55 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lannan v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Much akin to the development of the depraved sexual instinct exception to the hearsay rule— which we abrogated in Lannan v. State — a significant underlying rationale to support permitting some accrediting of a child witness’ testimony was that “allowing such evidence lends credence to a victim’s testimony describing acts which would otherwise seem improbable standing alone.” 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1337 (Ind.1992). 2011While the defendant’s appeal was pending, this Court decided Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind.1992), which abolished the depraved-sexual-instinct exception and rendered the evidence in question inadmissible. | 3 | 21 |
Jarrett v. Stategreen2 sentences1986Knisley v. State (1985), Ind.App., 474 N.E.2d 513 ; see also Jarrett v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1097 ; Lawrence v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 923 . 1986Knisley v. State (1985), Ind. App., 474 N.E.2d 513 ; see also Jarrett v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1097 ; Lawrence v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 923 . | 2 | 3 |
Reichard v. Stategreen2 sentences1991Letica argues that evidence of a prior rape conviction does not fit under the depraved sexual instinct rule, citing Reichard v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 163 , and Lehiy v. State (1987), 509 N.E.2d 1116 . 1989Nevertheless, the language in Reichard is unmistakable: "In the present situation, the prior offenses [rape] did not involve depraved sexual instinct; therefore, the depraved sexual instinct exception is inapplicable." Reichard, supra at 165 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 5 |
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences1991The rationale for the depraved sexual instinct exception was explained in Stewart v. State (1990), Ind., 555 N.E.2d 121, 124 , wherein this Court stated that: "acts showing a perverted sexual instinct are circumstances which with other circumstances may have a tendency to connect an accused with a crime of that character, and to lend credence to a victim's accusations or testimony which describe acts which would otherwise seem improbable standing alone. 1991The rationale for the depraved sexual instinct exception was explained in Stewart v. State (1990), Ind., 555 N.E.2d 121, 124 , wherein this Court stated that: "acts showing a perverted sexual instinct are circumstances which with other circumstances may have a tendency to connect an accused with a crime of that character, and to lend credence to a vie-tim's accusations or testimony which describe acts which would otherwise seem improbable standing alone. | 1 | 3 |
Pirnat v. Stategreen2 sentences1996Cossel now argues that the rule announced in Lannan should apply retroactively to his case on postconvietion relief. 2 In Pirnat v. State, 607 N.E.2d 973 (Ind.1993), our supreme court stated, “We doubt Lannan will qualify for retroactive application to cases on collateral review, but reserve that question for another day.” Id. at 974. 1994Moreover, in Pirnat v. State (1992), 600 N.E.2d 1342 , reh'g denied (1993), 607 N.E.2d 973 (per curiam), after remand (1993), Ind. App., 612 N.E.2d 153 , reh'g denied, decided the same day as Lannan, we said: We have today in Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (1992), revisited the depraved sexual instinct exception and announced a *577 new rule concerning the admissibility of prior bad acts in sex offense cases. | 1 | 2 |
Stout v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See Stout v. State (1993), Ind.App., 612 N.E.2d 1076, 1078-79 , trans. denied. 1993Stout v. State (1993), Ind.App., 612 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 , trans. denied; see also Clausen v. State, Ind., 622 N.E.2d 925 at 927-928 (1993); Shackelford v. State, (1993), Ind.App., 622 N.E.2d 1340 at 1343 . | 1 | 2 |
Lehiy v. Stategreen2 sentences1989See, Lehiy, supra at 455; Pieper v. State (1975), 262 Ind. 580 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 198 ; State v. Robbins (1943), 221 Ind. 125 , 46 N.E.2d 691, 695 . 1989Lehiy v. State (1986), Ind.App., 501 N.E.2d 451 , aff'd, 509 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind.1987). | 1 | 2 |
Posey v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, eg., Posey v. State, 624 N.E.2d 515, 517 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that our supreme court's elimination of the depraved sexual instinct exception in Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (1992) did not apply retroactively because the defendant did not file his praecipe until December 4, 1992, and his case was not pending on appeal when Lannan was decided on October 16, 1992); cf. Santonelli v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (holding that "[the distinction made by the court in Posey ... between cases in which conviction had been entered but the direct appeal had not been initia | 1 | 1 |
