first degree felony-murder rule in California

2022(See People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 462– 472.) The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 to “amend the felony murder rule . . . as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 .) It accomplished this by amending section 189 “ ‘to restrict the scope of first degree 5 felony murder.’ ” (Peo

2021The information also need not specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution relies at trial.” (Contreras, at p. 147; see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287 , 369–370 (Hughes); see also People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104 , 107–108.) Nevertheless, defendant argues these principles were “completely undermined” by People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , which described section 189 as “a statutory enactment of the first degree felony-murder rule in California.” (Id. at p. 472.) This argument fails.

2003In particular, we have held the first degree felony-murder rule ‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ].) Analysis of this question must begin with Ferlin, supra, 203 Cal. 587 .

2003In particular, we have held the first degree felony-murder rule ‘should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ].) Analysis of this question must begin with Ferlin, supra, 203 Cal. 587 .

2021The information also need not specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution relies at trial.” (Contreras, at p. 147; see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287 , 369–370 (Hughes); see also People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104 , 107–108.) Nevertheless, defendant argues these principles were “completely undermined” by People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , which described section 189 as “a statutory enactment of the first degree felony-murder rule in California.” (Id. at p. 472.) This argument fails.

2009He recognizes that we have repeatedly held that an information charging murder in violation of section 187 is sufficient to support a first degree murder conviction. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 369 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ], citing cases; see also People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 591 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ]; People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 131-132 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 172 , 158 P.3d 743 ].) However, he claims the rationale of these cases is irreconcilable with the holding of People v. Dillon [, supra, ] 34 Cal.3d 441 ... ( Dillon ). (4) " Dillon

1998“The felony-murder rule ‘artificially imposes malice as to one crime because of defendant’s commission of another’ and thereby satisfies the standard of culpability necessary to raise a homicide to *258 murder. [Citation.]” (.People v. Wells (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 989 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699 , 911 P.2d 1374 ], quoting People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 583, fn. 6 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ].) “The felony-murder rule applies to both first and second degree murder.” (People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 308 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 ].) Under the first degree felony-murde

1998“The felony-murder rule ‘artificially imposes malice as to one crime because of defendant’s commission of another’ and thereby satisfies the standard of culpability necessary to raise a homicide to *258 murder. [Citation.]” (.People v. Wells (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 989 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699 , 911 P.2d 1374 ], quoting People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 583, fn. 6 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ].) “The felony-murder rule applies to both first and second degree murder.” (People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 308 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 885 P.2d 1022 ].) Under the first degree felony-murde

2009He recognizes that we have repeatedly held that an information charging murder in violation of section 187 is sufficient to support a first degree murder conviction. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 369 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ], citing cases; see also People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 591 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ]; People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 131-132 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 172 , 158 P.3d 743 ].) However, he claims the rationale of these cases is irreconcilable with the holding of People v. Dillon [, supra, ] 34 Cal.3d 441 ... ( Dillon ). (4) " Dillon

2009He recognizes that we have repeatedly held that an information charging murder in violation of section 187 is sufficient to support a first degree murder conviction. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 369 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 ], citing cases; see also People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 591 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 161 P.3d 104 ]; People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 131-132 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 172 , 158 P.3d 743 ].) However, he claims the rationale of these cases is irreconcilable with the holding of People v. Dillon [, supra, ] 34 Cal.3d 441 ... ( Dillon ). (4) " Dillon

2004Case law has emphasized the need to deter the commission of felonies that put human life at risk ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 310, 311, 314; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 42-43 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 ], disapproved on another ground in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ]) [the doctrine is intended to deter felonious acts “in which danger to human life is inherent”]; People v. Clem (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 346, 349 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 ]), and also the need to deter persons who commit such felonies from committing negligent or accide

2004Case law has emphasized the need to deter the commission of felonies that put human life at risk ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 310, 311, 314; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 42-43 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1361 ], disapproved on another ground in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ]) [the doctrine is intended to deter felonious acts “in which danger to human life is inherent”]; People v. Clem (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 346, 349 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 ]), and also the need to deter persons who commit such felonies from committing negligent or accide

