premises liability claim in Illinois

2025Smart v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120901 , ¶ 54; (citing Reed, 298 Ill.

2019In fact, Kun Mook’s complaint specifically alleged that Young Rok resided at the house where he was injured, and he referred to himself as an invitee. ¶ 26 Thus, it is likewise irrelevant that Kun Mook claims that, “[u]nder circumstances where a landowner’s conduct in creating an unsafe condition precedes the plaintiff’s injury, a plaintiff may elect to pursue a negligence claim, a premises liability claim, or both” (citing Reed v. Wal- Mart Stores, Inc., 298 Ill.

2023See Avila v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 190636 , ¶¶ 86-87 (premises liability instruction was proper where the plaintiff, who sustained injuries after falling down a staircase at a train station, alleged that the defendant chose not to have an anti-skid surface and handrails that extended to the landing); Garcia v. Goetz, 2018 IL App (1st) 172204, ¶¶17, 31 (premises liability instruction was proper where most of the plaintiff’s allegations supported elements of a premises liability claim and most of the evidence showed that it was the condition of the defendant’s basement sta

2023See Avila v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 190636 , ¶¶ 86-87 (premises liability instruction was proper where the plaintiff, who sustained injuries after falling down a staircase at a train station, alleged that the defendant chose not to have an anti-skid surface and handrails that extended to the landing); Garcia v. Goetz, 2018 IL App (1st) 172204 (premises liability instruction was proper -8- No. 1-22-1116 where most of the plaintiff’s allegations supported elements of a premises liability claim and most of the evidence showed that it was the condition of the defendant’s base

2018Genaust v. -4- Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 468 (1976); see also LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 389-90 (1998).

2017Genaust v. Illinois Power Co. , 62 Ill. 2d 456 , 468, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976) ; see also LaFever v. Kemlite Co. , 185 Ill. 2d 380 , 389-90, 235 Ill.Dec. 886 , 706 N.E.2d 441 (1998).

2015Under these circumstances, unless Mular exercised reasonable diligence in her efforts to serve Ingram, Rule 103(b) dictates that her complaint “shall” be dismissed with prejudice. ¶ 20 The purpose of Rule 103(b)’s requirement that a plaintiff exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining service on a defendant is “to protect a defendant from unnecessary delay in the service of process and to prevent the plaintiff from circumventing the applicable statute of limitations, which is designed to afford the defendant a fair opportunity of investigation, by filing suit before the expiration of the limit

2015Under these circumstances, unless Mular exercised reasonable diligence in her efforts to serve Ingram, Rule 103(b) dictates that her complaint "shall" be dismissed with prejudice. ¶ 20 The purpose of Rule 103(b)'s requirement that a plaintiff exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining service on a defendant is "to protect a defendant from unnecessary delay in the service of process and to prevent the plaintiff from circumventing the applicable statute of limitations, which is designed to afford the defendant a fair opportunity of investigation, by filing suit before the expiration of the limit

2008Legal Aspects of Sport 107, 125 (Winter 2007) (listing 19 Illinois state and federal court cases between 1990 and 2005). 10 No. 1-06-1447 supreme court has held with respect to a premises liability claim that “[t]he existence of an open and obvious danger is not a per se bar to finding that a defendant who owns, occupies or controls land has a duty to exercise reasonable care.” Jackson, 185 Ill. 2d at 425 , Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 449 (not “an automatic or per se bar”).

2008Our supreme court has held with respect to a premises liability claim that “[t]he existence of an open and obvious danger is not a per se bar to finding that a defendant who owns, occupies or controls land has a duty to exercise reasonable care.” Jackson, 185 Ill. 2d at 425 ; Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 449 (not “an automatic or per se bar”).

2007Recently, in Blue v. Environmental Engineering, Inc., 215 Ill. 2d 78, 101-08 , 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1144-48 (2005), our supreme court also addressed the open-and-obvious doctrine’s relation to the duty analysis in a premises-liability claim.

2007Recently, in Blue v. Environmental Engineering, Inc., 215 Ill. 2d 78, 101-08 , 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1144-48 (2005), our supreme court also addressed the open-and-obvious doctrine’s relation to the duty analysis in a premises-liability claim.