Santonelli v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, eg., Posey v. State, 624 N.E.2d 515, 517 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that our supreme court's elimination of the depraved sexual instinct exception in Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (1992) did not apply retroactively because the defendant did not file his praecipe until December 4, 1992, and his case was not pending on appeal when Lannan was decided on October 16, 1992); cf. Santonelli v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (holding that "[the distinction made by the court in Posey ... between cases in which conviction had been entered but the direct appeal had not been initia | 1 | 1 |
Clausen v. Stategreen1 sentence1993Stout v. State (1993), Ind.App., 612 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 , trans. denied; see also Clausen v. State, Ind., 622 N.E.2d 925 at 927-928 (1993); Shackelford v. State, (1993), Ind.App., 622 N.E.2d 1340 at 1343 . | 1 | 1 |
Ried v. Stategreen2 sentences1993Id., 610 N.E.2d at 281 (Barteau, J., dissenting). 1993Id., 610 N.E.2d at 281 (Barteau, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
| Lámar v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences1991The rationale for the depraved sexual instinct exception was explained in Stewart v. State (1990), Ind., 555 N.E.2d 121, 124 , wherein this Court stated that: "acts showing a perverted sexual instinct are circumstances which with other circumstances may have a tendency to connect an accused with a crime of that character, and to lend credence to a victim's accusations or testimony which describe acts which would otherwise seem improbable standing alone. 1991The rationale for the depraved sexual instinct exception was explained in Stewart v. State (1990), Ind., 555 N.E.2d 121, 124 , wherein this Court stated that: "acts showing a perverted sexual instinct are circumstances which with other circumstances may have a tendency to connect an accused with a crime of that character, and to lend credence to a vie-tim's accusations or testimony which describe acts which would otherwise seem improbable standing alone. | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lawrence v. State
red
2 sentences1989Lawrence v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 923 ; Allbritten v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 452 , 317 N.E.2d 854 . 1988As the sole issue in this direct appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of defendant's prior Michigan conviction. 1 Defendant argues that the prior conviction, appearing to be equivalent to the offense of rape, was not sufficiently similar to the crimes charged to allow its introduction into evidence under the depraved sexual instinct rule as applied in Lawrence v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 923 . | 5 | 1985–1989 |
Rouster v. State
green
2 sentences1994Moreover, in Pirnat v. State (1992), 600 N.E.2d 1342 , reh'g denied (1993), 607 N.E.2d 973 (per curiam), after remand (1993), Ind. App., 612 N.E.2d 153 , reh'g denied, decided the same day as Lannan, we said: We have today in Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (1992), revisited the depraved sexual instinct exception and announced a *577 new rule concerning the admissibility of prior bad acts in sex offense cases. 1993It means only that such evidence will no longer be admitted to show action in conformity with a particular character trait." According to Pirnat v. State (1992), Ind., 600 N.E.2d 1342 , rek. denied, decided on the same day as Lonnaon, supra, Orr is entitled to application of Lan-nan as his case was pending on direct appeal at the time of the Lannan decision. | 3 | 1992–1994 |
Stwalley v. State
green
2 sentences1993Stout argues, first, that a prior rape would not have been admissible under the exception, citing Stwalley v. State (1989), Ind., 534 N.E.2d 229 and Reichard v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 163 ; and, second, that, with the abolition of the exception by the Indiana Supreme Court in Lannan v. State (1992), Ind., 600 N.E.2d 1334 , the admission of the evidence of the rape and other acts of child molesting constitutes reversible error. 1991Stwalley v. State (1989), Ind., 534 N.E.2d 229 ." The uncharged acts being offered need not be identical to the acts charged; it is sufficient if the same sexual instinet is involved. | 2 | 1991–1993 |
Grey v. State
green
2 sentences1992Stephens, supra citing Grey v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 439, 446 , 404 N.E.2d 1348, 1352 . 1992Stephens, supra citing Grey v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 439, 446 , 404 N.E.2d 1348, 1352 . | 2 | 1989–1992 |
Lehiy v. State
neutral
2 sentences1991Letica argues that evidence of a prior rape conviction does not fit under the depraved sexual instinct rule, citing Reichard v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 163 , and Lehiy v. State (1987), 509 N.E.2d 1116 . 1989Lehiy v. State (1986), Ind.App., 501 N.E.2d 451 , aff'd, 509 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind.1987). | 2 | 1989–1991 |
State v. Robbins
green
2 sentences1988In explanation of the basis for the depraved sexual instinct rule, this court stated: The basis for this exception is that in prosecutions for depraved acts "... the prosecuting witness is not likely to be believed, since the evidence 'standing alone and entirely unconnected with anything which led to or brought it about, would appear ... unnatural or improbable in itself"" Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 585 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 199 , quoting State v. Robbins, (1943) 221 Ind. 125 , 46 N.E.2d 691, 695 . 1988In explanation of the basis for the depraved sexual instinct rule, this court stated: The basis for this exception is that in prosecutions for depraved acts "... the prosecuting witness is not likely to be believed, since the evidence 'standing alone and entirely unconnected with anything which led to or brought it about, would appear ... unnatural or improbable in itself"" Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 585 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 199 , quoting State v. Robbins, (1943) 221 Ind. 125 , 46 N.E.2d 691, 695 . | 2 | 1988–1989 |
