mtca waiver in Maryland

2023The Plain Language and Statutory Context Starting with the plain text, the MTCA does not define the term “tort action.” In support of her position that “tort action,” as used in the MTCA, encompasses federal statutory claims, Appellant contends that three decisions of this Court “broaden[ed] the definition of ‘tort’” beyond common law tort actions: Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528 (2009); Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311 (2015); and Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 (2004).7 None of those decisions supports Appellant’s contention that the MTCA waiver extends generally even to state statutory claims, m

2007Thus, “[t] he purpose of MTCA immunity is not simply to protect judgmental decisions by officials, but to insulate state employees generally from tort liability if their actions are within the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence!.]” Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 261 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004). *400 One of the statutory “exclusions and limitations” on tort actions against the State and its units is the notice requirement that lies at the heart of this appeal.

2026Id.

2023In Green, this Court considered whether to apply Maryland’s cap on noneconomic damages set forth in CJP § 11-108 to damages for a violation of the Maryland Consumer 7 At oral argument, Appellant directly claimed support from our decision in Hansen v. City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670 (2011), and, in her brief, she cites to unreported decisions of other courts that discuss that decision.

2023The Plain Language and Statutory Context Starting with the plain text, the MTCA does not define the term “tort action.” In support of her position that “tort action,” as used in the MTCA, encompasses federal statutory claims, Appellant contends that three decisions of this Court “broaden[ed] the definition of ‘tort’” beyond common law tort actions: Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528 (2009); Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311 (2015); and Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 (2004).7 None of those decisions supports Appellant’s contention that the MTCA waiver extends generally even to state statutory claims, m

2023The Plain Language and Statutory Context Starting with the plain text, the MTCA does not define the term “tort action.” In support of her position that “tort action,” as used in the MTCA, encompasses federal statutory claims, Appellant contends that three decisions of this Court “broaden[ed] the definition of ‘tort’” beyond common law tort actions: Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528 (2009); Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311 (2015); and Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 (2004).7 None of those decisions supports Appellant’s contention that the MTCA waiver extends generally even to state statutory claims, m

2012Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 66-70 , 30 A.3d at 1029-32 .

2012Marks-Sloan, 202 Md.App. at 66-70 , 30 A.3d at 1029-32 .

2011Aside from James and Parker , both supra, the only other cases cited by the State defendants in support of their argument that the MTCA does not waive immunity for the State and its agencies for tort actions “arising from discretionary governmental planning and policy discussions authorized by statute,” are Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Whalen, 395 Md. 154, 159 , 909 A.2d 683 (2006), and Lee v. Cline, supra. The Whalen case involves a suit against a municipality (Baltimore City) and has nothing whatsoever to do with the MTCA The issue presented in Whalen was whether Baltimore City was

2011Aside from James and Parker , both supra, the only other cases cited by the State defendants in support of their argument that the MTCA does not waive immunity for the State and its agencies for tort actions “arising from discretionary governmental planning and policy discussions authorized by statute,” are Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Whalen, 395 Md. 154, 159 , 909 A.2d 683 (2006), and Lee v. Cline, supra. The Whalen case involves a suit against a municipality (Baltimore City) and has nothing whatsoever to do with the MTCA The issue presented in Whalen was whether Baltimore City was

2010WMATA contends that this Court should adopt the Court of Special Appeals’ holding in Deschamps, 183 Md.App. at 298-99 , 961 A.2d at 602-03 , that the limit on tort damages contained in § 12-104(a) of the State Government Article applies to WMATA as a “unit” of the State.

2010WMATA contends that this Court should adopt the Court of Special Appeals’ holding in Deschamps, 183 Md.App. at 298-99 , 961 A.2d at 602-03 , that the limit on tort damages contained in § 12-104(a) of the State Government Article applies to WMATA as a “unit” of the State.

2007Focusing on the MTCA claim against the State, the Sawyer Court held that the surviving spouse failed to substantially comply with section 12-106(b) because his claim was not received by the State Treasurer before the deadline. 8 See id. at 228-29, 592 A.2d 1090 .

2007Focusing on the MTCA claim against the State, the Sawyer Court held that the surviving spouse failed to substantially comply with section 12-106(b) because his claim was not received by the State Treasurer before the deadline. 8 See id. at 228-29, 592 A.2d 1090 .