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15 Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 2003–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Griffin v. Griffingreen2 sentences2026The discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test, Code § 20-124.3, reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.” Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 83 (2003). 2025In reaching its holding, this Court observed that “[c]ustody and visitation disputes between two fit parents involve one parent’s fundamental right pitted against the other parent’s fundamental right” and that “[t]he discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test . . . reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.” Id. at 83 . | 10 | 13 |
Yopp v. Hodgesgreen2 sentences2026The discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test, Code § 20-124.3, reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.”); Copeland, 282 Va. at 197 (“In [custody] cases, ‘the best interests of the child are paramount and form the lodestar for the guidance of the court in determining the dispute.’” (quoting Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 99 (1986))); Yopp, 43 Va. App. at 440 (affirming the trial court’s application of the best-interests test). 2026See Yopp v. Hodges, 43 Va. App. 427, 439 (2004). | 4 | 4 |
Copeland v. Toddgreen2 sentences2026The discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test, Code § 20-124.3, reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.”); Copeland, 282 Va. at 197 (“In [custody] cases, ‘the best interests of the child are paramount and form the lodestar for the guidance of the court in determining the dispute.’” (quoting Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 99 (1986))); Yopp, 43 Va. App. at 440 (affirming the trial court’s application of the best-interests test). 2012The discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test, Code § 20-124.3, reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.” Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 83 , 581 S.E.2d 899, 902 (2003).8 8 The cases cited by husband on brief do not apply because they involve parent- nonparent disputes, e.g, Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 198 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 19 (2011) (terminating parental rights in favor of adoption by non-parents); State v. Letourneau, 997 P.2d 436, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing restriction on visitation with convict’s children), or because the | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2025On the other hand, “a dispute between a fit parent and a non-parent” reflects a “very different kind of legal contest” where “the best-interests test should be applied only if the trial court first finds ‘an actual harm to the child’s health or welfare without such visitation.’” Id. (quoting Williams, 256 Va. at 22 ). 2016In order to protect those rights, mother is correct that Virginia courts have found that “in a dispute between a fit parent and a non-parent ... the best-interests test should be applied only if the trial court first finds can actual harm to the child’s health or welfare without such visitation.’ ” Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va.App. 77, 83 , 581 S.E.2d 899, 902 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 256 Va. 19, 22 , 501 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1998)). | 1 | 2 |
Bailes v. Soursgreen1 sentence2026The discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test, Code § 20-124.3, reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.”); Copeland, 282 Va. at 197 (“In [custody] cases, ‘the best interests of the child are paramount and form the lodestar for the guidance of the court in determining the dispute.’” (quoting Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 99 (1986))); Yopp, 43 Va. App. at 440 (affirming the trial court’s application of the best-interests test). | 1 | 1 |
Josephina Duchesne as Administratrix of the Estate of Pauline Perez v. Jule M. Sugarmangreen1 sentence2026Additionally, Father quotes Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977), in arguing that the best-interests standard infringes on children’s “reciprocal right to the integrity of the family, from not being dislocated from the ‘emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association,’ with the parent.” However, we cannot address Father’s argument. -6- Simply put, Father lacks standing to assert the rights of his children, who are not parties here. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2012The discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test, Code § 20-124.3, reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.” Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 83 , 581 S.E.2d 899, 902 (2003).8 8 The cases cited by husband on brief do not apply because they involve parent- nonparent disputes, e.g, Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 198 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 19 (2011) (terminating parental rights in favor of adoption by non-parents); State v. Letourneau, 997 P.2d 436, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing restriction on visitation with convict’s children), or because the | 1 | 1 |
Cassell v. Cassellgreen1 sentence2012App. 1994) (citing Alabama rule applied when “a divorce judgment is modified . . . based on misconduct”); J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409, 413 (Alaska 1996) (expanding the “infer[ence] that the best interests of the child standard normally requires unrestricted visitation with the noncustodial parent” to require “findings that specify how unsupervised visitation will adversely affect” the child (emphasis added)); In re Marriage of Parr, 240 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. App. 2010) (noting “a requirement that visitation be supervised . . . implicates the endangerment standard” in Colorado); Cassell v. Ca | 1 | 1 |
