7 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1931–1994 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kirkland v. Pitmangreen2 sentences1950The use may originate in permission, and yet may ripen by prescription.” Kirkland v. Pitman, 122 Ga. 256, 259 ( 50 S. E. 117 ). 1950The use may originate in permission, and yet may ripen by prescription.” Kirkland v. Pitman, 122 Ga. 256, 259 ( 50 S. E. 117 ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Michaelsgreen2 sentences1994In fact, it appears that “ ‘[w]ith the notable exception of courts in California, . . . virtually every appellate court that has ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the psychological profile of child molesters has rejected it.’ ” State v. Michaels, 625 A2d 489, 510 (N. J. 1993), quoting from Peters & Murphy, Profiling Child Sex ual Abusers, Legal Considerations, 19 Crim. 1994In fact, it appears that "`[w]ith the notable exception of courts in California, . . . virtually every appellate court that has ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the psychological profile of child molesters has rejected it.'" State v. Michaels, 625 A2d 489, 510 (N. J. 1993), quoting from Peters & Murphy, Profiling Child Sexual *184 Abusers, Legal Considerations, 19 Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
First Christian Church v. Realty Investment Co.
green
2 sentences1949The use may originate in permission, and yet may ripen by prescription”; and in First Christian Church v. Realty Investment Co., 180 Ga. 35 ( 178 S. E. 303 ), it was said: “When the use of a private way originates by permission of the owner, prescription does not begin to run until the user notifies the owner, by repairs or otherwise, that he has changed his position from that of a mere licensee to that of a prescriber”; and in the body of the opinion (p. 39) it was said: “The essence of the right claimed by the plaintiff to the use of the driveway is prescription; and it is- fundamental that 1949The use may originate in permission, and yet may ripen by prescription”; and in First Christian Church v. Realty Investment Co., 180 Ga. 35 ( 178 S. E. 303 ), it was said: “When the use of a private way originates by permission of the owner, prescription does not begin to run until the user notifies the owner, by repairs or otherwise, that he has changed his position from that of a mere licensee to that of a prescriber”; and in the body of the opinion (p. 39) it was said: “The essence of the right claimed by the plaintiff to the use of the driveway is prescription; and it is- fundamental that | 2 | 1944–1949 |
McCullough v. Georgia Power Company
neutral
2 sentences1953In McCullough v. Georgia Power Co., 81 Ga. App. 293 ( 58 S. E. 2d 505 ), the petition set forth facts similar to those alleged in the instant case, with the notable exception that in the McCullough case facts were not set forth showing that the power company was put on notice that those handling the pipes might be so negligent as to allow the pipes to come in contact with its wires. 1953In McCullough v. Georgia Power Co., 81 Ga. App. 293 ( 58 S. E. 2d 505 ), the petition set forth facts similar to those alleged in the instant case, with the notable exception that in the McCullough case facts were not set forth showing that the power company was put on notice that those handling the pipes might be so negligent as to allow the pipes to come in contact with its wires. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Collier v. Farr
green
1 sentence1949The use may originate in permission, and yet may ripen by prescription”; and in First Christian Church v. Realty Investment Co., 180 Ga. 35 ( 178 S. E. 303 ), it was said: “When the use of a private way originates by permission of the owner, prescription does not begin to run until the user notifies the owner, by repairs or otherwise, that he has changed his position from that of a mere licensee to that of a prescriber”; and in the body of the opinion (p. 39) it was said: “The essence of the right claimed by the plaintiff to the use of the driveway is prescription; and it is- fundamental that | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Snider v. State
green
1 sentence1949The use may originate in permission, and yet may ripen by prescription”; and in First Christian Church v. Realty Investment Co., 180 Ga. 35 ( 178 S. E. 303 ), it was said: “When the use of a private way originates by permission of the owner, prescription does not begin to run until the user notifies the owner, by repairs or otherwise, that he has changed his position from that of a mere licensee to that of a prescriber”; and in the body of the opinion (p. 39) it was said: “The essence of the right claimed by the plaintiff to the use of the driveway is prescription; and it is- fundamental that | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Mays v. Redman Bros.
neutral
2 sentences1931And it is wholly immaterial of what nature the equity is, whether it is a lien, or an encumbrance, or a trust, or any claim; for a bona fide purchaser of an estate, for a valuable consideration, purges away the equity from the estate in the hands of all persons who may derive title to it.” This rule is “subject to a notable exception; and that is, a conveyance is not protected when made back to a former owner who had notice of the equity, and who did not originally derive title through a bona fide holder.” It was ruled in Mays v. Redman, 134 Ga. 870 (2) ( 68 S. E. 738 ) : “If the defendant was 1931And it is wholly immaterial of what nature the equity is, whether it is a lien, or an encumbrance, or a trust, or any claim; for a bona fide purchaser of an estate, for a valuable consideration, purges away the equity from the estate in the hands of all persons who may derive title to it.” This rule is “subject to a notable exception; and that is, a conveyance is not protected when made back to a former owner who had notice of the equity, and who did not originally derive title through a bona fide holder.” It was ruled in Mays v. Redman, 134 Ga. 870 (2) ( 68 S. E. 738 ) : “If the defendant was | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.