neglect hearing in Illinois

2003S.A., 296 Ill.

1974Although a hearing into the question of restoration of parental rights in a neglected child and change of custody is necessarily confined to ascertaining what is in the present best interests of the child (see Giacopelli, supra, and People v. Hoerner (1972), 6 Ill.App.3d 994 , 287 N.E.2d 510 ) and does not require relitigation of the facts which formed the basis of the original neglect decree, the question of whether a parent has been neglectful in the past may be relevant to whether the parent has been rehabilitated and has the present ability to properly care for his child.

1974Although a hearing into the question of restoration of parental rights in a neglected child and change of custody is necessarily confined to ascertaining what is in the present best interests of the child (see Giacopelli, supra, and People v. Hoerner (1972), 6 Ill.App.3d 994 , 287 N.E.2d 510 ) and does not require relitigation of the facts which formed the basis of the original neglect decree, the question of whether a parent has been neglectful in the past may be relevant to whether the parent has been rehabilitated and has the present ability to properly care for his child.

1974(See Petition of Breger v. Seymour (1966), 74 Ill.App.2d 197 , 219 N.E. 2d 265 .) Thus, even if the court finds that the prior neglect hearing resulted in an incorrect decision due to a denial of some constitutional right, this finding is not determinative of the issues in this hearing, and does not require an automatic restoration of custody to the natural parent.

1974(See Petition of Breger v. Seymour (1966), 74 Ill.App.2d 197 , 219 N.E. 2d 265 .) Thus, even if the court finds that the prior neglect hearing resulted in an incorrect decision due to a denial of some constitutional right, this finding is not determinative of the issues in this hearing, and does not require an automatic restoration of custody to the natural parent.

1952It is stated on page 566 of this note: “It is said in American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, par. 243d: ‘If the trustee repudiates the trust or misappropriates the trust property, or if he intentionally or negligently mismanages the whole trust, he will ordinarily be allowed no compensation.’ ” Cases illustrative of this rule denying compensation are Lehman v. Rothbarth, 159 Ill. 270 ; Sauvage v. Gallaway, 335 Ill.

1952It is stated on page 566 of this note: “It is said in American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, par. 243d: ‘If the trustee repudiates the trust or misappropriates the trust property, or if he intentionally or negligently mismanages the whole trust, he will ordinarily be allowed no compensation.’ ” Cases illustrative of this rule denying compensation are Lehman v. Rothbarth, 159 Ill. 270 ; Sauvage v. Gallaway, 335 Ill.

1873A quasi crime would not embrace an indictable offense, whatever might be its grade, but simply forfeitures for a wrong done to the public, whether voluntary or involuntary, where a penalty is given, whether recoverable by criminal or civil process; and it would embrace proseentions for bastardy, and informations in the nature of a quo warranto, etc. In accordance with these views, it was held in the case of Naylor v. The City of Galesburg, 56 Ill. 285 , that a suit to recover a penalty for the violation of a city ordinance was a quasi criminal prosecution.