state or federal constitutional standard in California

2013(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) II.

2013(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) The factor is phrased in a neutral manner (see People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1234 ), and it applies not only when a witness is certain of his or her identification, but also when he or she is not certain.

2013(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) II.

2013(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) The factor is phrased in a neutral manner (see People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1234 ), and it applies not only when a witness is certain of his or her identification, but also when he or she is not certain.

2026(People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 731 .) Soto thus did not preserve for appeal either a state or federal constitutional challenge to his sentence being cruel or unusual.

2026(People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 731 .) Soto thus did not preserve for appeal either a state or federal constitutional challenge to his sentence being cruel or unusual.

2013(Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 74 ; People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 525-527.) In sum, the error was harmless under either the state or federal constitutional standard of error.

2013(Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 74 ; People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 525-527.) In sum, the error was harmless under either the state or federal constitutional standard of error.

2013(Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 74 ; People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 525-527.) In sum, the error was harmless under either the state or federal constitutional standard of error.

2013(Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 74 ; People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 525-527.) In sum, the error was harmless under either the state or federal constitutional standard of error.

2026Our Supreme Court held that the failure to appoint counsel does not raise a state or federal constitutional violation. ( Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972–973.) “There is no unconditional state or federal constitutional right to counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of conviction.” (Id. at p. 972.) “[A] petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to counsel at the outset of the subdivision (c) stage of the section [1172.6] petitioning process.” (Id. at p. 973.) “At that point, the petitioner has not yet ‘stated facts 3 We point out that on April 26, 2017, the trial court amende

2021(Compare Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th 766 with Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230 , 1241–1242, 1246; O’Toole v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 , citing Galvin v. Hay (9th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 739 , 758.) Given the tardy manner in which Close raises this claim, we deem it forfeited and denied the request for leave to file supplemental briefing. 6 Close belatedly contends in her reply brief that issue preclusion should not apply because the federal district court “did not fully and fairly litigat[e] the issue of whether Tan violated [her] right to be

2021(Compare Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th 766 with Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230 , 1241–1242, 1246; O’Toole v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 , citing Galvin v. Hay (9th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 739 , 758.) Given the tardy manner in which Close raises this claim, we deem it forfeited and denied the request for leave to file supplemental briefing. 6 Close belatedly contends in her reply brief that issue preclusion should not apply because the federal district court “did not fully and fairly litigat[e] the issue of whether Tan violated [her] right to be

2021(Compare Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th 766 with Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230 , 1241–1242, 1246; O’Toole v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 , citing Galvin v. Hay (9th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 739 , 758.) Given the tardy manner in which Close raises this claim, we deem it forfeited and denied the request for leave to file supplemental briefing. 6 Close belatedly contends in her reply brief that issue preclusion should not apply because the federal district court “did not fully and fairly litigat[e] the issue of whether Tan violated [her] right to be

2021(Compare Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th 766 with Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230 , 1241–1242, 1246; O’Toole v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 , citing Galvin v. Hay (9th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 739 , 758.) Given the tardy manner in which Close raises this claim, we deem it forfeited and denied the request for leave to file supplemental briefing. 6 Close belatedly contends in her reply brief that issue preclusion should not apply because the federal district court “did not fully and fairly litigat[e] the issue of whether Tan violated [her] right to be

2021(Compare Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th 766 with Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230 , 1241–1242, 1246; O’Toole v. Superior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 511 , citing Galvin v. Hay (9th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3d 739 , 758.) Given the tardy manner in which Close raises this claim, we deem it forfeited and denied the request for leave to file supplemental briefing. 6 Close belatedly contends in her reply brief that issue preclusion should not apply because the federal district court “did not fully and fairly litigat[e] the issue of whether Tan violated [her] right to be

2013(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) The factor is phrased in a neutral manner (see People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1234 ), and it applies not only when a witness is certain of his or her identification, but also when he or she is not certain.

2013(See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455 .) Finally, even if we were to conclude the jury's consideration of a certainty factor is erroneous, its inclusion in CALCRIM No. 315 would not require reversal, whether under the state or federal constitutional standard of error.