premises liability claim in Georgia

2025It is a plaintiff’s knowledge of the specific hazard that determines whether the plaintiff can prevail on a premises liability claim.9 7 Cf. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 739 (1) ( 493 SE2d 403 ) (1997) (“The trial court can conclude as a matter of law that the facts do or do not show negligence on the part of the defendant or the plaintiff only where the evidence is plain, palpable and undisputable.”) (punctuation omitted). 8 See Gervin, 354 Ga. App. at 13 (1) (“[A] plaintiff is not entitled to recovery if the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff’s knowledge of the hazar

2025It is a plaintiff’s knowledge of the specific hazard that determines whether the plaintiff can prevail on a premises liability claim.9 7 Cf. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 739 (1) ( 493 SE2d 403 ) (1997) (“The trial court can conclude as a matter of law that the facts do or do not show negligence on the part of the defendant or the plaintiff only where the evidence is plain, palpable and undisputable.”) (punctuation omitted). 8 See Gervin, 354 Ga. App. at 13 (1) (“[A] plaintiff is not entitled to recovery if the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff’s knowledge of the hazar

2022Co. of Va., 282 Ga. 771, 772 ( 653 SE2d 699 ) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 658 SE2d 362 ) (2008) (“A plaintiff cannot recover on a premises liability claim unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard . . .” (punctuation omitted)). 7 Camp v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 626, 626 ( 484 SE2d 349 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. Toys R Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 191 (1) ( 504 SE2d 31 ) (1998) (“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that some water would normally be present at a place where shoppers conti

2022Co. of Va., 282 Ga. 771, 772 ( 653 SE2d 699 ) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 658 SE2d 362 ) (2008) (“A plaintiff cannot recover on a premises liability claim unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard . . .” (punctuation omitted)). 7 Camp v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 626, 626 ( 484 SE2d 349 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. Toys R Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 191 (1) ( 504 SE2d 31 ) (1998) (“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that some water would normally be present at a place where shoppers conti

2023See Munroe, 277 Ga. at 866 (addressing the equally divided issue of whether summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligent hiring/retention claim should be affirmed and remanding to the Court of Appeals to consider “the trial court’s rulings on other claims by Munroe”); Munroe v. Universal Health Svcs., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 320, 320-321 ( 605 SE2d 928 ) (2004) (addressing, on remand, the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim and rejecting the plaintiff’s premises liability claim raised for the first time on appeal); Hoffman, 260 Ga. at 588 -590 & n.1 (explaining t

2023See Munroe, 277 Ga. at 865 (addressing the equally divided issue of whether summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligent hiring/retention claim should be affirmed and remanding to the Court of Appeals to consider “the trial court’s rulings on other claims by Munroe”); Munroe v. Universal Health Services, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 320, 320-321 (605 SE2d 928) (2004) (addressing, on remand, the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim and rejecting the plaintiff’s premises liability claim raised for the first time on appeal); Hoffman, 260 Ga. at 588-590 & n.1 (explaining t

2011In going on to find that, as a matter of law, the precautions taken by the owners to protect their invitees from that danger were reasonable under the circumstances, the dissent, in our view, usurps the role of the jury. [10] See American Multi-Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. at 446 (3), 679 S.E.2d 25 (Where there was evidence that collapsible "Wet Floor" signs tend to fall on contact with moving crowds, that a theater owner's agents set up such a sign in an area just before a large concentration of patrons would cross that area to exit, and that a patron did not see the collapsed sign on the floor u

2011In going on to find that, as a matter of law, the precautions taken by the owners to protect their invitees from that danger were reasonable under the circumstances, the dissent, in our view, usurps the role of the jury. [10] See American Multi-Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga. at 446 (3), 679 S.E.2d 25 (Where there was evidence that collapsible "Wet Floor" signs tend to fall on contact with moving crowds, that a theater owner's agents set up such a sign in an area just before a large concentration of patrons would cross that area to exit, and that a patron did not see the collapsed sign on the floor u

2021The Supreme Court of Georgia distinguished the plaintiff’s claims from a premises liability claim on the basis that the case did “not concern a condition of the premises over which Rich’s could have exercised some degree of control or of which Rich’s could have warned; instead, the claims pertain[ed] to an act of active negligence on the part of a Rich’s employee.” Id. 11 Here, Stanton argues that jury questions exist regarding whether Griffin engaged in active negligence by “allow[ing] people to operate the zipline without any safety information or equipment” and failing to give “warnings, in