2023See Avila v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 190636 , ¶¶ 86-87 (premises liability instruction was proper where the plaintiff, who sustained injuries after falling down a staircase at a train station, alleged that the defendant chose not to have an anti-skid surface and handrails that extended to the landing); Garcia v. Goetz, 2018 IL App (1st) 172204, ¶¶17, 31 (premises liability instruction was proper where most of the plaintiff’s allegations supported elements of a premises liability claim and most of the evidence showed that it was the condition of the defendant’s basement sta

2023See Avila v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 190636 , ¶¶ 86-87 (premises liability instruction was proper where the plaintiff, who sustained injuries after falling down a staircase at a train station, alleged that the defendant chose not to have an anti-skid surface and handrails that extended to the landing); Garcia v. Goetz, 2018 IL App (1st) 172204 (premises liability instruction was proper -8- No. 1-22-1116 where most of the plaintiff’s allegations supported elements of a premises liability claim and most of the evidence showed that it was the condition of the defendant’s base

2018Genaust v. -4- Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 468 (1976); see also LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 389-90 (1998).

2017Genaust v. Illinois Power Co. , 62 Ill. 2d 456 , 468, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976) ; see also LaFever v. Kemlite Co. , 185 Ill. 2d 380 , 389-90, 235 Ill.Dec. 886 , 706 N.E.2d 441 (1998).

2023Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). ¶ 47 As relevant here, plaintiff’s complaint consisted of two counts, i.e., negligence and premises liability. “[W]here a landowner’s conduct in creating an unsafe condition precedes the plaintiff’s injury, a plaintiff may elect to pursue a negligence claim, a premises liability claim, or both.” Smart v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120901 , ¶ 54.

2021Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 (1992).

2021Garcia v. Goetz, 2018 IL App (1st) 172204, ¶ 31 ; see also Simmons, 198 Ill. 2d at 556 .

2020McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 251, 255 (2000).

2020Id. ¶ 47 Here, the record makes clear that defendant submitted her special interrogatories for the sole purpose of testing a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the premises liability claim.

2020Specifically, defendant -12- 1-19-2193 argues that she asked questions at plaintiff’s deposition that revolved primarily around plaintiff’s prior knowledge of the wood on the floor, and had she known that plaintiff would be permitted to amend the complaint to include a claim of negligence, she would have also asked questions designed to show a lack of negligence by defendant or comparative negligence by plaintiff. ¶ 36 As an initial matter, defendant refers to the following legal principles: “Ordinarily, once a trial has begun, an amendment should not be permitted to set up matters of which th

2020See Lee v. Lee, 2019 IL App (2d) 180923, ¶¶ 20-25 ; see also Atchley, 2016 IL App (1st) 152481, ¶ 32 (concluding that the “open and obvious doctrine pertains to the element of duty in a negligence action”). ¶ 66 We now turn to the merits of REIT’s open and obvious defense.

2020Smart v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120901 , ¶ 54; Atchley v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2016 IL App (1st) 152481 , ¶ 32 n.4. “[P]laintiffs are the masters of their complaint and are entitled to proceed under whichever theory they decide, so long as the evidence supports such a theory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smart, 2013 IL App (1st) 120901 , ¶ 54. ¶ 65 Greenhill relies on Smart, 2013 IL App (1st) 120901 , ¶ 56, which provides that a “claim that the unreasonably dangerous condition of property proved by the plaintiff was open and obvious is a defense to a premis

2020Smart v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120901 , ¶ 54; Atchley v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2016 IL App (1st) 152481 , ¶ 32 n.4. “[P]laintiffs are the masters of their complaint and are entitled to proceed under whichever theory they decide, so long as the evidence supports such a theory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smart, 2013 IL App (1st) 120901 , ¶ 54. ¶ 65 Greenhill relies on Smart, 2013 IL App (1st) 120901 , ¶ 56, which provides that a “claim that the unreasonably dangerous condition of property proved by the plaintiff was open and obvious is a defense to a premis

2011See Skelton, 214 Ill.App.3d at 573-74 , 158 Ill.Dec. 130 , 573 N.E.2d 1315 . ¶ 38 In arguing that the allegations relating to the lack of an adequate public address system and sufficient platform barriers should be governed by the standard of ordinary care, the defendants entirely misconstrue the applicability of the premises liability rule set forth above.

2011See Skelton, 214 Ill.App.3d at 573-74 , 158 Ill.Dec. 130 , 573 N.E.2d 1315 . ¶ 38 In arguing that the allegations relating to the lack of an adequate public address system and sufficient platform barriers should be governed by the standard of ordinary care, the defendants entirely misconstrue the applicability of the premises liability rule set forth above.

2004Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002); Sollami v. Eaton , 201 Ill. 2d 1, 6 , 772 N.E.2d 215, 218 (2002).

2004Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002); Sollami v. Eaton , 201 Ill. 2d 1, 6 , 772 N.E.2d 215, 218 (2002).