8 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Texasgreen2 sentences2007Rather, Johnson argued that "the future dangerousness inquiry did not allow the jury to take account of how [his youth] bore upon his personal culpability.” Id. 2007Rather, Johnson argued that "the future dangerousness inquiry did not allow the jury to take account of how [his youth] bore upon his personal culpability." Id. | 1 | 3 |
Jurek v. Texasgreen2 sentences2025See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 274–76 (1976); Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 297 ; see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 440 (2008) (recognizing Court’s prior holding that Texas statute’s inquiry into defendant’s future dangerousness meets State’s obligation to ensure individualized sentencing in capital murder cases). 2007The Court disagreed and stated, "If any jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth made him less culpable for the murder, there is no reasonable likelihood that those jurors would have deemed themselves foreclosed from considering and evaluating petitioner's future-dangerousness." Id. at 370 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [54] Id. at 371 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [55] Id. at 371-72 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 493, 110 S.Ct. 1257 ). [56] Id. at 372 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [57] Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). [58] Lockett v. Ohio, | 1 | 2 |
Kennedy v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2025See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 274–76 (1976); Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 297 ; see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 440 (2008) (recognizing Court’s prior holding that Texas statute’s inquiry into defendant’s future dangerousness meets State’s obligation to ensure individualized sentencing in capital murder cases). | 1 | 1 |
Hunter v. Stategreen1 sentence2012When reviewing a legal-sufficiency challenge to a jury’s finding of future dangerousness, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 65 See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d 664, 674 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Nenno v. Stategreen1 sentence2010In point of error sixteen, appellant alleges that the “10/12 rule” violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.134 In point of error seventeen, appellant alleges that the future dangerousness inquiry results in the arbitrary and disproportionate imposition of the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.135 In point of error eighteen, appellant argues that the future dangerousness scheme violates the Texas constitutional proscription against cruel or unusual punishment.136 In point of error nineteen, appellant comp | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2010App. 1998). 134 Smith v. State, 297 S.W.3d 260, 278 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Saffle v. Parksgreen2 sentences2007The Court disagreed and stated, "If any jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth made him less culpable for the murder, there is no reasonable likelihood that those jurors would have deemed themselves foreclosed from considering and evaluating petitioner's future-dangerousness." Id. at 370 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [54] Id. at 371 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [55] Id. at 371-72 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 493, 110 S.Ct. 1257 ). [56] Id. at 372 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [57] Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). [58] Lockett v. Ohio, 2007The Court disagreed and stated, "If any jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth made him less culpable for the murder, there is no reasonable likelihood that those jurors would have deemed themselves foreclosed from considering and evaluating petitioner's future-dangerousness." Id. at 370 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [54] Id. at 371 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [55] Id. at 371-72 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 493, 110 S.Ct. 1257 ). [56] Id. at 372 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [57] Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). [58] Lockett v. Ohio, | 1 | 1 |
Chamberlain v. Stategreen1 sentence2000XXXIII, at 50 (emphasis added). [30] The future dangerousness special issue asks jurors "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1). [31] The future dangerousness instruction is now article 37.071 section 2(b)(1). [32] See Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). [33] Id. [34] The robbery and attempted possession of a deadly weapon offenses were committed in New York. [35] There were questions at trial about a second knife missing from the butcher block in t | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2000XXXIII, at 50 (emphasis added). [30] The future dangerousness special issue asks jurors "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1). [31] The future dangerousness instruction is now article 37.071 section 2(b)(1). [32] See Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). [33] Id. [34] The robbery and attempted possession of a deadly weapon offenses were committed in New York. [35] There were questions at trial about a second knife missing from the butcher block in t | 1 | 1 |
Keeton v. Stategreen2 sentences2000XXXIII, at 50 (emphasis added). [30] The future dangerousness special issue asks jurors "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1). [31] The future dangerousness instruction is now article 37.071 section 2(b)(1). [32] See Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). [33] Id. [34] The robbery and attempted possession of a deadly weapon offenses were committed in New York. [35] There were questions at trial about a second knife missing from the butcher block in t 2000XXXIII, at 50 (emphasis added). [30] The future dangerousness special issue asks jurors "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1). [31] The future dangerousness instruction is now article 37.071 section 2(b)(1). [32] See Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). [33] Id. [34] The robbery and attempted possession of a deadly weapon offenses were committed in New York. [35] There were questions at trial about a second knife missing from the butcher block in t | 1 | 1 |
Matamoros v. Stategreen1 sentence2000XXXIII, at 50 (emphasis added). [30] The future dangerousness special issue asks jurors "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1). [31] The future dangerousness instruction is now article 37.071 section 2(b)(1). [32] See Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). [33] Id. [34] The robbery and attempted possession of a deadly weapon offenses were committed in New York. [35] There were questions at trial about a second knife missing from the butcher block in t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coble v. State
green
2 sentences2025See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 274–76 (1976); Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 297 ; see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 440 (2008) (recognizing Court’s prior holding that Texas statute’s inquiry into defendant’s future dangerousness meets State’s obligation to ensure individualized sentencing in capital murder cases). 2015We have emphasized that the future-dangerousness special issue focuses on the degree to which a defendant “poses a real threat of future violence.” See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 268 . | 2 | 2015–2025 |
Lockett v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2007The Court disagreed and stated, "If any jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth made him less culpable for the murder, there is no reasonable likelihood that those jurors would have deemed themselves foreclosed from considering and evaluating petitioner's future-dangerousness." Id. at 370 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [54] Id. at 371 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [55] Id. at 371-72 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 493, 110 S.Ct. 1257 ). [56] Id. at 372 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [57] Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). [58] Lockett v. Ohio, 2007The Court disagreed and stated, "If any jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth made him less culpable for the murder, there is no reasonable likelihood that those jurors would have deemed themselves foreclosed from considering and evaluating petitioner's future-dangerousness." Id. at 370 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [54] Id. at 371 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [55] Id. at 371-72 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 493, 110 S.Ct. 1257 ). [56] Id. at 372 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [57] Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). [58] Lockett v. Ohio, | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Eddings v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2007The Court disagreed and stated, "If any jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth made him less culpable for the murder, there is no reasonable likelihood that those jurors would have deemed themselves foreclosed from considering and evaluating petitioner's future-dangerousness." Id. at 370 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [54] Id. at 371 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [55] Id. at 371-72 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 493, 110 S.Ct. 1257 ). [56] Id. at 372 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [57] Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). [58] Lockett v. Ohio, 2007The Court disagreed and stated, "If any jurors believed that the transient qualities of petitioner's youth made him less culpable for the murder, there is no reasonable likelihood that those jurors would have deemed themselves foreclosed from considering and evaluating petitioner's future-dangerousness." Id. at 370 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [54] Id. at 371 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [55] Id. at 371-72 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 493, 110 S.Ct. 1257 ). [56] Id. at 372 , 113 S.Ct. 2658 . [57] Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). [58] Lockett v. Ohio, | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.