suitability hearing in California

2013(In re Luis B., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123 .) But the prosecuting attorney’s initial duty to assess the minor’s eligibility for DEJ and the court’s duty, if the minor is found eligible, either to summarily grant DEJ or to conduct a suitability hearing are mandatory.

2013(In re Usef S. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 276, 283-284 (Usef S.); In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 (Luis B.).) However, the juvenile court is not required to conduct a suitability hearing if the prosecutor determines the minor is eligible for DEJ, and the minor receives the requisite notice of his or her eligibility, but he or she nevertheless denies the allegations of the petition and requests a contested hearing.

2013(In re Usef S. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 276, 283-284 (Usef S.); In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 (Luis B.).) The court‟s ultimate denial of DEJ is proper “only when the trial court finds the minor would not benefit from education, treatment and rehabilitation.” (Martha C. v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 556, 561 .) However, the juvenile court is not required to conduct a suitability hearing if the prosecutor determines the minor is eligible for DEJ, and the minor receives the requisite notice of his or her eligibility, but he or she nevertheless denies the allegations of

2013(In re Usef S. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 276, 283-284 (Usef S.); In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 (Luis B.).) However, the juvenile court is not required to conduct a suitability hearing if the prosecutor determines the minor is eligible for DEJ, and the minor receives the requisite notice of his or her eligibility, but he or she nevertheless denies the allegations of the petition and requests a contested hearing.

2014Indeed, allowing N.H. to have both a suitability hearing without admitting to the petition and a contested jurisdictional hearing would contradict the intent of the DEJ program to provide “an expedited mechanism for channeling certain first-time offenders away from the full panoply of a contested delinquency proceeding.” (Kenneth J., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 980 .) Under the circumstances, N.H.’s failure to admit to the petition and her choice to proceed with a contested jurisdictional hearing was tantamount to a rejection of DEJ.

2013(In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 976-980 (Kenneth J.); Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 281-283.) In such circumstances, the minor’s denial of the allegations and insistence on a contested hearing 17. are “tantamount to a rejection of DEJ.” (Kenneth J., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 980 ; Usef S., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 286, fn. 3 .) B.

2015The court is not empowered to reweigh the evidence.” (Id. at p. 221.) Nonetheless, we “examine[] the rationality of the parole authority’s decision, an inquiry that properly focuses on the authority’s reasoning, including the evidence cited by demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering”; or the motive for the crime was “inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” (Regs., § 2402, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(E).) Other unsuitability factors are a previous history of violence; “a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others”; sadistic sexual offenses; “a

2014SCOPE OF REVIEW OF PAROLE BOARD DECISIONS A. THE BOARD’S ROLE IN DETERMINING PAROLE SUITABILITY The Board is charged by statute with conducting “parole consideration hearings” (§ 5075.1, subd. (a)) and, after a suitability hearing, the Board or a panel “shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual . . . .” (§ 3041, subd. (b).) “[T]he core sta

2015The court is not empowered to reweigh the evidence.” (Id. at p. 221.) Nonetheless, we “examine[] the rationality of the parole authority’s decision, an inquiry that properly focuses on the authority’s reasoning, including the evidence cited by demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering”; or the motive for the crime was “inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” (Regs., § 2402, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(E).) Other unsuitability factors are a previous history of violence; “a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others”; sadistic sexual offenses; “a

2014SCOPE OF REVIEW OF PAROLE BOARD DECISIONS A. THE BOARD’S ROLE IN DETERMINING PAROLE SUITABILITY The Board is charged by statute with conducting “parole consideration hearings” (§ 5075.1, subd. (a)) and, after a suitability hearing, the Board or a panel “shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual . . . .” (§ 3041, subd. (b).) “[T]he core sta

2023(Pereda, at p. 768; Bayuk v. Edson (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 309, 320 [agent remains liable].) But the insurance company is also liable, as the broker was acting as the company’s agent in conducting the suitability analysis—either because (as here) the company contractually authorized and obligated the broker to perform that analysis, or because the company subsequently ratified the broker’s conduct by adopting his suitability analysis as its own in relying on that analysis to issue a policy (rather than conducting its own analysis).

2023(Pereda, at p. 768; Bayuk v. Edson (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 309, 320 [agent remains liable].) But the insurance company is also liable, as the broker was acting as the company’s agent in conducting the suitability analysis—either because (as here) the company contractually authorized and obligated the broker to perform that analysis, or because the company subsequently ratified the broker’s conduct by adopting his suitability analysis as its own in relying on that analysis to issue a policy (rather than conducting its own analysis).

2023Co. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 18, 34 [same].) But if a broker negligently conducts a suitability analysis, both the broker and the insurance company would be liable.

2023Co. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 18, 34 [same].) But if a broker negligently conducts a suitability analysis, both the broker and the insurance company would be liable.

2023This is irrelevant because “‘expert testimony is incompetent on the . . . question whether [a legal] duty [of care] exists because this is a question of law for the court alone’ to decide. [Citations.]” (QDOS, Inc. v. Signature Financial, LLC (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 990, 1004 ; Shin v. Kong (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 498, 505 [“An expert cannot create a legal duty of care where none otherwise exists”].) Sixth and lastly, plaintiff suggests that insurance companies have a duty to conduct their own, independent analysis because that is the custom in the industry.