2024Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) narrowed the first degree felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for retroactive application of those changes in the law to defendants who

2022(See People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , 462– 472.) The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 to “amend the felony murder rule . . . as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 .) It accomplished this by amending section 189 “ ‘to restrict the scope of first degree 5 felony murder.’ ” (Peo

2020(Former § 189, amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 694, § 1; People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1182 .) But the fact that a murder was committed during a felony specified under section 189, subdivision (a), remained “insufficient of itself to establish a felony-murder special circumstance.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 .) A defendant (like McDowell) who aided and abetted the underlying felony but was not the actual killer, may only be subject to life imprisonment without parole if the prosecution proves the existence of special circumstances: either defendant intended to kill (§ 1

2015The Court of Appeal’s equating Matthews’s similar awareness with reckless indifference to human life cannot be squared with Enmund and Tison . 8 Alternatively, the People highlight the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that “there are some felonies as to which one could properly conclude that any major participant necessarily exhibits reckless indifference to the value of human life.” (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158, fn. 12 .) They argue each crime listed in section 189 qualifies and thus Matthews, because he participated in two such crimes, robbery and burglary, has autom

2009Nearly 45 years ago, this court acknowledged that "[t]he felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds that in almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. [Citations.] Although it is the law in this state [citation], it should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve." ( People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ], fn. omitted.) We have described the felony-murder rule as "`a "highly artificial concept"'" that this court

2009Nearly 45 years ago, this court acknowledged that “[t]he felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds that in almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. [Citations.] Although it is the law in this state [citation], it should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.” (People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 ], fn. omitted.) We have described the felony-murder rule as “ ‘a “highly artificial concept” ’ ” that this cou

2003First, “we are not concerned here with the wisdom of the first degree felony-murder rule itself, or with the criticisms—and defenses—directed at it by judicial and academic commentators; section 189 is the law of California, and we are not free to ignore or alter it if we would.” (People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 724 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 , 936 P.2d 1235 ].) Second, “[nevertheless, when the rule as ordained by the Legislature requires detailed delineation, this court properly considers policy and consistency.

2003First, “we are not concerned here with the wisdom of the first degree felony-murder rule itself, or with the criticisms—and defenses—directed at it by judicial and academic commentators; section 189 is the law of California, and we are not free to ignore or alter it if we would.” (People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 724 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 , 936 P.2d 1235 ].) Second, “[nevertheless, when the rule as ordained by the Legislature requires detailed delineation, this court properly considers policy and consistency.

1994(See People v. Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 626 (lead opn. of Kennard, J.) [speaking of the second degree felony-murder rule as a "substitute" for malice aforethought]; see also People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 472-476 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.) [expressing the same view as to the first degree felony-murder rule]; accord, id. at p. 490 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.).) The purpose of the second degree felony-murder rule is simply "to deter [persons] engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally...." ( People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d 1

1994(See People v. Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 626 (lead opn. of Kennard, J.) [speaking of the second degree felony-murder rule as a “substitute” for malice aforethought]; see also People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 472-476 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.) [expressing the same view as to the first degree felony-murder rule]; accord, id. at p. 490 (cone. opn. of Kaus, J.).) The purpose of the second degree felony-murder rule is simply “to deter [persons] engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally . . . .” (People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 34 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 33 , 489 P.2d

1994Pursuant to the so-called "merger" doctrine, the second degree felony-murder rule is not applicable when, on the evidence adduced at trial, the underlying felony was an "integral part" of, and "included in fact" within, the resulting homicide. ( People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 539 [ 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ], italics in original.) [3] A felony may be so characterized when "there was a single course of conduct with a single purpose," viz., to commit "the very assault which resulted in death...." ( People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 ,

1994Pursuant to the so-called "merger" doctrine, the second degree felony-murder rule is not applicable when, on the evidence adduced at trial, the underlying felony was an "integral part" of, and "included in fact" within, the resulting homicide. ( People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 539 [ 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ], italics in original.) [3] A felony may be so characterized when "there was a single course of conduct with a single purpose," viz., to commit "the very assault which resulted in death...." ( People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 ,

2021The information also need not specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution relies at trial.” (Contreras, at p. 147; see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287 , 369–370 (Hughes); see also People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104 , 107–108.) Nevertheless, defendant argues these principles were “completely undermined” by People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 , which described section 189 as “a statutory enactment of the first degree felony-murder rule in California.” (Id. at p. 472.) This argument fails.