2020Stores, 263 Ga. 865 ( 440 SE2d 193 ) (1994) (decided before Robinson v. Kroger, 268 Ga. 735 ( 493 SE2d 403 ) (1997), but with instructive analysis distinguishing a plaintiff’s claims from a premises liability claim pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-1 because the claims did “not concern a condition of the premises over which [the proprietor] could have exercised some degree of control or of which [the proprietor] could have warned; instead, the claims pertain[ed] to an act of active negligence on the part of a [proprietor’s] employee.”). 11 See Byrom, 338 Ga. App. 768, 772 (2) (“[T]he duty concerning a c

2026Generally, in order to recover on a premises-liability claim arising from third-party criminal conduct, a plaintiff must present evidence of “a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.”11 And as to the duty element, a proprietor owes its invitees a “duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.”12 That said, the landowner is not “an insurer of an invitee’s safety [and], [a]n 10 Tookes v. Murray, 297 Ga. App. 765, 766 ( 678 SE2d 209 ) (2009). 11 Pappas Rest., Inc. v. Welch, 371 Ga. App. 614 , 616 ( 901 SE2d 751 ) (2024) (punctuation omitted).

2026Generally, in order to recover on a premises-liability claim arising from third-party criminal conduct, a plaintiff must present evidence of “a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.”11 And as to the duty element, a proprietor owes its invitees a “duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.”12 That said, the landowner is not “an insurer of an invitee’s safety [and], [a]n 10 Tookes v. Murray, 297 Ga. App. 765, 766 ( 678 SE2d 209 ) (2009). 11 Pappas Rest., Inc. v. Welch, 371 Ga. App. 614 , 616 ( 901 SE2d 751 ) (2024) (punctuation omitted).

2023See also Thompson v. City of Atlanta, 274 Ga. App. 1, 4 (2) ( 616 SE2d 219 ) (2005).

2023See also Thompson v. City of Atlanta, 274 Ga. App. 1, 4 (2) ( 616 SE2d 219 ) (2005).

2022Co. of Va., 282 Ga. 771, 772 ( 653 SE2d 699 ) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 658 SE2d 362 ) (2008) (“A plaintiff cannot recover on a premises liability claim unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard . . .” (punctuation omitted)). 7 Camp v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 626, 626 ( 484 SE2d 349 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. Toys R Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 191 (1) ( 504 SE2d 31 ) (1998) (“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that some water would normally be present at a place where shoppers conti

2022Co. of Va., 282 Ga. 771, 772 ( 653 SE2d 699 ) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 658 SE2d 362 ) (2008) (“A plaintiff cannot recover on a premises liability claim unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard . . .” (punctuation omitted)). 7 Camp v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 626, 626 ( 484 SE2d 349 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. Toys R Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 191 (1) ( 504 SE2d 31 ) (1998) (“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that some water would normally be present at a place where shoppers conti

2014In Miller v. City Views at Rosa Burney Park GP, LLC, 323 Ga. App. 590, 592-598 ( 746 SE2d 710 ) (2013), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellants on the vicarious liability and punitive damages claims and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the premises liability claim.

2014In Miller v. City Views at Rosa Burney Park GP, LLC, 323 Ga. App. 590, 592-598 ( 746 SE2d 710 ) (2013), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellants on the vicarious liability and punitive damages claims and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the premises liability claim.

2012But a plaintiff asserting a premises liability claim for injuries sustained from a dog bite is “required to produce evidence of the vicious propensity of the dog in order to show the dangerous condition of which the premises owner had superior knowledge.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Wade, 246 Ga. App. at 461 (1).

2012But a plaintiff asserting a premises liability claim for injuries sustained from a dog bite is “required to produce evidence of the vicious propensity of the dog in order to show the dangerous condition of which the premises owner had superior knowledge.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Wade, 246 Ga. App. at 461 (1).

2011See id.

2011See id.

2024“As a general rule, in order to recover on a premises liability claim arising from third-party criminal conduct, a plaintiff must present evidence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.” Carmichael, 316 Ga. at 721 (II) (A).

2023We agree. (a) Duty. 6 In Ga. CVS Pharmacy v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 ( 890 SE2d 209 ) (2023), our Supreme Court addressed “the scope and nature of the liability faced by premises owners [and] occupiers . . . in cases involving personal injuries arising from third- party criminal conduct[,]” clarifying the standards to be applied.

