mtca immunity in Mississippi

2009Estate of Grimes v. Warrington, 982 So.2d 365, 370 (Miss.2008) (citing City of Ellisville v. Richardson, 913 So.2d 973, 975 (Miss.2005); Lumberman’s Underwriting Alliance v. City of Rosedale, 727 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss.1998); Dixon v. Singing River Hosp.

2009Estate of Grimes v. Warrington, 982 So.2d 365, 370 (Miss.2008) (citing City of Ellisville v. Richardson, 913 So.2d 973, 975 (Miss.2005); Lumberman's Underwriting Alliance v. City of Rosedale, 727 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss.1998); Dixon v. Singing River Hosp.

2021Similarly, in Grimes, 982 So. 2d at 370 (¶27), the supreme court addressed whether the defendant had a reasonable explanation for waiting five years to assert an MTCA immunity defense while he “proceeded substantially to engage the litigation process by consenting to a scheduling order, participating in written discovery, and conducting depositions.” The supreme court found that the defendant “offer[ed] no evidence that any information needed to assert this affirmative defense was not available to him from the inception of the litigation.” Id. at (¶26).

2021Similarly, in Grimes, 982 So. 2d at 370 (¶27), the supreme court addressed whether the defendant had a reasonable explanation for waiting five years to assert an MTCA immunity defense while he “proceeded substantially to engage the litigation process by consenting to a scheduling order, participating in written discovery, and conducting depositions.” The supreme court found that the defendant “offer[ed] no evidence that any information needed to assert this affirmative defense was not available to him from the inception of the litigation.” Id. at (¶26).

2009Estate of Grimes v. Warrington, 982 So.2d 365, 370 (Miss.2008) (citing City of Ellisville v. Richardson, 913 So.2d 973, 975 (Miss.2005); Lumberman’s Underwriting Alliance v. City of Rosedale, 727 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss.1998); Dixon v. Singing River Hosp.

2009Estate of Grimes v. Warrington, 982 So.2d 365, 370 (Miss.2008) (citing City of Ellisville v. Richardson, 913 So.2d 973, 975 (Miss.2005); Lumberman's Underwriting Alliance v. City of Rosedale, 727 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss.1998); Dixon v. Singing River Hosp.

2024Bd. of Supervisors, 243 So. 3d 177, 181 (Miss. 2018)).

2021Bd. of Supervisors, 243 So. 3d 177, 181 (Miss. 2018) (citing Fortenberry v. City of Jackson, 71 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Miss. 2011), overruled on other grounds as recognized in City of Magee v. Jones, 161 So. 3d 1047 (Miss. 2015)).

2024“Immunity is a question of law and is a proper matter for summary judgment.” Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 846 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (¶8) (Miss. 2003).

2018See id. (holding that, because MTCA immunity "is an entitlement not to stand trial rather than a mere defense to liability," this issue "should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation").

2018Fortenberry v. City of Jackson, 71 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Miss. 2011) (applying de novo review to the question of MTCA immunity); Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (Miss. 2006) (applying de novo review to a motion to dismiss).

2018Fortenberry v. City of Jackson , 71 So.3d 1196 , 1199 (Miss. 2011) (applying de novo review to the question of MTCA immunity); Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc. , 931 So.2d 1274 , 1275 (Miss. 2006) (applying de novo review to a motion to dismiss).

2011McQueen v. Williams, 587 So.2d 918, 924-25 (Miss.1991). .

2010McQueen v. Williams, 587 So. 2d 918, 924-25 (Miss. 1991). 7 2d at 867.

2009Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Gray Corp., 972 So.2d 495, 517 (Miss.2007) (failure to cite authority in support of claims of error precludes appellate review of those claims) (citing Grey v. Grey, 638 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1994)) (other citations omitted). ¶ 51.

2009Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Gray Corp., 972 So.2d 495, 517 (Miss.2007) (failure to cite authority in support of claims of error precludes appellate review of those claims) (citing Grey v. Grey, 638 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1994)) (other citations omitted). ś 51.

2009Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Gray Corp., 972 So.2d 495, 517 (Miss.2007) (failure to cite authority in support of claims of error precludes appellate review of those claims) (citing Grey v. Grey, 638 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1994)) (other citations omitted). ¶ 51.

2009Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Gray Corp., 972 So.2d 495, 517 (Miss.2007) (failure to cite authority in support of claims of error precludes appellate review of those claims) (citing Grey v. Grey, 638 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1994)) (other citations omitted). ś 51.

