7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.green2 sentences2015As the California Supreme Court has made clear, for the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine to apply, the “risk of injury must be inherent in the workplace.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1008 .) “Neither discrimination nor harassment is a normal incident of employment.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288 .) “The Legislature . . . did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. . . . [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological da 2013A cause 14 of action for such a claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers‟ compensation law. [Citations.] The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. [Citations.] [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer‟s illegal discriminatory practices.” (Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 352 , disapproved on other grounds in Richards v. CH2 | 1 | 2 |
Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2015As the California Supreme Court has made clear, for the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine to apply, the “risk of injury must be inherent in the workplace.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1008 .) “Neither discrimination nor harassment is a normal incident of employment.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288 .) “The Legislature . . . did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. . . . [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological da 2013This is so because the claim is „founded upon actions that are outside the normal part of the employment environment . . . .‟ [Citation.]” (Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1363 .) Here, the emotional distress Lu alleges to have suffered, namely depression and anxiety, resulted from regular employment practices, specifically, Stanford‟s transfer of 11 Lu to OCME. | 1 | 2 |
Shoemaker v. Myersgreen2 sentences2017In Miklosy , the plaintiffs alleged causes of action for retaliation in violation of the California Whistleblower *688 Protection Act (§ 8547 et seq.), wrongful termination and constructive wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ( Id. at p. 884, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 690 , 188 P.3d 629 .) As to the last claim, "Plaintiffs allege[d] defendants engaged in 'outrageous conduct' that was intended to, and did, cause plaintiffs 'severe emotional distress,' giving rise to common law causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distres 2017In Miklosy , the plaintiffs alleged causes of action for retaliation in violation of the California Whistleblower *688 Protection Act (§ 8547 et seq.), wrongful termination and constructive wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ( Id. at p. 884, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 690 , 188 P.3d 629 .) As to the last claim, "Plaintiffs allege[d] defendants engaged in 'outrageous conduct' that was intended to, and did, cause plaintiffs 'severe emotional distress,' giving rise to common law causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distres | 1 | 1 |
Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co.green1 sentence2015As the California Supreme Court has made clear, for the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine to apply, the “risk of injury must be inherent in the workplace.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1008 .) “Neither discrimination nor harassment is a normal incident of employment.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288 .) “The Legislature . . . did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. . . . [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological da | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Los Angeles Community College Districtgreen1 sentence2015College Dist. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 794, 802, 805 [upholding the plaintiff’s claim for emotional and psychological damages where the distress was allegedly caused by employer’s illegal discriminatory practices].) Here, the allegations surrounding Li’s IIED claim stemmed in large part from the same facts constituting her discrimination and retaliation claims. | 1 | 1 |
Flait v. North American Watch Corp.green2 sentences1993(Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 480 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 ]; Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1095-1096 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer’s illegal discriminatory practices. 1993(Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 480 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 ]; Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1095-1096 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer’s illegal discriminatory practices. | 1 | 1 |
Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc.green2 sentences1993(Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 480 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 ]; Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1095-1096 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer’s illegal discriminatory practices. 1993(Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 480 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 ]; Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1095-1096 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 294 ].) Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer’s illegal discriminatory practices. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Accardi v. SUPERIOR COURT OF VENTURA CTY.
green
2 sentences2017A cause of action for such a claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law. [Citation.] The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices." ( Accardi, supra , 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 352 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 .) The Accardi plaintiff "allege[d] that she suffered emotional distress because of the pattern of continuing violations which were discriminatory; her cause of action for emotional distress is founded upon actions that are outside the normal 2017A cause of action for such a claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law. [Citation.] The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices." ( Accardi, supra , 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 352 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 .) The Accardi plaintiff "allege[d] that she suffered emotional distress because of the pattern of continuing violations which were discriminatory; her cause of action for emotional distress is founded upon actions that are outside the normal | 5 | 2013–2017 |
Miklosy v. Regents of the University of California
green
2 sentences2017A cause of action for such a claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law. [Citation.] The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices." ( Accardi, supra , 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 352 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 .) The Accardi plaintiff "allege[d] that she suffered emotional distress because of the pattern of continuing violations which were discriminatory; her cause of action for emotional distress is founded upon actions that are outside the normal 2017A cause of action for such a claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law. [Citation.] The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices." ( Accardi, supra , 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 352 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 .) The Accardi plaintiff "allege[d] that she suffered emotional distress because of the pattern of continuing violations which were discriminatory; her cause of action for emotional distress is founded upon actions that are outside the normal | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015As the California Supreme Court has made clear, for the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine to apply, the “risk of injury must be inherent in the workplace.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1008 .) “Neither discrimination nor harassment is a normal incident of employment.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288 .) “The Legislature . . . did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. . . . [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological da 2013A cause 14 of action for such a claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers‟ compensation law. [Citations.] The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. [Citations.] [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer‟s illegal discriminatory practices.” (Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 352 , disapproved on other grounds in Richards v. CH2 | 2 | 2013–2015 |
Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015As the California Supreme Court has made clear, for the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine to apply, the “risk of injury must be inherent in the workplace.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1008 .) “Neither discrimination nor harassment is a normal incident of employment.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288 .) “The Legislature . . . did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. . . . [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological da | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital
green
1 sentence2000We said, “In Fisher[, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 590 ], the court held that . . by its very nature, sexual harassment in the work place is outrageous conduct as it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society. [H] Accordingly, if properly pled, sexual harassment will constitute the outrageous behavior element of a *1363 cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . .’ (Id. at p. 618.) We hold that the same is true of harassment based on sexual orientation.” (Kovatch, supra, at p. 1278 , italics added.) We then found that Kovatch’s evidence was suffici | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Kovatch v. California Casualty Management Co.
green
1 sentence2000Thus, “[a] cause of action for such a claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation law. [Citations.] The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. [Citations.] [ft] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer’s illegal discriminatory practices.” (Id. at p. 352, italics added; also see Leibert, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1706-1707.) Similarly, | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District
green
1 sentence1993Code, § 3601, subd. (a); Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 160 .) The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.