State v. Letourneaugreen1 sentence2012The discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test, Code § 20-124.3, reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.” Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 83 , 581 S.E.2d 899, 902 (2003).8 8 The cases cited by husband on brief do not apply because they involve parent- nonparent disputes, e.g, Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 198 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 19 (2011) (terminating parental rights in favor of adoption by non-parents); State v. Letourneau, 997 P.2d 436, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing restriction on visitation with convict’s children), or because the | 1 | 1 |
Jfe v. Jasgreen1 sentence2012App. 1994) (citing Alabama rule applied when “a divorce judgment is modified . . . based on misconduct”); J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409, 413 (Alaska 1996) (expanding the “infer[ence] that the best interests of the child standard normally requires unrestricted visitation with the noncustodial parent” to require “findings that specify how unsupervised visitation will adversely affect” the child (emphasis added)); In re Marriage of Parr, 240 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. App. 2010) (noting “a requirement that visitation be supervised . . . implicates the endangerment standard” in Colorado); Cassell v. Ca | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Parr and Lymangreen1 sentence2012App. 1994) (citing Alabama rule applied when “a divorce judgment is modified . . . based on misconduct”); J.F.E. v. J.A.S., 930 P.2d 409, 413 (Alaska 1996) (expanding the “infer[ence] that the best interests of the child standard normally requires unrestricted visitation with the noncustodial parent” to require “findings that specify how unsupervised visitation will adversely affect” the child (emphasis added)); In re Marriage of Parr, 240 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. App. 2010) (noting “a requirement that visitation be supervised . . . implicates the endangerment standard” in Colorado); Cassell v. Ca | 1 | 1 |
Carr v. Broylesgreen2 sentences2012App. 2007), or involve state law standards far different from the best-interests standard codified by Code § 20-124.3, e.g., Carr v. Broyles, 652 So. 2d 299, 304 (Ala. Civ. 2012App. 2007), or involve state law standards far different from the best-interests standard codified by Code § 20-124.3, e.g., Carr v. Broyles, 652 So. 2d 299, 304 (Ala. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Browngreen2 sentences2005See Brown, 30 Va. App. at 538 , 518 S.E.2d at 338 . 2005See Brown, 30 Va. App. at 538 , 518 S.E.2d at 338 . | 1 | 1 |
Dotson v. Hyltongreen2 sentences2003We disagree with husband that our reasoning conflicts with Dotson v. Hylton, 29 Va.App. 635, 639 , 513 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1999), which held: “When only one parent objects to a [non-parent’s] visitation and the other parent requests it, the trial court is not required to follow the standard enumerated in Williams.” Unlike Dotson , the “other parent” in our case (Michael Groh) did not request that visitation be awarded to *84 husband. 2003We disagree with husband that our reasoning conflicts with Dotson v. Hylton, 29 Va.App. 635, 639 , 513 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1999), which held: “When only one parent objects to a [non-parent’s] visitation and the other parent requests it, the trial court is not required to follow the standard enumerated in Williams.” Unlike Dotson , the “other parent” in our case (Michael Groh) did not request that visitation be awarded to *84 husband. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. City of Richmond
green
1 sentence2026Unless a statute provides otherwise, our general rule with respect to third party standing is that an individual “may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her.” Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 463 , reh’g denied, 6 Va. App. 296 (1988). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Coleman v. City of Richmond
green
1 sentence2026Unless a statute provides otherwise, our general rule with respect to third party standing is that an individual “may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her.” Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459, 463 , reh’g denied, 6 Va. App. 296 (1988). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Troxel v. Granville
green
1 sentence2012See Code § 20-103(E). 7 On brief, husband correctly asserts: “Pertinent to the issues raised here, the Court did not find that any child abuse had occurred — whether sexual or any other kind.” Appellant’s Br. at 13 (emphasis in original). -6- On appeal, husband argues the trial court should have applied the constitutional actual- harm test, as required by Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), and its progeny. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mlb v. Slj
green
1 sentence2012The discretion afforded trial courts under the best-interests test, Code § 20-124.3, reflects a finely balanced judicial response to this parental deadlock.” Griffin v. Griffin, 41 Va. App. 77, 83 , 581 S.E.2d 899, 902 (2003).8 8 The cases cited by husband on brief do not apply because they involve parent- nonparent disputes, e.g, Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 198 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 19 (2011) (terminating parental rights in favor of adoption by non-parents); State v. Letourneau, 997 P.2d 436, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing restriction on visitation with convict’s children), or because the | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Williams v. Williams
green
2 sentences2003In this latter situation, the best-interests test should be applied only if the trial court first finds “an actual harm to the child’s health or welfare without such visitation.” Id. (quoting Williams, 24 Va.App. at 784-85 , 485 S.E.2d at 654 ). 2003In this latter situation, the best-interests test should be applied only if the trial court first finds “an actual harm to the child’s health or welfare without such visitation.” Id. (quoting Williams, 24 Va.App. at 784-85 , 485 S.E.2d at 654 ). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.