best-interests analysis in Arizona

2026Ultimately, the court’s primary concern during the best-interests inquiry is “protecting a child’s interest in stability and security.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1 , 4 ¶ 15 (2016) (citation modified).

2024Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 (2016). “[C]ourts should consider a parent’s rehabilitation efforts as part of the best-interests analysis” but not “subordinate the interests of the child to those of the parent once a determination of [parental] unfitness has been made.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 15.

2026When performing a best-interests analysis, courts "presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence." Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 35 (2005)).

2025When performing the best-interests analysis, courts "presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence." Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286, ¶ 35 (2005)).

2022See id. at 150– 51 ¶ 13; see also Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96 , 98–99 ¶ 12 (App. 2016) (noting that bonding between a child and biological parent is a factor but not dispositive in a best-interests analysis). ¶32 To the extent the court of appeals’ opinion suggests that a court must give equal weight to a parent’s interest in the custody and care of a child and the child’s interests in security and stability and then balance those interests in making the best-interests determination, we disagree.

2018Dominique M., 240 Ariz. at 97-98, ¶¶ 6, 9 . ¶14 Second, the best-interests analysis does not require DCS to have an immediate adoption plan in place at the time of severance when the child is “adoptable.” Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 19 .

2025Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, ¶ 27 (“We will not substitute our judgment by reweighing the evidence underlying the court’s best-interests analysis.”). ¶20 In explaining its finding that Anthony was the parent more likely to facilitate contact with the other parent, the trial court noted that Tamara had “repeatedly made allegations or initiated proceedings against [Anthony] in an attempt to reduce [Anthony]’s parenting time.” The court’s statement might have referred, in part, to the positions Tamara took in the initial paternity proceedings and her prior petitions to reduce Anthony’s parenting ti

2025“We will not substitute our judgment by reweighing the evidence underlying the court’s best-interests analysis.” Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 27 . ¶15 Here, the court made written findings on all the statutory factors and the reasons it was in Lucy’s best interests to modify legal decision-making and parenting time.

2018Indeed, “[t]he State’s interest in finding the child an alternative permanent home arises only when it is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal family home for the child.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 (1982) (internal quotation and citation omitted). ¶16 While the severance-ground inquiry focuses on the parent, the best-interests inquiry primarily focuses on the child.

2018Indeed, Santosky recognized that once such a finding has been made, the parent and child no longer "share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship," and "the court may assume ... that the interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge." 455 U.S. at 760 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ; see also Demetrius L. , 239 Ariz. at 4 ¶ 15, 365 P.3d at 356 ; Kent K. , 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 35, 110 P.3d at 1020 . ¶ 16 The court of appeals further erred in its best-interests analysis by quoting Roberto F. to support its statement that the material issue in the best-intere

2026Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 11 (App. 2009). ¶13 Specific findings enable effective appellate review, guide the best-interests analysis, and provide a baseline against which future best- interests inquiries are measured.

2022See Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

2024According to Father, the child could not celebrate Thanksgiving or other holidays with his new brother or extended family because of the limited holiday schedule. ¶16 While Mother may disagree about the weight the superior court should give the evidence, “[w]e will not substitute our judgment by reweighing the evidence underlying the court’s best-interests analysis.” Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 27 ; see also Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 18 (App. 2015) (Appellate courts defer to the superior court’s credibility determinations and resolution of conflicting evidence.).

2020Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 15 (App. 2013) (citing Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977)); Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 16 (App. 2003) (quoting Canty v. Canty, 178 Ariz. 443, 448 (App. 1994)); see also Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 17 (App. 2015) (quoting Canty, 178 Ariz. at 448 ).

2020Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 15 (App. 2013) (citing Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977)); Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 16 (App. 2003) (quoting Canty v. Canty, 178 Ariz. 443, 448 (App. 1994)); see also Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 17 (App. 2015) (quoting Canty, 178 Ariz. at 448 ).

2019See Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 15 (App. 2013) (citing Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977)); Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 16 (App. 2003) 1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version. 2 Father argues that we should not address the merits of Mother’s appeal because she did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites to filing a petition to modify within one year of the original order.

2020Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 15 (App. 2013) (citing Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977)); Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 16 (App. 2003) (quoting Canty v. Canty, 178 Ariz. 443, 448 (App. 1994)); see also Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 17 (App. 2015) (quoting Canty, 178 Ariz. at 448 ).

