MOU hearing in California

2026Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4); Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 606 .) Kendrick was not a party to the MOU and could not claim contractual attorney fees.

2026Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4); Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 606 .) Kendrick was not a party to the MOU and could not claim contractual attorney fees.

2026The trial court nonetheless concluded that he was entitled to attorney fees under section 1717, which provides “a reciprocal remedy for a nonsignatory defendant, sued on a contract as if he were a party to it, when a plaintiff would clearly be entitled to attorney’s fees should he prevail in enforcing the contractual obligation against the defendant.” (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 128 .) Moses argues that Kendrick was not entitled to fees under section 1717 because Moses did not bring a breach of contract claim against Kendrick.7 We agree. 7 Respondents argue that Mose

2022(See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 258 .) Our Supreme Court, moreover, has considered arbitration authority in the context of a case involving the discharge of a public employee.

2020The issue of Mou’s credibility was a matter for the trial court to resolve, not this court. “[S]o long as the trier of fact does not act arbitrarily and has a rational ground for doing so, it may reject the testimony of a witness even though the witness is uncontradicted. [Citations.] Consequently, the testimony of a witness which has been rejected by the trier of fact cannot be credited on appeal unless, in view of the whole record, it is clear, positive, and of such a nature that it cannot rationally be disbelieved.” (Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.

2020(See Nelson, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1560 ; see also Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 491 .) Having clarified the relevance of the marital standard of living to the overall determination of spousal support under section 4320, we examine what remains of Mou’s claim of error.

2016(Ortega, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086 .) The City does not raise (and did not raise in the trial court) any independent basis for dismissal of Saavedra’s non-FEHA claims on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative or judicial remedies.

2015(Fauth I, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1424 .) The County’s failure to provide Fauth with an opportunity to respond, either before or after termination, constituted a denial of Fauth’s due process rights, which, in turn, entitled Fauth to back pay until she received a proper hearing and decision on her MOU appeal. ( Barber, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 402-403; Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 215 .) There is more than ample evidence establishing that the County violated Fauth’s due process rights by terminating her without complying with due process procedural requirements stated in MOU Article XII.

2015(Fauth I, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1424 .) The County’s failure to provide Fauth with an opportunity to respond, either before or after termination, constituted a denial of Fauth’s due process rights, which, in turn, entitled Fauth to back pay until she received a proper hearing and decision on her MOU appeal. ( Barber, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 402-403; Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 215 .) There is more than ample evidence establishing that the County violated Fauth’s due process rights by terminating her without complying with due process procedural requirements stated in MOU Article XII.

2015(Fauth I, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414 , and Sanchez, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 32 .) Although in Sanchez, the County said it was rescinding termination, the County, in effect, did not completely rescind termination because the County did not restore all of the employee’s wages and benefits that she would have been entitled to had she been an employee. 18 Fauth I and Sanchez are not on point here because in those cases there had not yet been a MOU hearing and therefore we did not address the issue of whether the MOU hearing officer was required to find the County terminated the employe

2015(Fauth I, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414 , and Sanchez, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 32 .) Although in Sanchez, the County said it was rescinding termination, the County, in effect, did not completely rescind termination because the County did not restore all of the employee’s wages and benefits that she would have been entitled to had she been an employee. 18 Fauth I and Sanchez are not on point here because in those cases there had not yet been a MOU hearing and therefore we did not address the issue of whether the MOU hearing officer was required to find the County terminated the employe

2015F. Back pay Extending from Termination, Until Date of Arbitrator’s Decision Because the County denied Fauth’s request for a MOU hearing, under Barber, she is entitled to back pay from the time of her termination on March 17, 2007, until the date the arbitrator issued his decision on September 24, 2010. ( Barber, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 404-405.) Fauth is entitled to back pay during this period because of the County’s “imposition of discipline prior to affording [her] notice of the reasons for the punitive action and an opportunity to respond.

2015F. Back pay Extending from Termination, Until Date of Arbitrator’s Decision Because the County denied Fauth’s request for a MOU hearing, under Barber, she is entitled to back pay from the time of her termination on March 17, 2007, until the date the arbitrator issued his decision on September 24, 2010. ( Barber, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 404-405.) Fauth is entitled to back pay during this period because of the County’s “imposition of discipline prior to affording [her] notice of the reasons for the punitive action and an opportunity to respond.

2015(Fauth I, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414 , and Sanchez, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 32 .) Although in Sanchez, the County said it was rescinding termination, the County, in effect, did not completely rescind termination because the County did not restore all of the employee’s wages and benefits that she would have been entitled to had she been an employee. 18 Fauth I and Sanchez are not on point here because in those cases there had not yet been a MOU hearing and therefore we did not address the issue of whether the MOU hearing officer was required to find the County terminated the employe

2015(Fauth I, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414 , and Sanchez, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 32 .) Although in Sanchez, the County said it was rescinding termination, the County, in effect, did not completely rescind termination because the County did not restore all of the employee’s wages and benefits that she would have been entitled to had she been an employee. 18 Fauth I and Sanchez are not on point here because in those cases there had not yet been a MOU hearing and therefore we did not address the issue of whether the MOU hearing officer was required to find the County terminated the employe

2009Lazan, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 453 , also does not support the county’s criminal liability contention.

2009Lazan, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 453 , also does not support the county’s criminal liability contention.