Legislature to waive sovereign immunity in Texas

2022Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. 2002) (“We have consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function.”).

2016Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex.2002) ("We have consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign' immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function."); Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex. 1993) ("Since the Tort Claims Act was passed in 1969, we have repeatedly held that the waiver of governmental immunity is a matter addressed to the Legislature.") (internal quotation marks omitted). . 43 Tex. Admin.

2008Branch v. York , 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994) ("[F]or the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity, it must do so by clear and unambiguous language.").

1996University of Tex. Medical Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex.1994). “[F]or the legislature to waive sovereign immunity, it must do so by clear and unambiguous language.” York, 871 S.W.2d at 177 .

2019Id. at 685 ; id. at 685 (Cornyn, J., dissenting) (“The result [of the plurality opinion] is that no opinion speaks for the court.”). 22 See id. at 688–689 (Cornyn, J., dissenting). 23 871 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1994). 24 Id. at 176–177. 25 Id. at 177 (citing Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. 1980)). 26 Id. at 179. 9 who was not provided a knee brace, the epileptic swimmer who was not provided a life preserver, and the undiagnosed heart attack, stating that each was limited to its facts.27 C York’s precept—that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be by clear and unambiguous language—has

2000Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. 1980).

2015Reasoning that it was not the Court’s place to create a situation where immunity from suit would not apply, the Supreme Court further explained that is has “consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function.” Tooke, 18 197 S.W.3d at 332; see also Gay, 457 S.W.3d at 505 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332 ); West Texas Mun.

2011The Texas Supreme Court has “consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policy-making function.” Id.

2006Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex.2002) (stating “[w]e have consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function.”) (citing Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847)); id. at 861 (HECHT, J., concurring) (“[T]he Legislature is better suited than the Judiciary to weigh the policy and political concerns that inhere in determining whether the State should be immune from suit for breaching its contracts.”).

2006Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex.2002) (stating “[w]e have consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function.”) (citing Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847)); id. at 861 (HECHT, J., concurring) (“[T]he Legislature is better suited than the Judiciary to weigh the policy and political concerns that inhere in determining whether the State should be immune from suit for breaching its contracts.”).

2010See id. [F]or the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity [by enacting a statute], it must do so by clear and unambiguous language.

2010See id. “[F]or the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity [by enacting a statute], it must do so by clear and unambiguous language.” Univ. of Tex. Med.

2008The court of criminal appeals has termed this "a Herculean task." Ex parte Brown , 205 S.W.3d 538, 545 (Tex. Crim.

2008The court of criminal appeals has termed this "a Herculean task.” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 545 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

2004See IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 854 (recognizing that “the Legislature is better suited than the courts to weigh the conflicting public policies associated with waiving immunity”); Little-Tex Insulation , 39 S.W.3d at 597 ( “[W]e defer to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity.

2002Furthermore, the court noted that it consistently defers to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity and that after the Federal Sign decision, the Legislature enacted a dispute-resolution procedure to resolve certain breach-of-contract cases against the State. 3 See Little-Tex, 39 S.W.3d at 595, 600 ; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2260.001-2260.108 (Vernon 2000).

2019Id. at 685 ; id. at 685 (Cornyn, J., dissenting) (“The result [of the plurality opinion] is that no opinion speaks for the court.”). 22 See id. at 688–689 (Cornyn, J., dissenting). 23 871 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1994). 24 Id. at 176–177. 25 Id. at 177 (citing Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. 1980)). 26 Id. at 179. 9 who was not provided a knee brace, the epileptic swimmer who was not provided a life preserver, and the undiagnosed heart attack, stating that each was limited to its facts.27 C York’s precept—that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be by clear and unambiguous language—has

2019Id. at 685 ; id. at 685 (Cornyn, J., dissenting) (“The result [of the plurality opinion] is that no opinion speaks for the court.”). 22 See id. at 688–689 (Cornyn, J., dissenting). 23 871 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1994). 24 Id. at 176–177. 25 Id. at 177 (citing Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. 1980)). 26 Id. at 179. 9 who was not provided a knee brace, the epileptic swimmer who was not provided a life preserver, and the undiagnosed heart attack, stating that each was limited to its facts.27 C York’s precept—that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be by clear and unambiguous language—has

2016Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex.2002) ("We have consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign' immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function."); Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex. 1993) ("Since the Tort Claims Act was passed in 1969, we have repeatedly held that the waiver of governmental immunity is a matter addressed to the Legislature.") (internal quotation marks omitted). . 43 Tex. Admin.

2015“For the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity by enacting a statute, it must do so by clear and unambiguous language.” Id. at 925 .

2015W ATER C ODE § 49.222. 12 As noted above, “for the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity by enacting a statute, it must do so by clear and unambiguous language.” Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Garland, 313 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Tex. App. – Tyler 2010, no pet.).

2015Reasoning that it was not the Court’s place to create a situation where immunity from suit would not apply, the Supreme Court further explained that is has “consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function.” Tooke, 18 197 S.W.3d at 332; see also Gay, 457 S.W.3d at 505 (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332 ); West Texas Mun.

2008See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004); Bland Indep.

2008City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Tex.2007); Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 375 ; IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 857 .

2008Oakley, 227 S.W.3d at 62 ; see Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex. 2006) (state cannot “be sued in her own courts without her consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that consent.”) (quoting Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847)); State v. Isbell, 94 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tex. 1936) (state may be sued “only in the manner, place, and court or courts designated” by legislature).