2019See Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 15 (App. 2013) (citing Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977)); Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 16 (App. 2003) 1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version. 2 Father argues that we should not address the merits of Mother’s appeal because she did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites to filing a petition to modify within one year of the original order.

2020Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 15 (App. 2013) (citing Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977)); Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 16 (App. 2003) (quoting Canty v. Canty, 178 Ariz. 443, 448 (App. 1994)); see also Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 17 (App. 2015) (quoting Canty, 178 Ariz. at 448 ).

2019See Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 15 (App. 2013) (citing Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283 (1977)); Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 422, ¶ 16 (App. 2003) 1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version. 2 Father argues that we should not address the merits of Mother’s appeal because she did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites to filing a petition to modify within one year of the original order.

2019Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). ¶8 Mother does not contest the superior court’s ruling on the statutory grounds for termination; she argues only that the superior court erred by finding severance to be in the children’s best interests. ¶9 The best-interests inquiry focuses on the interests of the child as distinct from those of the parent.

2018Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 13 . ¶26 “While the severance-ground inquiry focuses on the parent, the best-interests inquiry primarily focuses on the child.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 778 Ariz. Adv.

2023We also stated that the best-interests requirement could be met if “the petitioner proves that a current adoptive plan exists for the child . . . or even that the child is adoptable.” Id. ¶25 Here, the court reasonably concluded that the current placement was meeting the children’s needs and that the children were adoptable.

2018And, in reliance on that statement, we have said the best-interests requirement may be met by proof "that the child is adoptable." Mary Lou C. , 207 Ariz. 43 , ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 43 .

2026Sec., 222 Ariz. 369, 371, ¶ 3 (App. 2009)).

2023Id. at 371 ¶ 3. ¶10 In Antonio M., a parent challenged the juvenile court’s placement of his child with the foster family rather than a relative.

2026Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, 209, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

2025See, e.g., Dep’t of Child Safety v. Beene, 235 Ariz. 300 , 304 ¶ 9 (App. 2014). 4 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.L., et al.

2023See Pridgeon, 134 Ariz. at 180 . ¶29 For these reasons, the court was within its discretion not to address the COVID-19 incident within the context of Father’s petition to modify.4 The court, therefore, did not err in terminating its analysis once it found Father had failed to show there had been a material change in circumstances.

2022See Navajo Nation, 230 Ariz. at 349, ¶ 38 (“While the record shows that it would be easier for [the child] to be exposed comprehensively to Navajo culture by living with a Navajo family, there is evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that he could still be so exposed through the cooperative efforts of his relatives and the current placement.”). ¶33 The Nation counters with unpersuasive arguments that would narrow the best-interests inquiry.

2022See Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 343, ¶ 14 . 4 MARLOWE v. MICKELSEN Decision of the Court ¶14 Father, nonetheless, argues the superior court should have allowed him to present evidence on the best-interests factors to rebut § 25- 403.03.D’s presumption against awarding him sole or joint legal decision- making, relying on Olesen v. Daniel, 251 Ariz. 25, 30, ¶ 23 (App. 2021). ¶15 Father misplaces his reliance on Olesen for two reasons.

2022See Stephenson v. Nastro, 192 Ariz. 475, 481, ¶ 17 (App. 1998); see also Antonsen, 186 Ariz. at 7 (“‘[T]he determination of the best interests of the child must be made separately, after the resolution of biological paternity,’ when the mother contests the presumptive father’s paternity, and when the tests confirm the presumptive father is not biologically related to the child.”) (citation omitted).

2022See Stephenson v. Nastro, 192 Ariz. 475, 481, ¶ 17 (App. 1998); see also Antonsen, 186 Ariz. at 7 (“‘[T]he determination of the best interests of the child must be made separately, after the resolution of biological paternity,’ when the mother contests the presumptive father’s paternity, and when the tests confirm the presumptive father is not biologically related to the child.”) (citation omitted).

2022Xavier R. v. Joseph R., 230 Ariz. 96, 100, ¶ 11 (App. 2012). ¶8 The court considers the totality of the circumstances when conducting the best-interests inquiry.

2020Action No. JS-6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 559 (App. 1988) (finding the existence of a statutory ground for severance that negatively effects a child to be relevant to the best-interests analysis).