commonly raised exception in California

2018Unlike statutory exemptions, categorical exemptions such as the "existing facilities" exemption are subject to exceptions enumerated in Guidelines section 15300. 2. ( North Coast , supra , 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 850 , 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 229 .) An agency may not apply a categorical exemption without considering whether it is foreclosed by an exception. ( Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086 , 1103, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 643 , 343 P.3d 834 ( Berkeley Hillside ).) The most commonly raised exception is the "unusual circumstances" exception at issue here.

2018Unlike statutory exemptions, categorical exemptions such as the "existing facilities" exemption are subject to exceptions enumerated in Guidelines section 15300. 2. ( North Coast , supra , 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 850 , 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 229 .) An agency may not apply a categorical exemption without considering whether it is foreclosed by an exception. ( Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086 , 1103, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 643 , 343 P.3d 834 ( Berkeley Hillside ).) The most commonly raised exception is the "unusual circumstances" exception at issue here.

2013The most commonly raised exception is subdivision (c) of section 15300.2, which provides that an activity which would otherwise be categorically exempt is not exempt if there are ‘unusual circumstances’ which create a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment.” (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 115 .) As relevant here, the “cumulative impact” exception in subdivision (b) of Guidelines section 15300.2 provides that a public agency may not rely on a categorical exemption “when the cumulative impact of successive pro

2013The most commonly raised exception is subdivision (c) of section 15300.2, which provides that an activity which would otherwise be categorically exempt is not exempt if there are „unusual circumstances‟ which create a „reasonable 9 possibility‟ that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment.” (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 115 .) As relevant here, the “cumulative impact” exception in subdivision (b) of Guidelines section 15300.2 provides that a public agency may not rely on a categorical exemption “when the cumulative impact of successive p

2013The most commonly raised exception is subdivision (c) of section 15300.2, which provides that an activity which would otherwise be categorically exempt is not exempt if there are ‘unusual circumstances’ which create a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment.” (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 115 .) As relevant here, the “cumulative impact” exception in subdivision (b) of Guidelines section 15300.2 provides that a public agency may not rely on a categorical exemption “when the cumulative impact of successive pro

2013The most commonly raised exception is subdivision (c) of section 15300.2, which provides that an activity which would otherwise be categorically exempt is not exempt if there are ‘unusual circumstances’ which create a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment.” (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 115 .) As relevant here, the “cumulative impact” exception in subdivision (b) of Guidelines section 15300.2 provides that a public agency may not rely on a categorical exemption “when the cumulative impact of successive pro

2003A challenger must therefore produce substantial evidence showing a reasonable possibility of adverse environmental impact sufficient to remove the project from the categorically exempt class.” (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 112-113, 115; see also Apartment Assn. of Greater Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1162, 1172-1175 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 504 ].) With these principles in mind, we evaluate appellant’s contentions.

2003A challenger must therefore produce substantial evidence showing a reasonable possibility of adverse environmental impact sufficient to remove the project from the categorically exempt class.” (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 112-113, 115; see also Apartment Assn. of Greater Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1162, 1172-1175 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 504 ].) With these principles in mind, we evaluate appellant’s contentions.

1999A challenger must therefore produce substantial evidence showing a reasonable possibility of adverse environmental impact sufficient to remove the project from the categorically exempt class. [Citations.]” (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 106, 115 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 612 ]; Association for Protection etc. Values v. City of Ukiah (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 720, 728 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 488 ] (Ukiah).) There is a split of authority on the appropriate standard of judicial review for a local agency’s decision on the applicability of the Guidelines section 15300.2(c) exception to a projec

1999A challenger must therefore produce substantial evidence showing a reasonable possibility of adverse environmental impact sufficient to remove the project from the categorically exempt class. [Citations.]” (Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 106, 115 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 612 ]; Association for Protection etc. Values v. City of Ukiah (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 720, 728 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 488 ] (Ukiah).) There is a split of authority on the appropriate standard of judicial review for a local agency’s decision on the applicability of the Guidelines section 15300.2(c) exception to a projec