past standard in Arkansas

2023Johnson v. Cotton-Johnson, 88 Ark.

2018Johnson v. Cotton-Johnson , 88 Ark.

2026Page v. Page, 2010 Ark.

2022Page v. Page, 2010 Ark.

2021Id., 506 S.W.3d at 815 .

2020“In addition, the following secondary factors should be considered: (1) the financial circumstances of both parties; (2) the couple’s past standard of living; (3) the value of jointly owned property; (4) the amount and nature of the parties’ income, both current and anticipated; (5) the extent and nature of the resources and assets of each of the parties; (6) the amount of income of each that is spendable; (7) the earning ability and capacity of each party; (8) the property awarded or given to one of the parties, either by the court or the other party; (9) the disposition made of the homestead

2017Id.

2014Delacey v. Delacey, 85 ArkApp. 419, 155 S.W.3d 701 (2004).

2012Rudder v. Hurst, 2009 Ark.

2010Rudder v. Hurst, 2009 Ark.

1983However, in Lewis v. Lewis, 202 Ark. 740 , 151 S.W.2d 998 (1941), and Boyles, supra, the Court has stated that infixing the amount of alimony the primary consideration is the ability of the husband to pay regardless of what other factors may indicate.

1983However, in Lewis v. Lewis, 202 Ark. 740 , 151 S.W.2d 998 (1941), and Boyles, supra, the Court has stated that infixing the amount of alimony the primary consideration is the ability of the husband to pay regardless of what other factors may indicate.

2019Id.

2018Id.

2017Franklin, 25 Ark.App. at 290-91 , 758 S.W.2d at 8 (quoting Boyles v. Boyles, 268 Ark. 120, 124-25 , 594 S.W.2d 17, 20 (1980)).

2017Franklin, 25 Ark.App. at 290-91 , 758 S.W.2d at 8 (quoting Boyles v. Boyles, 268 Ark. 120, 124-25 , 594 S.W.2d 17, 20 (1980)).

2013Evtimov v. Milanova, 2009 Ark.

2013Evtimov v. Milanova, 2009 Ark.

2026App. 536 , 564 S.W.3d 537 . 8 (Repl. 2020). 6 of living in light of the particular facts in each case, and the primary factors to be considered in determining whether to award alimony are the financial need of one spouse and the other spouse’s ability to pay.9 There are secondary factors that may also be considered: (1) the parties’ financial circumstances; (2) the parties’ past standard of living; (3) the value of jointly owned property; (4) the amount and nature of the parties’ income, both current and anticipated; (5) the extent and nature of the resources and assets of each party; (6) the

2021Id.

2020Id.

2016Other factors include the financial circumstances of both parties; the couple’s past standard of living; the value of jointly owned property; the amount and nature of the income, both current and anticipated, of both parties; the extent and nature of the resources and assets of each party; the amount of each party’s spendable income; the earning ability and capacity of both parties; the disposition of the homestead or jointly owned property; the condition of health and medical needs of the parties; and the duration of the marriage, Id.

2016Id.

2016Va. 2014) (discussing statutory factors applicable to all awards of spousal support); Mayfield v. Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108 (Tenn. 2012) (same); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1993) (same).

2016Cyr, 228 Md.App. 163 , 137 A.3d 332 (2016) (discussing statutory factors such as the parties’ past standard of living, their earning ability and capacity, and the duration of their marriage in determining whether rehabilitative alimony was appropriate); Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 , 119 A.3d 891 (2015) (holding that the trial court was required to consider all statutory factors in considering whether permanent, limited-duration, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony was warranted); Ward v. Ward, 233 W.Va. 108 , 755 S.E.2d 494 (2014) (discussing statutory factors applicable to all awards of

2016Cyr, 228 Md.App. 163 , 137 A.3d 332 (2016) (discussing statutory factors such as the parties’ past standard of living, their earning ability and capacity, and the duration of their marriage in determining whether rehabilitative alimony was appropriate); Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 , 119 A.3d 891 (2015) (holding that the trial court was required to consider all statutory factors in considering whether permanent, limited-duration, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony was warranted); Ward v. Ward, 233 W.Va. 108 , 755 S.E.2d 494 (2014) (discussing statutory factors applicable to all awards of

2016Cyr, 228 Md.App. 163 , 137 A.3d 332 (2016) (discussing statutory factors such as the parties’ past standard of living, their earning ability and capacity, and the duration of their marriage in determining whether rehabilitative alimony was appropriate); Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 , 119 A.3d 891 (2015) (holding that the trial court was required to consider all statutory factors in considering whether permanent, limited-duration, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony was warranted); Ward v. Ward, 233 W.Va. 108 , 755 S.E.2d 494 (2014) (discussing statutory factors applicable to all awards of

2016Ct. App. 2016) (discussing statutory factors such as the parties’ past standard of living, their earning ability and capacity, and the duration of their marriage in determining whether rehabilitative alimony was appropriate); Gnall v. Gnall, 119 A.3d 891 (N.J. 2015) (holding that the trial court was required to consider all statutory factors in considering whether permanent, limited-duration, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony was warranted); Ward v. Ward, 755 S.E.2d 494 (W.