2013Although he concedes People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104 [ 148 P. 928 ] held that “it is sufficient to charge the offense of murder in the language of the statute defining it . . . ,” and that such charging language *969 “includes both degrees of murder” (id., at pp. 107-108), he argues Witt s rationale has been “completely undermined” by this court’s reasoning in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 ] that section 189 is the “statutory enactment of the first degree felony-murder rule in California.” (Dillon, supra, at p. 472 .) But as defendant concedes, “su

2009The jury instructions, together with the trial court’s answer to a question from the jury, “could reasonably be understood to mean that if defendant entered with intent to assault his wife and stepdaughter he was guilty of burglary and that the first degree felony-murder rule was applicable.” (Id. at p. 188 (lead opn. of Peters, J.), italics added.) Therefore, under the principles enunciated in Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522 , and Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d 431 , Justice Peters’s lead opinion, in which Chief Justice Traynor and Justice Tobriner concurred, held that the merger doctrine precluded re

1994Pursuant to the so-called "merger" doctrine, the second degree felony-murder rule is not applicable when, on the evidence adduced at trial, the underlying felony was an "integral part" of, and "included in fact" within, the resulting homicide. ( People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 539 [ 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ], italics in original.) [3] A felony may be so characterized when "there was a single course of conduct with a single purpose," viz., to commit "the very assault which resulted in death...." ( People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 ,

2020(Former § 189, amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 694, § 1; People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1182 .) But the fact that a murder was committed during a felony specified under section 189, subdivision (a), remained “insufficient of itself to establish a felony-murder special circumstance.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 .) A defendant (like McDowell) who aided and abetted the underlying felony but was not the actual killer, may only be subject to life imprisonment without parole if the prosecution proves the existence of special circumstances: either defendant intended to kill (§ 1

2009In addition to these analytical anomalies, we note that our recent opinion in Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th 1172 , which analyzed the basis of the second degree felony-murder rule, has highlighted the difference between the sources of the second degree felony-murder rule—the context in which the merger doctrine developed—and the first degree felony-murder rule.

2014(Id. at pp. 903, 907.) Mendoza rejected the defendants’ argument that their convictions should be reduced from first to second degree murder, and held section 1157 was inapplicable because the defendants had not been convicted of a crime which was “ ‘distinguished into degrees.’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 910 , fn. omitted.) “[T]he prosecution’s only murder theory at trial” was felony murder, “which is first degree murder as a matter of law [citation],” and the jury was instructed “to return either an acquittal or a conviction of first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 900.) The court reason

2014(Id. at pp. 903, 907.) Mendoza rejected the defendants’ argument that their convictions should be reduced from first to second degree murder, and held section 1157 was inapplicable because the defendants had not been convicted of a crime which was “ ‘distinguished into degrees.’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 910 , fn. omitted.) “[T]he prosecution’s only murder theory at trial” was felony murder, “which is first degree murder as a matter of law [citation],” and the jury was instructed “to return either an acquittal or a conviction of first degree murder.” (Id. at p. 900.) The court reason

2009(See People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ].) Because first degree felony murder is specifically proscribed by statute (§ 189), what we say about the second degree felony-murder rule does not necessarily apply to the first degree felony-murder rule. [7] Justice Baxter makes some provocative arguments in favor of abolishing the Ireland merger doctrine entirely.

2009(See People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ].) Because first degree felony murder is specifically proscribed by statute (§ 189), what we say about the second degree felony-murder rule does not necessarily apply to the first degree felony-murder rule. [7] Justice Baxter makes some provocative arguments in favor of abolishing the Ireland merger doctrine entirely.