2020But the record contains no evidence that Jerry was an owner, officer, administrator, or employee of The Providers.12 As summarized in Dorothy’s deposition, she is the CEO, and Jerry has no role in the business as an officer or 10 (Emphasis in original.) Murphy v. Blue Bird Body Co., 207 Ga. App. 853, 857 (3) ( 429 SE2d 530 ) (1993) (concluding that an invitee plaintiff had not identified a premises liability claim implicated by the plaintiff’s injury from an alleged misuse of the defendant’s forklift).

2020But the record contains no evidence that Jerry was an owner, officer, administrator, or employee of The Providers.12 As summarized in Dorothy’s deposition, she is the CEO, and Jerry has no role in the business as an officer or 10 (Emphasis in original.) Murphy v. Blue Bird Body Co., 207 Ga. App. 853, 857 (3) ( 429 SE2d 530 ) (1993) (concluding that an invitee plaintiff had not identified a premises liability claim implicated by the plaintiff’s injury from an alleged misuse of the defendant’s forklift).

2017As we emphasized in Norwich , “ ‘it is the plaintiff’s knowledge of the specific hazard which caused the fall that determines whether the plaintiff can prevail on a premises liability claim.’ ” 332 Ga. App. at 163 (emphasis in original), quoting Orff v. Stonewood Restaurant Group, 285 Ga.App. 488, 490 ( 646 SE2d 702 ) (2007). 1 Here, the record shows without dispute that Kane successfully traversed the ramp, which included its sloping sides, on her way into the restaurant, and there is no evidence that conditions had changed such that her perception of the ramp could have been materially diffe

2017As we emphasized in Norwich , “ ‘it is the plaintiff’s knowledge of the specific hazard which caused the fall that determines whether the plaintiff can prevail on a premises liability claim.’ ” 332 Ga. App. at 163 (emphasis in original), quoting Orff v. Stonewood Restaurant Group, 285 Ga.App. 488, 490 ( 646 SE2d 702 ) (2007). 1 Here, the record shows without dispute that Kane successfully traversed the ramp, which included its sloping sides, on her way into the restaurant, and there is no evidence that conditions had changed such that her perception of the ramp could have been materially diffe

2026See Cham, 311 Ga. at 174 (2)(a).

2025See also Rentz v. Prince of Albany, Inc., 340 Ga. App. 388, 390 (1) ( 797 SE2d 254 ) (2017). 6 “If nothing obstructs the invitee’s ability to see the static condition, the proprietor may safely assume that the invitee will see it and will realize any associated risks.”10 Before the accident, Bobby had on a prior occasion safely driven down the driveway, across the bridge, into the parking area, and turned around, driving back out the same way.

2025See also Rentz v. Prince of Albany, Inc., 340 Ga. App. 388, 390 (1) ( 797 SE2d 254 ) (2017). 6 “If nothing obstructs the invitee’s ability to see the static condition, the proprietor may safely assume that the invitee will see it and will realize any associated risks.”10 Before the accident, Bobby had on a prior occasion safely driven down the driveway, across the bridge, into the parking area, and turned around, driving back out the same way.

2025See id.

2023See Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B., 300 Ga. 840, 841-842 (1) (797 SE2d 87) (2017); Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 492.

2023See Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B., 300 Ga. 840, 841-842 (1) (797 SE2d 87) (2017); Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 492.

2023See Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B., 300 Ga. 840, 841-842 (1) (797 SE2d 87) (2017); Lau’s Corp., 261 Ga. at 492.

2023See Munroe, 277 Ga. at 865 (addressing the equally divided issue of whether summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligent hiring/retention claim should be affirmed and remanding to the Court of Appeals to consider “the trial court’s rulings on other claims by Munroe”); Munroe v. Universal Health Services, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 320, 320-321 (605 SE2d 928) (2004) (addressing, on remand, the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim and rejecting the plaintiff’s premises liability claim raised for the first time on appeal); Hoffman, 260 Ga. at 588-590 & n.1 (explaining t

2023See Munroe, 277 Ga. at 865 (addressing the equally divided issue of whether summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligent hiring/retention claim should be affirmed and remanding to the Court of Appeals to consider “the trial court’s rulings on other claims by Munroe”); Munroe v. Universal Health Services, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 320, 320-321 (605 SE2d 928) (2004) (addressing, on remand, the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim and rejecting the plaintiff’s premises liability claim raised for the first time on appeal); Hoffman, 260 Ga. at 588-590 & n.1 (explaining t

2022Co. of Va., 282 Ga. 771, 772 ( 653 SE2d 699 ) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 658 SE2d 362 ) (2008) (“A plaintiff cannot recover on a premises liability claim unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard . . .” (punctuation omitted)). 7 Camp v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 626, 626 ( 484 SE2d 349 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. Toys R Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 191 (1) ( 504 SE2d 31 ) (1998) (“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that some water would normally be present at a place where shoppers conti

