7 California opinions name it 1 courts 1986–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doney v. Tambouratgisgreen2 sentences1999We question Gibbs’s right to alter her position, and depart from her theory of trial, by now insisting that her emotional distress claim survived the loss of her CFRA claim and faulting American Airlines for not producing evidence which Gibbs may have led it to believe was unnecessary. *11 Nevertheless, we proceed to address Gibbs’s claim that American Airlines lost its workers’ compensation exclusivity defense by failing to affirmatively prove the “conditions of compensation” at trial. “[Generally speaking, a defendant in a civil action who claims to be one of that class of persons protected 1999We question Gibbs’s right to alter her position, and depart from her theory of trial, by now insisting that her emotional distress claim survived the loss of her CFRA claim and faulting American Airlines for not producing evidence which Gibbs may have led it to believe was unnecessary. *11 Nevertheless, we proceed to address Gibbs’s claim that American Airlines lost its workers’ compensation exclusivity defense by failing to affirmatively prove the “conditions of compensation” at trial. “[Generally speaking, a defendant in a civil action who claims to be one of that class of persons protected | 1 | 1 |
Shapiro v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co.green2 sentences1999The jury returned a special verdict in favor of defendant American Airlines on Gibbs’s claim for violation of CFRA, finding that Gibbs did not “give American Airlines notice of the need for a leave under the California Family Rights Act.” Gibbs concedes that the jury was properly instructed on CFRA’s notice provisions, but argues that she was entitled to JNOV because the jury’s finding was “erroneous.” “‘“The scope of appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontr 1999The jury returned a special verdict in favor of defendant American Airlines on Gibbs’s claim for violation of CFRA, finding that Gibbs did not “give American Airlines notice of the need for a leave under the California Family Rights Act.” Gibbs concedes that the jury was properly instructed on CFRA’s notice provisions, but argues that she was entitled to JNOV because the jury’s finding was “erroneous.” “‘“The scope of appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontr | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. Owens Corninggreen2 sentences1999The jury returned a special verdict in favor of defendant American Airlines on Gibbs’s claim for violation of CFRA, finding that Gibbs did not “give American Airlines notice of the need for a leave under the California Family Rights Act.” Gibbs concedes that the jury was properly instructed on CFRA’s notice provisions, but argues that she was entitled to JNOV because the jury’s finding was “erroneous.” “‘“The scope of appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontr 1999The jury returned a special verdict in favor of defendant American Airlines on Gibbs’s claim for violation of CFRA, finding that Gibbs did not “give American Airlines notice of the need for a leave under the California Family Rights Act.” Gibbs concedes that the jury was properly instructed on CFRA’s notice provisions, but argues that she was entitled to JNOV because the jury’s finding was “erroneous.” “‘“The scope of appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontr | 1 | 1 |
County of Alameda v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1997(County of Alameda v. Johnson (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 259, 264 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ]; § 4053, subd. (f) [“Child support may therefore appropriately improve the standard of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the children.”].) In this respect, Gibbs had already received a windfall by not having had to support Deshaun until he had reached the age of 15. 1997(County of Alameda v. Johnson (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 259, 264 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 483 ]; § 4053, subd. (f) [“Child support may therefore appropriately improve the standard of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the children.”].) In this respect, Gibbs had already received a windfall by not having had to support Deshaun until he had reached the age of 15. | 1 | 1 |
Friedman v. Stadumgreen2 sentences1988Because a malicious prosecution action cannot be brought during the pendency of an appeal in the underlying action (Friedman v. Stadum (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 775, 778-779 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 585 ]), such a turn of events would render the plaintiff’s action premature and thus subject to dismissal (id., at p. 779). *337 The Gibbs rule also unduly complicates the computation of the running of the statute. 1988Because a malicious prosecution action cannot be brought during the pendency of an appeal in the underlying action (Friedman v. Stadum (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 775, 778-779 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 585 ]), such a turn of events would render the plaintiff’s action premature and thus subject to dismissal (id., at p. 779). *337 The Gibbs rule also unduly complicates the computation of the running of the statute. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Metropolitan Water District v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2026At oral argument, defendants’ counsel cited Metropolitan, supra, 32 Cal.4th 491 . 2026At oral argument, defendants’ counsel cited Metropolitan, supra, 32 Cal.4th 491 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys.
green
1 sentence2026In our view, the court was properly reluctant to sanction a contractual basis for Gibbs’s claim, as 19 “[t]he terms and conditions of public employment are ordinarily considered to be statutory rather than contractual.” (Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (2019) 6 Cal.5th 965, 970 .) In any event, given our conclusion that the county had mandatory statutory duties to maintain at least some of Gibbs’s records and allow her to inspect them, we need not resolve her undeveloped alternative theory that these obligations may have also been a part of the county’s co | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Kelly
red
1 sentence2015The procedure should have been subjected to Kelly [People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 ] analysis.” Gibbs further argued, “Apart from the Kelly rule deficiency in this case, there is a foundational weakness in the dog identification evidence.” In response to Gibbs’s motion, the court conducted a lengthy preliminary fact determination hearing (Evidence Code section 402 et seq.) in which the following evidence was adduced. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. A-Mark Coin Co.
green
2 sentences2014(Ibid.) Rare Coin, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 330 , which refined the Gibbs rule, concluded the appellate process is exhausted when the remittitur issues and jurisdiction is revested in the superior court. 2014(Ibid.) Rare Coin, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 330 , which refined the Gibbs rule, concluded the appellate process is exhausted when the remittitur issues and jurisdiction is revested in the superior court. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Courts
green
2 sentences1986(See People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 693 P.2d 778 ].) Gibbs’ motion for a mistrial on the eve of resuming the trial was not coupled with a motion for continuance or any other condition making “timeliness” an issue. 1986(See People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 693 P.2d 778 ].) Gibbs’ motion for a mistrial on the eve of resuming the trial was not coupled with a motion for continuance or any other condition making “timeliness” an issue. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.