2023This is irrelevant because “‘expert testimony is incompetent on the . . . question whether [a legal] duty [of care] exists because this is a question of law for the court alone’ to decide. [Citations.]” (QDOS, Inc. v. Signature Financial, LLC (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 990, 1004 ; Shin v. Kong (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 498, 505 [“An expert cannot create a legal duty of care where none otherwise exists”].) Sixth and lastly, plaintiff suggests that insurance companies have a duty to conduct their own, independent analysis because that is the custom in the industry.

2022(See Simi Corp. v. Garamendi (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503 [“A case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical impact or cannot provide the parties with effective relief”].) But a suitability hearing is not the same as a rescission hearing.

2022(See Simi Corp. v. Garamendi (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503 [“A case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical impact or cannot provide the parties with effective relief”].) But a suitability hearing is not the same as a rescission hearing.

2015(See National Football League v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 902, 918 ; see also Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2014) ¶ 8:104b.) The Stangvik court appears to have applied the substantial evidence standard (see Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 754 [“In the present case, the trial court found that Sweden and Norway were adequate alternative forums. . . . [T]he trial court’s determination of these issues is supported by substantial evidence, and we defer to its conclusion.”]), and some courts of appeal cases have appli

1992(S.D.Fla.) No. 91-1576-CIV.) The suitability standard set forth in the Judicial Council comment to section 410.30 is based on the “orthodox” and “limited nondiscretionary concept of a suitable alternative forum,” that is, “a forum in which the action can be brought. ” (Note, Considerations of Choice of Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens (1986) 74 Cal.L.Rev. 565, 587, cited in Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 752, fn. 3 , italics added.) Thus, contrary to plaintiffs’ position, so long as there is jurisdiction and no statute of limitations bar, a forum is suitable where an action “can b

2022The proper focus in a suitability hearing is on whether the petitioner currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f); Buford, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 913 .) Even if Peoples is correct that his mental health issues were the cause of his dangerousness to public safety, he failed to show while in custody that he could control his behavior, and he lacked postrelease plans and family support to ensure he could safely manage his behavior in the community.

2022The proper focus in a suitability hearing is on whether the petitioner currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f); Buford, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 913 .) Even if Peoples is correct that his mental health issues were the cause of his dangerousness to public safety, he failed to show while in custody that he could control his behavior, and he lacked postrelease plans and family support to ensure he could safely manage his behavior in the community.

2017The minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) is the earliest date on which a life prisoner may legally be released on parole. (§ 3046; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2000, subd. (b)(67).) An inmate is entitled to a parole suitability hearing one year before his MEPD. (§ 3041, subd. (a)(2).) While a subdivision (b)(5) enhancement could be a factor tending to show a defendant is unsuitable for parole (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402 ; People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ), a subdivision (b)(1)(C) enhancement would postpone the inmate's suitability hearing for 10

2017The minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) is the earliest date on which a life prisoner may legally be released on parole. (§ 3046; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2000, subd. (b)(67).) An inmate is entitled to a parole suitability hearing one year before his MEPD. (§ 3041, subd. (a)(2).) While a subdivision (b)(5) enhancement could be a factor tending to show a defendant is unsuitable for parole (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402 ; People v. Johnson , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1238, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 ), a subdivision (b)(1)(C) enhancement would postpone the inmate's suitability hearing for 10

2025However, when charged with a misdemeanor, the defendant has no burden to show such a relationship or nexus.” (Segura, supra, 2025 WL 2505320 , at *1.) Since this case was decided by the trial court prior to the change to Penal Code section 1001.80, and involves a misdemeanor offense, we do not consider whether the suitability requirement is the same for felony offenses, and restrict our opinion to the evaluation of misdemeanor offenses only. 10 Subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 1001.80 provides, “If the court determines that a defendant charged with an applicable offense under this chapter

2024Finally, Rhode Island has a suitability requirement, [citation], but the Rhode Island Supreme Court has flatly denied that the ‘[d]emonstration of a proper showing of need’ is a component of that requirement.” (Bruen, 597 U.S. at p. 13, fn. 1 .) We agree with Mosqueda’s conclusion: “The Bruen court’s citation to these statutes as ‘shall issue’ statutes demonstrated the court was not facially condemning licensing schemes based solely on their use of ‘may issue’ language or the exercise of discretion.

2024The court’s language that these jurisdictions ‘appear to operate like “shall-issue” jurisdictions’ (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 13, fn. 1 ) indicates that, unless it can be determined from the face of the provision, whether a licensing scheme vests an amount of discretion in licensing authorities that exceeds what the Second Amendment allows is an issue best decided in as- applied challenges, not facial challenges.

2021Generally a court “is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 ; accord, People v. Galvez (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264 [“‘[A]bsent a showing to the contrary, the trial court is presumed 17 to have known and followed the applicable law and to have properly exercised its discretion.’”].) But here the record affirmatively shows the superior court denied Young’s Romero motion based on its single finding that Young’s “lengthy criminal history leading up to the commitment off