2016Cyr, 228 Md.App. 163 , 137 A.3d 332 (2016) (discussing statutory factors such as the parties’ past standard of living, their earning ability and capacity, and the duration of their marriage in determining whether rehabilitative alimony was appropriate); Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 , 119 A.3d 891 (2015) (holding that the trial court was required to consider all statutory factors in considering whether permanent, limited-duration, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony was warranted); Ward v. Ward, 233 W.Va. 108 , 755 S.E.2d 494 (2014) (discussing statutory factors applicable to all awards of

2016Va. 2014) (discussing statutory factors applicable to all awards of spousal support); Mayfield v. Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108 (Tenn. 2012) (same); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1993) (same).

2016Cyr, 228 Md.App. 163 , 137 A.3d 332 (2016) (discussing statutory factors such as the parties’ past standard of living, their earning ability and capacity, and the duration of their marriage in determining whether rehabilitative alimony was appropriate); Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 , 119 A.3d 891 (2015) (holding that the trial court was required to consider all statutory factors in considering whether permanent, limited-duration, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony was warranted); Ward v. Ward, 233 W.Va. 108 , 755 S.E.2d 494 (2014) (discussing statutory factors applicable to all awards of

2016Ct. App. 2016) (discussing statutory factors such as the parties’ past standard of living, their earning ability and capacity, and the duration of their marriage in determining whether rehabilitative alimony was appropriate); Gnall v. Gnall, 119 A.3d 891 (N.J. 2015) (holding that the trial court was required to consider all statutory factors in considering whether permanent, limited-duration, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony was warranted); Ward v. Ward, 755 S.E.2d 494 (W.

2016Cyr, 228 Md.App. 163 , 137 A.3d 332 (2016) (discussing statutory factors such as the parties’ past standard of living, their earning ability and capacity, and the duration of their marriage in determining whether rehabilitative alimony was appropriate); Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414 , 119 A.3d 891 (2015) (holding that the trial court was required to consider all statutory factors in considering whether permanent, limited-duration, rehabilitative, or reimbursement alimony was warranted); Ward v. Ward, 233 W.Va. 108 , 755 S.E.2d 494 (2014) (discussing statutory factors applicable to all awards of

2015Secondary factors the court may consider are “the circumstances of the parties; the couple’s past standard of living; the value of jointly owned property; the amount and nature of the income, both current and anticipated, of both parties; the disposition of the homestead or jointly owned property; the condition of health and medical needs of the parties; and the duration of the marriage.” Id. at 3-4, 450 S.W.3d at 269 .

2012Vigneault v. Vigneault, 2010 Ark.

2009Id.

2009Id.

2009In the case at bar we find that alimony should be set at $2,100.00 per month. .The factors referred to by Boyles, are: (1) the financial circumstances of both parties; (2) the couple's past standard of living; (3) the value of jointly owned property; (4) the amount and nature of the parties’ income, both current and anticipated; (5) the extent and nature of the resources and assets of each of the parties; (6) the amount of income of each that is spendable; (7) the earning ability and capacity of each party; (8) the property awarded or given to one of the parties, either by the court or the oth

2009In the case at bar we find that alimony should be set at $2,100.00 per month. .The factors referred to by Boyles, are: (1) the financial circumstances of both parties; (2) the couple's past standard of living; (3) the value of jointly owned property; (4) the amount and nature of the parties’ income, both current and anticipated; (5) the extent and nature of the resources and assets of each of the parties; (6) the amount of income of each that is spendable; (7) the earning ability and capacity of each party; (8) the property awarded or given to one of the parties, either by the court or the oth

1997Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 , 108 S.Ct. 101 , 98 L.Ed.2d 61 (1987).

1997Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 , 108 S.Ct. 101 , 98 L.Ed.2d 61 (1987).

1997Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 , 108 S.Ct. 101 , 98 L.Ed.2d 61 (1987).

1997Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 , 108 S.Ct. 101 , 98 L.Ed.2d 61 (1987).

1997Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 , 108 S.Ct. 101 , 98 L.Ed.2d 61 (1987).

1997Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260 , 724 S.W.2d 160 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987).