inquiry that may, but does not necessarily, overlap with the one demanded under Miller.” ( Kirchner, supra, at pp. 1054– 1055.) In response to Kirchner, the Legislature amended section 3051 to add subdivision (b)(4), which provides juveniles sentenced to LWOP a youth offender parole hearing during their 25th year of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4), added by Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.) Nevertheless, the Legislature did not

2022In denying the motion, the trial court said, “I understand you would like to seek appellate review, and I think that’s appropriate.” Pursuant to section 3051, an offender who receives a life sentence for a crime committed “before the person had attained 18 years of age … shall be eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration.” (Id., subd. (b)(4).) “As originally enacted, section 3051 applied only to non-LWOP offenses committed before the offender was 18 years old. [Citation] [But a]n amendment effective January 1, 2018 … includ

2021Jan. 1, 2018.) Under section 3051 “an offender who committed a ‘controlling offense’ under the age of 26 is entitled to a ‘youth offender parole hearing’ during his or her 15th year of incarceration if he [or she] received a determinate sentence; during his or her 20th year of incarceration if he or she received a life term of less than 25 years to life; and during his or her 25th year of incarceration if he or she received a term of 25 years to life. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(1)-(3).) An offender convicted of a controlling offense committed before the age of 18 for which he or she was sentenced to L

2026(See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 880 , [“ ‘[w]hen the Legislature “has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded” ’ ”].) As a defendant who was sentenced under the Three Strikes law, Torres is not eligible for a Franklin hearing or a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051.4 4 Torres does not argue that his exclusion as a strike offender violates equal protection.

2026(See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 880 , [“ ‘[w]hen the Legislature “has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded” ’ ”].) As a defendant who was sentenced under the Three Strikes law, Torres is not eligible for a Franklin hearing or a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051.4 4 Torres does not argue that his exclusion as a strike offender violates equal protection.

2021“Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable basis for concluding, as defendant argues, that defendant was denied a sufficient opportunity to put on the record the kinds of information that . . . sections 3051 and 4801, subdivision (c) deem relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.” (People v. Woods, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088-1089, italics added; accord, People v. Medrano (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 961 , 963; cf. People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1131-1132 ; In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, 807 ; People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 .) Defendant says nothing

2020“Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable basis for concluding, as defendant argues, that defendant was denied a sufficient opportunity to put on the record the kinds of information that . . . sections 3051 and 4801, subdivision (c) deem relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.” (People v. Woods, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088-1090, italics added; accord, People v. Medrano (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 961 , 963; cf. People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1131-1132 ; In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797, 807 ; People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 .) That we find no reason

2025(See People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193 , 199 (Sands).) He appeals from the trial court’s denial of his post-judgment motion for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051.1 His appellate counsel filed a brief identifying no issues as grounds for relief, complying with the procedure established in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, 231-232 (Delgadillo).

2024No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. —————————— Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), we review this appeal of an order denying an evidentiary hearing to preserve evidence for a youth offender parole hearing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1203.01, People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 .

2024For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment. [Citations.] But the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26. . . . [T]he Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further.” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 204.) Further, as explained in Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pages 779 through 780, when discussing the amendment to section 3051 to include juvenile LWOP offenders, “Section 3051 now affords a youth offender parole hearing to juvenile LWOP offende

2021(Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347; see Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 736 [“[a] State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting 3 juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing”].) Section 3051, subdivision (h), continues to exclude certain categories of youthful offenders from the youth offender parole hearing process.

2023In Gutierrez, our Supreme Court found “no constitutional infirmity” in section 190.5 (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1361 ), construing it to give the court the discretion “to sentence a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstance murder to life without parole or to 25 years to life, with no presumption in favor of [LWOP].” (Id. at p. 1360.) Moreover, after the enactment of the youth offender parole hearing statute (§ 3051), in practical terms, there is no such thing as LWOP for a defendant who committed a crime as a juvenile, because section 3051 “effectively reforms the

2021(Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.) To that end, Senate Bill 394 amends section 3051 to add subdivision (b)(4), which provides: “A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and for which the sentence is life without the possibility of parole shall be eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing, unless previously released or entitled to an earlier parole consideration hearing pursuant to other statutory provisions.” People v. Lozano (2017) 16 Cal.A