7 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tibbs v. Stategreen2 sentences2013We note that with regard to the examination, the trial judge is required to do more than merely “go through the motions.” See Tibbs, 323 Md. at 32 , 590 A.2d at 551 (noting that “[i]t is not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry ... ”); see also Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 , 50 S.Ct. 253, 263 , 74 L.Ed. 854, 870 (1930), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (noting that “the duty of the trial court ... is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discre 2013We note that with regard to the examination, the trial judge is required to do more than merely “go through the motions.” See Tibbs, 323 Md. at 32 , 590 A.2d at 551 (noting that “[i]t is not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry ... ”); see also Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 , 50 S.Ct. 253, 263 , 74 L.Ed. 854, 870 (1930), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (noting that “the duty of the trial court ... is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discre | 3 | 6 |
Patton v. United Statesred2 sentences2013We note that with regard to the examination, the trial judge is required to do more than merely “go through the motions.” See Tibbs, 323 Md. at 32 , 590 A.2d at 551 (noting that “[i]t is not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry ... ”); see also Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 , 50 S.Ct. 253, 263 , 74 L.Ed. 854, 870 (1930), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (noting that “the duty of the trial court ... is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discre 2013We note that with regard to the examination, the trial judge is required to do more than merely “go through the motions.” See Tibbs, 323 Md. at 32 , 590 A.2d at 551 (noting that “[i]t is not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry ... ”); see also Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 , 50 S.Ct. 253, 263 , 74 L.Ed. 854, 870 (1930), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (noting that “the duty of the trial court ... is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discre | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Floridagreen2 sentences2013We note that with regard to the examination, the trial judge is required to do more than merely “go through the motions.” See Tibbs, 323 Md. at 32 , 590 A.2d at 551 (noting that “[i]t is not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry ... ”); see also Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 , 50 S.Ct. 253, 263 , 74 L.Ed. 854, 870 (1930), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (noting that “the duty of the trial court ... is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discre 2013We note that with regard to the examination, the trial judge is required to do more than merely “go through the motions.” See Tibbs, 323 Md. at 32 , 590 A.2d at 551 (noting that “[i]t is not sufficient that an accused merely respond affirmatively to a naked inquiry ... ”); see also Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 , 50 S.Ct. 253, 263 , 74 L.Ed. 854, 870 (1930), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 , 90 S.Ct. 1893 , 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (noting that “the duty of the trial court ... is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discre | 1 | 1 |
Abeokuto v. Stategreen2 sentences2006We conclude, therefore, that constitutional due process requirements were transgressed in this case." 323 Md. at 32 , 590 A.2d at 551-552 . [4] The majority made a similar comparison in Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 324 , 893 A.2d 1018, 1038 (2006). 2006We conclude, therefore, that constitutional due process requirements were transgressed in this case." 323 Md. at 32 , 590 A.2d at 551-552 . [4] The majority made a similar comparison in Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 324 , 893 A.2d 1018, 1038 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Weitzel v. Stategreen2 sentences2006The trial court in Tibbs should have inquired further. [14] As we recently stated in Weitzel v. State, 384 Md. 451, 456 , 863 A.2d 999, 1001-02 (2004) and Kosh v. State, 382 Md. 218, 227 , 854 A.2d 1259, 1264 (2004), evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence is inadmissible as substantive evidence of his guilt. [15] This same defect afflicts several of Appellant's other appellate issues, to wit questions presented numbers (9), (10), and (11). [16] In Whitfield, we concluded that the defendant was in custody at the time of the interrogations at issue in that case. 2006The trial court in Tibbs should have inquired further. [14] As we recently stated in Weitzel v. State, 384 Md. 451, 456 , 863 A.2d 999, 1001-02 (2004) and Kosh v. State, 382 Md. 218, 227 , 854 A.2d 1259, 1264 (2004), evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence is inadmissible as substantive evidence of his guilt. [15] This same defect afflicts several of Appellant's other appellate issues, to wit questions presented numbers (9), (10), and (11). [16] In Whitfield, we concluded that the defendant was in custody at the time of the interrogations at issue in that case. | 1 | 1 |
Kosh v. Stategreen2 sentences2006The trial court in Tibbs should have inquired further. [14] As we recently stated in Weitzel v. State, 384 Md. 451, 456 , 863 A.2d 999, 1001-02 (2004) and Kosh v. State, 382 Md. 218, 227 , 854 A.2d 1259, 1264 (2004), evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence is inadmissible as substantive evidence of his guilt. [15] This same defect afflicts several of Appellant's other appellate issues, to wit questions presented numbers (9), (10), and (11). [16] In Whitfield, we concluded that the defendant was in custody at the time of the interrogations at issue in that case. 2006The trial court in Tibbs should have inquired further. [14] As we recently stated in Weitzel v. State, 384 Md. 451, 456 , 863 A.2d 999, 1001-02 (2004) and Kosh v. State, 382 Md. 218, 227 , 854 A.2d 1259, 1264 (2004), evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence is inadmissible as substantive evidence of his guilt. [15] This same defect afflicts several of Appellant's other appellate issues, to wit questions presented numbers (9), (10), and (11). [16] In Whitfield, we concluded that the defendant was in custody at the time of the interrogations at issue in that case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences2006On the contrary, our case law is clear: “[T]he trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion, and further that the defendant has some knowledge of the jury trial right before being allowed to waive it.” Id. at 31 , 590 A.2d at 551 , citing Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83 , 582 A.2d at 509 . 2006On the contrary, our case law is clear: “[T]he trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver is not a product of duress or coercion, and further that the defendant has some knowledge of the jury trial right before being allowed to waive it.” Id. at 31 , 590 A.2d at 551 , citing Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83 , 582 A.2d at 509 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. DeCola
green
1 sentence1964In the latter case, the court thus summarized and restated the rule ( 170 A. 2d at 818 ) : “As we held in State v. De Cola, supra, * * * a court cannot evaluate a naked claim of possible deviation from prior testimony and hence the witness may be compelled to answer, he however being protected against the use of the compelled answers if it should later be charged that he perjured himself in his prior sworn testimony.” The New Jersey perjury statute, it may be observed, is similar to ours in that proof of two inconsistent, material statements under oath is sufficient without the State being req | 1 | 1964–1964 |
State v. Boiardo
green
2 sentences1964In the latter case, the court thus summarized and restated the rule ( 170 A.2d at 818 ): "As we held in State v. De Cola, supra, * * * a court cannot evaluate a naked claim of possible deviation from prior testimony and hence the witness may be compelled to answer, he however being protected against the *209 use of the compelled answers if it should later be charged that he perjured himself in his prior sworn testimony." The New Jersey perjury statute, it may be observed, is similar to ours in that proof of two inconsistent, material statements under oath is sufficient without the State being 1964In the latter case, the court thus summarized and restated the rule ( 170 A. 2d at 818 ) : “As we held in State v. De Cola, supra, * * * a court cannot evaluate a naked claim of possible deviation from prior testimony and hence the witness may be compelled to answer, he however being protected against the use of the compelled answers if it should later be charged that he perjured himself in his prior sworn testimony.” The New Jersey perjury statute, it may be observed, is similar to ours in that proof of two inconsistent, material statements under oath is sufficient without the State being req | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.