pretrial motion immunity in Georgia

2020“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (a) Mathis first argues that his counsel performed deficiently by not filing a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2.3 We disagree.

2019See id. at 697 . (a) Appellant asserts first that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution based on self-defense.

2024See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Mathis, 309 Ga. at 113-114; McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342, 347 (667 SE2d 43) (2008) (holding that a tactical decision by counsel cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim unless it was “so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it”).4 Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he chose not to file a pretrial immunity motion because he did not 4 Russell argues that a lower standard of proof would have applied in a pretrial immunity hearing versus

2024See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Mathis, 309 Ga. at 113-114; McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342, 347 (667 SE2d 43) (2008) (holding that a tactical decision by counsel cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim unless it was “so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it”).4 Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he chose not to file a pretrial immunity motion because he did not 4 Russell argues that a lower standard of proof would have applied in a pretrial immunity hearing versus

2022Although the State presented only one witness at the immunity hearing in this case, and the trial court’s ruling with respect to the pretrial motion for immunity must be based solely on the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing, see Sifuentes v. State, 293 Ga. 441, 444 (2), n. 3 ( 746 SE2d 127 ) (2013), the transcript from the hearing – viewed under the above standards – supports the trial court’s conclusion that Jennings failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in self-defense.

2022Although the State presented only one witness at the immunity hearing in this case, and the trial court’s ruling with respect to the pretrial motion for immunity must be based solely on the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing, see Sifuentes v. State, 293 Ga. 441, 444 (2), n. 3 ( 746 SE2d 127 ) (2013), the transcript from the hearing – viewed under the above standards – supports the trial court’s conclusion that Jennings failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in self-defense.

2020“To succeed on [a pretrial motion for immunity], counsel would have had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [Mathis] acted in self-defense.” Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 892 (3) (a) (834 3 Mathis argues that under Missouri v. Frye, 566 U. S. 134, 149 (III) ( 132 SCt 1399 , 182 LE2d 379) (2012), in pursuing plea negotiations, he was entitled to the same effective assistance of counsel as is required at trial.

2020“To succeed on [a pretrial motion for immunity], counsel would have had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [Mathis] acted in self-defense.” Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 892 (3) (a) (834 3 Mathis argues that under Missouri v. Frye, 566 U. S. 134, 149 (III) ( 132 SCt 1399 , 182 LE2d 379) (2012), in pursuing plea negotiations, he was entitled to the same effective assistance of counsel as is required at trial.

2020See Orr, 305 Ga. at 736 . 11 The evidence in question concerned a wiretap recording of a conversation between Jeff and Appellant.

2020“To succeed on [a pretrial motion for immunity], counsel would have had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [Mathis] acted in self-defense.” Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 892 (3) (a) (834 3 Mathis argues that under Missouri v. Frye, 566 U. S. 134, 149 (III) ( 132 SCt 1399 , 182 LE2d 379) (2012), in pursuing plea negotiations, he was entitled to the same effective assistance of counsel as is required at trial.

2020Calmer filed a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which provides that a defendant is immune from criminal prosecution if he used justifiable force to protect himself or his home.7 To avoid trial based on a justification defense presented at an immunity hearing, “a defendant bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (3) ( 667 SE2d 605 ) (2008).

2020Calmer filed a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which provides that a defendant is immune from criminal prosecution if he used justifiable force to protect himself or his home.7 To avoid trial based on a justification defense presented at an immunity hearing, “a defendant bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (3) ( 667 SE2d 605 ) (2008).

2005See Giglio, supra; Brady, supra. At a pretrial motion hearing, the district attorney stated that he had complied with the motion by informing the defense about Frederico’s plea bargain, and that he would continue to comply with this request.