door inquiry in Indiana

1978Newman v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 578 , 261 N.E.2d 364 ; Brower v. State, (1956) 236 Ind. 35 , 138 N.E.2d 237 .

1978Newman v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 578 , 261 N.E.2d 364 ; Brower v. State, (1956) 236 Ind. 35 , 138 N.E.2d 237 .

2011(PCR App. at 351-52.) Baer argued that Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 , 128 S.Ct. 2641 , 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008), opened the door to such a challenge, but the court rejected this argument because Kennedy involved the Court’s rejection of the death penalty for a class of *90 crimes, not a class of criminals as in prior relevant cases.

2011(PCR App. at 351-52.) Baer argued that Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 , 128 S.Ct. 2641 , 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008), opened the door to such a challenge, but the court rejected this argument because Kennedy involved the Court’s rejection of the death penalty for a class of *90 crimes, not a class of criminals as in prior relevant cases.

2000No. 12 v. Simonsen, 210 Mont. 100 , 683 P.2d 471, 477 (1984) (citing People v. Barenfeld, 203 Cal.App.2d 166 , 21 Cal.Rptr. 501 (1962)). *1262 In the present case, Warrick County, a governmental entity, brought an action against Waste Management.

2000No. 12 v. Simonsen, 210 Mont. 100 , 683 P.2d 471, 477 (1984) (citing People v. Barenfeld, 203 Cal.App.2d 166 , 21 Cal.Rptr. 501 (1962)). *1262 In the present case, Warrick County, a governmental entity, brought an action against Waste Management.

1991As we stated in Jones v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 478 , 479: "[A] defendant is not entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense unless the evidence would have warranted a jury's finding that the lesser offense was committed while the greater was not." To support appellant's position, he claims that the State's use of the term "knowingly" opens the door to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, citing Jones v. State (1982), Ind., 438 N.E.2d 972 .

1991As we stated in Jones v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 478 , 479: "[A] defendant is not entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense unless the evidence would have warranted a jury's finding that the lesser offense was committed while the greater was not." To support appellant's position, he claims that the State's use of the term "knowingly" opens the door to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, citing Jones v. State (1982), Ind., 438 N.E.2d 972 .

1991As we stated in Jones v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 478 , 479: "[A] defendant is not entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense unless the evidence would have warranted a jury's finding that the lesser offense was committed while the greater was not." To support appellant's position, he claims that the State's use of the term "knowingly" opens the door to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, citing Jones v. State (1982), Ind., 438 N.E.2d 972 .

1991As we stated in Jones v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 478 , 479: "[A] defendant is not entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense unless the evidence would have warranted a jury's finding that the lesser offense was committed while the greater was not." To support appellant's position, he claims that the State's use of the term "knowingly" opens the door to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, citing Jones v. State (1982), Ind., 438 N.E.2d 972 .

1990In contrast, the State maintains Roth opened the door to such inquiry when he testified he was not "crazy" and when he defined that term. 1 The State maintains it was within its rights to inquire into the convictions because "disorderly conduct and battery convictions show a pattern of erratic or irrational behavior on the part of the Defendant, contrary to what he would have mislead the jury into believing." (Appel-lee's Brief, p. 8) In Ashton v. Anderson (1972), 258 Ind. 51 , 279 N.E.2d 210 , our supreme court limited the convictions for which a witness may be impeached for credibility to th

1990In contrast, the State maintains Roth opened the door to such inquiry when he testified he was not "crazy" and when he defined that term. 1 The State maintains it was within its rights to inquire into the convictions because "disorderly conduct and battery convictions show a pattern of erratic or irrational behavior on the part of the Defendant, contrary to what he would have mislead the jury into believing." (Appel-lee's Brief, p. 8) In Ashton v. Anderson (1972), 258 Ind. 51 , 279 N.E.2d 210 , our supreme court limited the convictions for which a witness may be impeached for credibility to th

1990In contrast, the State maintains Roth opened the door to such inquiry when he testified he was not "crazy" and when he defined that term. 1 The State maintains it was within its rights to inquire into the convictions because "disorderly conduct and battery convictions show a pattern of erratic or irrational behavior on the part of the Defendant, contrary to what he would have mislead the jury into believing." (Appel-lee's Brief, p. 8) In Ashton v. Anderson (1972), 258 Ind. 51 , 279 N.E.2d 210 , our supreme court limited the convictions for which a witness may be impeached for credibility to th

1987Teague v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 103 , 379 N.E.2d 418 .

1987Teague v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 103 , 379 N.E.2d 418 .

1978Newman v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 578 , 261 N.E.2d 364 ; Brower v. State, (1956) 236 Ind. 35 , 138 N.E.2d 237 .

1978Newman v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 578 , 261 N.E.2d 364 ; Brower v. State, (1956) 236 Ind. 35 , 138 N.E.2d 237 .