Lane defendant in New York

2022Contrary to the defendants' contention, the photographs submitted with the plaintiff's initial motion papers did not reveal the existence of a triable issue of fact ( see Richardson v County of Nassau , 156 AD3d 924, 925 ).

2022The plaintiff's affidavit submitted in support of her summary judgment motion established, prima facie, that Edwards was negligent in partially moving his vehicle into the plaintiff's lane in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a) ( see Shah v MTA Bus Co. , 201 AD3d 833, 834 ; Simon v Rent-A-Center E., Inc. , 180 AD3d 1100, 1101 ; Marks v Rieckhoff , 172 AD3d 847 , 848-849).

2022The plaintiff's affidavit submitted in support of her summary judgment motion established, prima facie, that Edwards was negligent in partially moving his vehicle into the plaintiff's lane in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a) ( see Shah v MTA Bus Co. , 201 AD3d 833, 834 ; Simon v Rent-A-Center E., Inc. , 180 AD3d 1100, 1101 ; Marks v Rieckhoff , 172 AD3d 847 , 848-849).

2007Courts “emphasize the need for finality and an end to litigation.” (Aurnou v Greenspan, 182 AD2d 523 [1992].) Accordingly, Lane’s motion is denied.

1998It is settled law that where, as here, a general contractor, without fault, has been held vicariously liable under the Labor Law for injuries sustained by a subcontractor’s employee due to the subcontractor’s negligence, the general contractor will be entitled to common-law indemnification from the subcontractor (see, Hawthorne v South Bronx Community Corp., 78 NY2d 433, 437 ; Golda v Hutchinson Enters., 247 AD2d 863 ; Marek v DePoalo & Son Bldg.

1998It is settled law that where, as here, a general contractor, without fault, has been held vicariously liable under the Labor Law for injuries sustained by a subcontractor’s employee due to the subcontractor’s negligence, the general contractor will be entitled to common-law indemnification from the subcontractor (see, Hawthorne v South Bronx Community Corp., 78 NY2d 433, 437 ; Golda v Hutchinson Enters., 247 AD2d 863 ; Marek v DePoalo & Son Bldg.

1994The subject was clearly of mutual interest and concern between AICPA and Lane (see, Commonwealth Motor Parts v Bank of Nova Scotia, 44 AD2d 375 , affd 37 NY2d 824 ).

1994Here, the Lane defendants’ communication to AICPA fell within the parameters of the "common interest” qualified privilege denoted in Shapiro (supra).

1994The subject was clearly of mutual interest and concern between AICPA and Lane (see, Commonwealth Motor Parts v Bank of Nova Scotia, 44 AD2d 375 , affd 37 NY2d 824 ).

1993The jury’s finding that the traffic/pedestrian signal time sequence allotted to the intersection of Horatio Street and Eighth Avenue, where the subject accident took place on February 5, 1985, was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries is based on a fair interpretation of the evidence and thus will not be disturbed (see, Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493 ).

1984Further, I suppose that now that the parties and the court have come to this point, early as it is, in the consideration of the case, it will probably ultimately be more convenient for everybody to work with a pleading which directly focuses on an action at law for breach of contract rather than trying to mine allegations with respect to breach of contract out of a pleading which focuses on equitable accounting. [ 122 Misc 2d 585 .]

1984Further, I suppose that now that the parties and the court have come to this point, early as it is, in the consideration of the case, it will probably ultimately be more convenient for everybody to work with a pleading which directly focuses on an action at law for breach of contract rather than trying to mine allegations with respect to breach of contract out of a pleading which focuses on equitable accounting. [ 122 Misc 2d 585 .]

1978A District Attorney may dictate the terms under which he will agree to consent to accept a guilty plea and where his terms are not met, he may withhold such consent; the withholding of such consent by statutory mandate renders the court without authority to accept a plea to anything less than the entire indictment (see CPL 220.10; Matter of McDonald v Sobel, 272 App Div 455 , affd 297 NY 679 ; People v Evans, 18 AD2d 1018 ; Matter of Cosgrove v Kubiniec, 56 AD2d 709 ).

1978A District Attorney may dictate the terms under which he will agree to consent to accept a guilty plea and where his terms are not met, he may withhold such consent; the withholding of such consent by statutory mandate renders the court without authority to accept a plea to anything less than the entire indictment (see CPL 220.10; Matter of McDonald v Sobel, 272 App Div 455 , affd 297 NY 679 ; People v Evans, 18 AD2d 1018 ; Matter of Cosgrove v Kubiniec, 56 AD2d 709 ).

1978A District Attorney may dictate the terms under which he will agree to consent to accept a guilty plea and where his terms are not met, he may withhold such consent; the withholding of such consent by statutory mandate renders the court without authority to accept a plea to anything less than the entire indictment (see CPL 220.10; Matter of McDonald v Sobel, 272 App Div 455 , affd 297 NY 679 ; People v Evans, 18 AD2d 1018 ; Matter of Cosgrove v Kubiniec, 56 AD2d 709 ).