2009In Glover v. Jackson State University, this Court defined negligence as “doing what a reasonable, prudent person would not do, or failing to do what a reasonable, prudent person would do, under substantially similar circumstances.” Glover, 968 So.2d 1267, 1277 (Miss.2007).

2009In Glover v. Jackson State University, this Court defined negligence as “doing what a reasonable, prudent person would not do, or failing to do what a reasonable, prudent person would do, under substantially similar circumstances.” Glover, 968 So.2d 1267, 1277 (Miss.2007).

2006Conrod v. Holder, 825 So.2d 16,19 (Miss.2002) (citing with approval Mallery v. Taylor, 805 So.2d 613, 622 (Miss.Ct.App. 2002)).

2004Conrod v. Holder, 825 So. 2d 16,19 (Miss. 2002) (citing with approval Mallery v. Taylor, 805 So. 2d 613, 622 (Miss.

2006Conrod v. Holder, 825 So.2d 16,19 (Miss.2002) (citing with approval Mallery v. Taylor, 805 So.2d 613, 622 (Miss.Ct.App. 2002)).

2004Conrod v. Holder, 825 So. 2d 16,19 (Miss. 2002) (citing with approval Mallery v. Taylor, 805 So. 2d 613, 622 (Miss.

2024The MTCA provides immunity for “any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury.” City of 15 Jackson v. Lewis, 153 So. 3d 689, 693 (¶5) (Miss. 2014) (quoting Miss.

2021Taylor then initiated discovery and, for over seven months, the parties engaged in substantial discovery that took place without Cook having “fair notice” that Taylor intended to pursue a qualified immunity defense, Latham, 262 So. 3d at 582 (¶73), and without Taylor limiting his participation to only those actions necessary to “specifically pursue his MTCA defense.” Grimes, 982 So. 2d at 370 (¶27).

2021Estate of Grimes v. Warrington, 982 So. 2d 365, 370 (¶24) (Miss. 2008); accord Alexander v. Newton County, 124 So. 3d 688, 690 (¶8) (Miss.

2019Bd. of Sup’rs, 19 So. 3d 672, 688 (¶82) (Miss. 2009). ¶9.

2018Fortenberry v. City of Jackson, 71 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Miss. 2011) (applying de novo review to the question of MTCA immunity); Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (Miss. 2006) (applying de novo review to a motion to dismiss).

2018Fortenberry v. City of Jackson , 71 So.3d 1196 , 1199 (Miss. 2011) (applying de novo review to the question of MTCA immunity); Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc. , 931 So.2d 1274 , 1275 (Miss. 2006) (applying de novo review to a motion to dismiss).

2018Schepens , 924 So.2d at 623-24 (¶¶ 11-13).

2018See also Tunica Cty. v. Gray, 13 So. 3d 826, 829 (Miss. 2009), holding that “a mere violation of a statute or regulation will not support a claim where no private cause of action exists.” It is only after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case against the entity that the MTCA and its immunity provision will be addressed.

2018See also Tunica Cty. v. Gray , 13 So.3d 826 , 829 (Miss. 2009), holding that "a mere violation of a statute or regulation will not support a claim where no private cause of action exists." It is only after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case against the entity that the MTCA and its immunity provision will be addressed.

2018Lee , 37 So.3d at 81 (¶¶ 22-23).

2017See Rogers v. Lee Cty., Miss., 684 Fed.Appx. at 391 (rejecting officer’s argument that MTCA immunity applied but still affirming the grant of summary judgment based on the plaintiffs failure to show a genuine issue of material fact on the element of malice). ¶ 36.

2017Id. at 793 (¶14). 20 This Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment that the officer’s failure to check the driver’s sobriety failed to rise to the level of reckless disregard, and we explained “that there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to hold that [the officer’s] omission [to check for sobriety] did not rise to the level of gross disregard for [the decedent’s] safety.” Id. at 796 (¶20).

2017Id. at 793 (¶14). 20 This Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment that the officer’s failure to check the driver’s sobriety failed to rise to the level of reckless disregard, and we explained “that there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to hold that [the officer’s] omission [to check for sobriety] did not rise to the level of gross disregard for [the decedent’s] safety.” Id. at 796 (¶20).

2013While there is not a set number of days that constitutes an unreasonable delay, our supreme court has held “that— absent extreme and unusual circumstances — an eight month unjustified delay in the assertion and pursuit of any affirmative defense or other right which, if timely pursued, could serve to terminate the litigation, coupled with active participation in the litigation process, constitutes waiver as a matter of law.” Horton, 926 So.2d at 181 (¶ 45) (footnote omitted).