2022Co. of Va., 282 Ga. 771, 772 ( 653 SE2d 699 ) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 658 SE2d 362 ) (2008) (“A plaintiff cannot recover on a premises liability claim unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard . . .” (punctuation omitted)). 7 Camp v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 626, 626 ( 484 SE2d 349 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. Toys R Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 191 (1) ( 504 SE2d 31 ) (1998) (“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that some water would normally be present at a place where shoppers conti

2022Co. of Va., 282 Ga. 771, 772 ( 653 SE2d 699 ) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 658 SE2d 362 ) (2008) (“A plaintiff cannot recover on a premises liability claim unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard . . .” (punctuation omitted)). 7 Camp v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 626, 626 ( 484 SE2d 349 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. Toys R Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 191 (1) ( 504 SE2d 31 ) (1998) (“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that some water would normally be present at a place where shoppers conti

2022Cf. Cook v. Arrington, 183 Ga. App. 384, 385 ( 358 SE2d 869 ) (1987) (“The risk of harm imposed by some accumulation of water on the floor of business premises during rainy days is not unusual or unreasonable in itself, but is one to which all who go out on a rainy day may be exposed and which all may expect or anticipate.” (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied)). 6 the rain as fast as it falls or blows in, or is carried in by wet feet or clothing or umbrellas.”9 Finally, in order to recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove “(1) that the defendant had

2022Cf. Cook v. Arrington, 183 Ga. App. 384, 385 ( 358 SE2d 869 ) (1987) (“The risk of harm imposed by some accumulation of water on the floor of business premises during rainy days is not unusual or unreasonable in itself, but is one to which all who go out on a rainy day may be exposed and which all may expect or anticipate.” (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied)). 6 the rain as fast as it falls or blows in, or is carried in by wet feet or clothing or umbrellas.”9 Finally, in order to recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove “(1) that the defendant had

2022Cf. Cook v. Arrington, 183 Ga. App. 384, 385 ( 358 SE2d 869 ) (1987) (“The risk of harm imposed by some accumulation of water on the floor of business premises during rainy days is not unusual or unreasonable in itself, but is one to which all who go out on a rainy day may be exposed and which all may expect or anticipate.” (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied)). 6 the rain as fast as it falls or blows in, or is carried in by wet feet or clothing or umbrellas.”9 Finally, in order to recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove “(1) that the defendant had

2022Cf. Cook v. Arrington, 183 Ga. App. 384, 385 ( 358 SE2d 869 ) (1987) (“The risk of harm imposed by some accumulation of water on the floor of business premises during rainy days is not unusual or unreasonable in itself, but is one to which all who go out on a rainy day may be exposed and which all may expect or anticipate.” (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied)). 6 the rain as fast as it falls or blows in, or is carried in by wet feet or clothing or umbrellas.”9 Finally, in order to recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove “(1) that the defendant had

2022Co. of Va., 282 Ga. 771, 772 ( 653 SE2d 699 ) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 658 SE2d 362 ) (2008) (“A plaintiff cannot recover on a premises liability claim unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard . . .” (punctuation omitted)). 7 Camp v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 626, 626 ( 484 SE2d 349 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. Toys R Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 191 (1) ( 504 SE2d 31 ) (1998) (“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that some water would normally be present at a place where shoppers conti

2022Co. of Va., 282 Ga. 771, 772 ( 653 SE2d 699 ) (2007) (punctuation omitted); see Diaz v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 889, 891 ( 658 SE2d 362 ) (2008) (“A plaintiff cannot recover on a premises liability claim unless the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard . . .” (punctuation omitted)). 7 Camp v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 626, 626 ( 484 SE2d 349 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. Toys R Us, Inc., 233 Ga. App. 188, 191 (1) ( 504 SE2d 31 ) (1998) (“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that some water would normally be present at a place where shoppers conti

2022See also Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 13-17 (3)-(4) ( 650 SE2d 709 ) (2007) (although the plaintiff could not prevail as to a claim of negligence per se, a jury had to determine whether the defendant breached its “legal duty to exercise due care” “under the tort doctrine of premises liability”) (punctuation omitted).

2022See also Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 13-17 (3)-(4) ( 650 SE2d 709 ) (2007) (although the plaintiff could not prevail as to a claim of negligence per se, a jury had to determine whether the defendant breached its “legal duty to exercise due care” “under the tort doctrine of premises liability”) (punctuation omitted).