Pieper v. State
green
2 sentences1988In explanation of the basis for the depraved sexual instinct rule, this court stated: The basis for this exception is that in prosecutions for depraved acts "... the prosecuting witness is not likely to be believed, since the evidence 'standing alone and entirely unconnected with anything which led to or brought it about, would appear ... unnatural or improbable in itself"" Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 585 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 199 , quoting State v. Robbins, (1943) 221 Ind. 125 , 46 N.E.2d 691, 695 . 1988In explanation of the basis for the depraved sexual instinct rule, this court stated: The basis for this exception is that in prosecutions for depraved acts "... the prosecuting witness is not likely to be believed, since the evidence 'standing alone and entirely unconnected with anything which led to or brought it about, would appear ... unnatural or improbable in itself"" Pieper v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 580, 585 , 321 N.E.2d 196, 199 , quoting State v. Robbins, (1943) 221 Ind. 125 , 46 N.E.2d 691, 695 . | 2 | 1988–1989 |
Brackens v. State
green
2 sentences1987Brackens, 480 N.E.2d at 539 ; McKim v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.24 503, 505. 1986Brackens v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 536 ; McKim v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 503 ; Jarrett v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1097 . | 2 | 1986–1987 |
Shanks v. State
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 736-37 . 2011The Court of Appeals in Shanks found three reasons the judicial-temperance presumption was overcome: (1) the trial court expressly stated a prohibited purpose for admitting the evidence; (2) the type of evidence was admissible at the time of trial but was held inadmissible while defendant’s appeal was pending; and (3) the trial court admitted the evidence over a specific objection. 640 N.E.2d at 737-739 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cossel v. State
green
1 sentence1997Cossel v. State, 675 N.E.2d 355 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Bedgood v. State
green
2 sentences1995Pursuant to that rule, evidence of an accused's extrancous bad acts is no longer admissible to prove a depraved sexual in-stincet, but "such evidence may be admissible despite its tendency to show bad character or criminal propensity, if it makes the existence of an element of the crime charged more probable than it would be without such evidence." Id. (quoting Bedgood v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 869, 872-73 ; emphasis in original). 1995Pursuant to that rule, evidence of an accused's extraneous bad acts is no longer admissible to prove a depraved sexual instinct, but "such evidence may be admissible despite its tendency to show bad character or criminal propensity, if it makes the existence of an element of the crime charged more probable than it would be without such evidence." Id. (quoting Bedgood v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 869, 872-73 ; emphasis in original). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Pirnat v. State
green
1 sentence1994Moreover, in Pirnat v. State (1992), 600 N.E.2d 1342 , reh'g denied (1993), 607 N.E.2d 973 (per curiam), after remand (1993), Ind. App., 612 N.E.2d 153 , reh'g denied, decided the same day as Lannan, we said: We have today in Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (1992), revisited the depraved sexual instinct exception and announced a *577 new rule concerning the admissibility of prior bad acts in sex offense cases. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Shackelford v. State
green
1 sentence1993Stout v. State (1993), Ind.App., 612 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 , trans. denied; see also Clausen v. State, Ind., 622 N.E.2d 925 at 927-928 (1993); Shackelford v. State, (1993), Ind.App., 622 N.E.2d 1340 at 1343 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Flansburg v. Flansburg
green
2 sentences1993The defendant’s motion sought reconsideration of the depraved sexual instinct rule and was supported by a detailed and thorough memorandum referring the trial court to various articles and treatises by social scientists, pursuant to the invitation in Hogg v. State (1991), Ind., 581 N.E.2d 430 (Dickson, J., concurring in the denial of transfer). 1993The defendant's motion sought reconsideration of the depraved sexual instinct rule and was supported by a detailed and thorough memorandum referring the trial court to various articles and treatises by social scientists, pursuant to the invitation in Hogg v. State (1991), Ind., 581 N.E.2d 430 (Dickson, J., concurring in the denial of transfer). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Vicorp Restaurants v. Corinco Insulating Co.
