7 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burns v. Gleason Plant Security, Inc.green2 sentences1990The court also granted Goclowski’s motion for summary judgment on the alternate ground that even if Goclowski’s actions were negligent, the acts of Gregory and Geremia were, as a matter of law, superseding causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries. “[T]he doctrine of superseding cause serves as a device by which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from liability by shifting the causation element entirely elsewhere.” D’Arcy v. Shugrue, 5 Conn. App. 12, 25 , 496 A.2d 967 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 817 , 500 A.2d 1336 (1985); see also Burns 1990The court also granted Goclowski’s motion for summary judgment on the alternate ground that even if Goclowski’s actions were negligent, the acts of Gregory and Geremia were, as a matter of law, superseding causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries. “[T]he doctrine of superseding cause serves as a device by which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from liability by shifting the causation element entirely elsewhere.” D’Arcy v. Shugrue, 5 Conn. App. 12, 25 , 496 A.2d 967 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 817 , 500 A.2d 1336 (1985); see also Burns | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co.
green
2 sentences2003Thus, the doctrine of superseding cause serves as a device by which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from liability by shifting the causation element entirely elsewhere.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 243 Conn. 168, 178-79 , 700 A.2d 38 (1997). 2003Thus, the doctrine of superseding cause serves as a device by which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from liability by shifting the causation element entirely elsewhere.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 243 Conn. 168, 178-79 , 700 A.2d 38 (1997). | 4 | 1998–2003 |
Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017If a third person's [culpability] is found to be the superseding cause of the plaintiff's injuries, that [culpability], rather than the negligence of the party attempting to invoke the doctrine of superseding cause, is said to be the sole proximate cause of the injury." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 434 -35 , 820 A.2d 258 . 14 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, to which our courts have consistently turned for guidance in crafting our own common law, defines a superseding cause as "an act 2017If a third person's [culpability] is found to be the superseding cause of the plaintiff's injuries, that [culpability], rather than the negligence of the party attempting to invoke the doctrine of superseding cause, is said to be the sole proximate cause of the injury." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 434 -35 , 820 A.2d 258 . 14 The Restatement (Second) of Torts, to which our courts have consistently turned for guidance in crafting our own common law, defines a superseding cause as "an act | 2 | 2012–2017 |
Purcell v. Slagle
green
1 sentence1990The court also granted Goclowski’s motion for summary judgment on the alternate ground that even if Goclowski’s actions were negligent, the acts of Gregory and Geremia were, as a matter of law, superseding causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries. “[T]he doctrine of superseding cause serves as a device by which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from liability by shifting the causation element entirely elsewhere.” D’Arcy v. Shugrue, 5 Conn. App. 12, 25 , 496 A.2d 967 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 817 , 500 A.2d 1336 (1985); see also Burns | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Wesson v. City of Milford
green
1 sentence1990The court also granted Goclowski’s motion for summary judgment on the alternate ground that even if Goclowski’s actions were negligent, the acts of Gregory and Geremia were, as a matter of law, superseding causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries. “[T]he doctrine of superseding cause serves as a device by which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from liability by shifting the causation element entirely elsewhere.” D’Arcy v. Shugrue, 5 Conn. App. 12, 25 , 496 A.2d 967 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 817 , 500 A.2d 1336 (1985); see also Burns | 1 | 1990–1990 |
D'Arcy v. Shugrue
green
2 sentences1990The court also granted Goclowski’s motion for summary judgment on the alternate ground that even if Goclowski’s actions were negligent, the acts of Gregory and Geremia were, as a matter of law, superseding causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries. “[T]he doctrine of superseding cause serves as a device by which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from liability by shifting the causation element entirely elsewhere.” D’Arcy v. Shugrue, 5 Conn. App. 12, 25 , 496 A.2d 967 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 817 , 500 A.2d 1336 (1985); see also Burns 1990The court also granted Goclowski’s motion for summary judgment on the alternate ground that even if Goclowski’s actions were negligent, the acts of Gregory and Geremia were, as a matter of law, superseding causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries. “[T]he doctrine of superseding cause serves as a device by which one admittedly negligent party can, by identifying another’s superseding conduct, exonerate himself from liability by shifting the causation element entirely elsewhere.” D’Arcy v. Shugrue, 5 Conn. App. 12, 25 , 496 A.2d 967 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 817 , 500 A.2d 1336 (1985); see also Burns | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.