residential property violation in Massachusetts

2017We have recognized that "crowding of an abutter's residential property by violation of the density provisions of the zoning by-law will generally constitute harm sufficiently perceptible and personal to qualify the abutter as aggrieved and thereby confer standing to maintain a zoning appeal." Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 12 (2009), quoting from Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 297 (2008).

2017In light of such interests, "crowding of an abutter's residential property by violation of the density provisions of the zoning by-law will generally constitute harm sufficiently perceptible and personal to qualify the abutter as aggrieved and thereby confer standing to maintain a zoning appeal." Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 297 (2008). 4 impact on their property." Ibid.

2017We have recognized that "crowding of an abutter's residential property by violation of the density provisions of the zoning by-law will generally constitute harm sufficiently perceptible and personal to qualify the abutter as aggrieved and thereby confer standing to maintain a zoning appeal." Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 12 (2009), quoting from Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 297 (2008).

2012This case, by contrast, deals with a crowded urban neighborhood, a context in which our case law makes clear that additional “crowding of an abutter’s residential property by violation of the density provisions of the zoning by-law will generally constitute harm sufficiently perceptible and personal to qualify the abutter as aggrieved.” Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 12 (2009), quoting from Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 297 (2008).

2010The following concerns have been recognized by Massachusetts’ appellate courts as a basis for standing under G.L.c. 40A, §17: ground water contamination, see Bertrand v. Bd. of Appeals of Bourne, 58 Mass.App.Ct. 912 (2003) (including “concerns about [the] environmental implications of two nearby septic systems instead of one . . . relate directly to the objectives of the density regulation at issue”); density, see Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass.App.Ct. at 297 (reaffirming notion that “crowding of an abutter’s residential property by violation of the density provisions of the zoning by-law will genera

2010Dec. 12, 2006), citing Bertrand, 58 Mass.App.Ct. at 912 (upholding standing where abutters expressed concerns about light, noise, and privacy due to construction of two houses on lot zoned for one single-family house); and, diminished light, see Bertrand, 58 Mass.App.Ct. at 912 (finding standing where proposed building would be taller than plaintiffs’ building, and within one foot of their windows, markedly decreasing their “light, air, view, and privacy”).

2013The Chanskys’ efforts to rebut the Mauris’ presumption of standing, focused on demonstrating no diminution in value of the Mauris’ property as a result of constructing a new residential dwelling on the garage lot, fail to show that the Mauris had no factual basis for their claim of harm from the overcrowding of their property. 81 Spooner Rd., LLC, supra at 705.

2010The following concerns have been recognized by Massachusetts’ appellate courts as a basis for standing under G.L.c. 40A, §17: ground water contamination, see Bertrand v. Bd. of Appeals of Bourne, 58 Mass.App.Ct. 912 (2003) (including “concerns about [the] environmental implications of two nearby septic systems instead of one . . . relate directly to the objectives of the density regulation at issue”); density, see Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass.App.Ct. at 297 (reaffirming notion that “crowding of an abutter’s residential property by violation of the density provisions of the zoning by-law will genera

2010The following concerns have been recognized by Massachusetts’ appellate courts as a basis for standing under G.L.c. 40A, §17: ground water contamination, see Bertrand v. Bd. of Appeals of Bourne, 58 Mass.App.Ct. 912 (2003) (including “concerns about [the] environmental implications of two nearby septic systems instead of one . . . relate directly to the objectives of the density regulation at issue”); density, see Dwyer v. Gallo, 73 Mass.App.Ct. at 297 (reaffirming notion that “crowding of an abutter’s residential property by violation of the density provisions of the zoning by-law will genera

2009See Chambers v. Building Inspector of Peabody, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 762, 768 (1996) (“we believe that a building located closer than planned to the plaintiff’s property line that is eleven percent larger . . . , plus a noisy air conditioner cooling tower located near the plaintiff’s property, add up to evidence of aggrievement”); Bertrand v. Board of Appeals of Bourne, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 912, 912 (2003) (“given the close quarters involved here,” plaintiff had standing).