green
1 sentence1993Stout argues, first, that a prior rape would not have been admissible under the exception, citing Stwalley v. State (1989), Ind., 584 N.E.2d 229 and Reichard v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 163 ; and, second, that, with the abolition of the exception by the Indiana Supreme Court in Lonnan v. State (1992), Ind., 600 N.E.2d 1334 , the admission of the evidence of the rape and other acts of child molesting constitutes reversible error. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Modesitt v. State
green
2 sentences1992Appellant's brief at 9. [3] This application is in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court's decision in Modesitt v. State (1991), Ind., 578 N.E.2d 649 , in which the Court abolished the Patterson exception to the hearsay rule. 1992Appellant's brief at 9. .This application is in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court’s decision in Modesitt v. State (1991), Ind., 578 N.E.2d 649 , in which the Court abolished the Patterson exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Kerlin v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Miller v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Stephens v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Lachterman
green
2 sentences1992Approximately twenty other states have or have had such exceptions. 3 Some, such as Missouri and Kansas, explicitly recognize a depraved sexual instinct exception, State v. Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759 (Mo.Ct.App.1991), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1666 , 118 L.Ed.2d 387 (1992), or allow evi dence of prior bad acts to prove defendant's "lustful disposition or nature." State v. Whiting, 173 Kan. 711 , 252 P.2d 884 (1953). 1992Approximately twenty other states have or have had such exceptions. [3] Some, such as Missouri and Kansas, explicitly recognize a depraved sexual instinct exception, State v. Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1666 , 118 L.Ed.2d 387 (1992), or allow evidence *1336 of prior bad acts to prove defendant's "lustful disposition or nature." State v. Whiting, 173 Kan. 711 , 252 P.2d 884 (1953). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Settle v. State
green
1 sentence1992Settle v. State (1988), Ind. 526 N.E.2d 974 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Whiting green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Czarneski v. Commissioner
green
2 sentences1992Approximately twenty other states have or have had such exceptions. 3 Some, such as Missouri and Kansas, explicitly recognize a depraved sexual instinct exception, State v. Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759 (Mo.Ct.App.1991), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1666 , 118 L.Ed.2d 387 (1992), or allow evi dence of prior bad acts to prove defendant's "lustful disposition or nature." State v. Whiting, 173 Kan. 711 , 252 P.2d 884 (1953). 1992Approximately twenty other states have or have had such exceptions. [3] Some, such as Missouri and Kansas, explicitly recognize a depraved sexual instinct exception, State v. Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1666 , 118 L.Ed.2d 387 (1992), or allow evidence *1336 of prior bad acts to prove defendant's "lustful disposition or nature." State v. Whiting, 173 Kan. 711 , 252 P.2d 884 (1953). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Peckinpaugh v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Kindred v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Jenkins v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Hodges v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Baughman v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Lewis v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Allbritten v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hatcher v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Harp v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Guenther v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Knisley v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Watkins v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| McKim v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Cobbs v. State neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Woods v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Howell v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Meeks v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.