2021(Arias, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1002-1003, citing People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 ; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).) The Arias court held “given the limited record of conviction before us, we are unable to conclude the special-circumstance finding satisfied the standards set 4 forth in Banks and Clark.” (Arias, at p. 991.) In a section 1170.95 petition, the petitioner must show he or she: “could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Arias, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) Effective

2021(Arias, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1002-1003, citing People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 ; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).) The Arias court held “given the limited record of conviction before us, we are unable to conclude the special-circumstance finding satisfied the standards set 4 forth in Banks and Clark.” (Arias, at p. 991.) In a section 1170.95 petition, the petitioner must show he or she: “could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Arias, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) Effective

2020(Compare Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2 with Stats. 1982, ch. 893, § 4.) “Section 189 codifies the first degree felony-murder rule [citation]” (People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 810 ) and serves “a degree-fixing function.” (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1295 .) “[F]irst degree felony murder, along with the predicate crimes underlying it, is expressly described in section 189.” (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 943 .) The amendment of section 189 by the passage of Senate Bill 1437 limited the scope of felony murder culpability.6 (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) Section 189, s

2015The Court of Appeal’s equating Matthews’s similar awareness with reckless indifference to human life cannot be squared with Enmund and Tison . 8 Alternatively, the People highlight the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that “there are some felonies as to which one could properly conclude that any major participant necessarily exhibits reckless indifference to the value of human life.” (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158, fn. 12 .) They argue each crime listed in section 189 qualifies and thus Matthews, because he participated in two such crimes, robbery and burglary, has autom

2024Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) narrowed the first degree felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for retroactive application of those changes in the law to defendants who

2024Murder liability and Senate Bill No. 1437 Under the first degree felony-murder rule at the time of defendants’ convictions, “‘when the defendant or an accomplice kill[ed] someone during the commission, or attempted commission’” of certain enumerated felonies, “the defendant could be found guilty of the crime of murder, without any showing of ‘an intent to kill, or even implied 21 malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying felony.’” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 704 (Strong).) “Then, as now, a defendant convicted of first degree murder could be punished by a sentence of de

2020(Former § 189, amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 694, § 1; People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1182 .) However, a defendant like McDowell, who aided and abetted the underlying felony but was not the actual killer, may only be subject to life imprisonment without parole if the prosecution proves the existence of special circumstances: either defendant intended to kill (§ 190.2, subd. (c)) or aided and abetted the commission of a specified felony “with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant.” (Id., subds. (a)(17), (d); see In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 .) The

2020(Former § 189, amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 694, § 1; People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1182 .) But the fact that a murder was committed during a felony specified under section 189, subdivision (a), remained “insufficient of itself to establish a felony-murder special circumstance.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 .) A defendant (like McDowell) who aided and abetted the underlying felony but was not the actual killer, may only be subject to life imprisonment without parole if the prosecution proves the existence of special circumstances: either defendant intended to kill (§ 1

1998(State v. DeWitt (1996) 184 Ariz. 464, 468 [ 910 P.2d 9, 13 ]; Stewart v. State (Tex.App. 1984) 681 S.W.2d 774, 778 .) 11 Proposition 115, effective June 6, 1990, added simple kidnapping to the list of felonies which trigger application of the first degree felony-murder rule.

1998(State v. DeWitt (1996) 184 Ariz. 464, 468 [ 910 P.2d 9, 13 ]; Stewart v. State (Tex.App. 1984) 681 S.W.2d 774, 778 .) 11 Proposition 115, effective June 6, 1990, added simple kidnapping to the list of felonies which trigger application of the first degree felony-murder rule.

1998Application of the first degree felony-murder rule is invoked by the perpetration of one of the felonies enumerated in section 189. . . . [T]he felonies that [can] support a conviction of second degree murder, based upon a felony-murder theory, [have been restricted] to those felonies that are ‘inherently dangerous to human life.’ We have explained that the justification for the imputation of implied malice under these circumstances is that, ‘when society has declared certain inherently dangerous conduct to be felonious, a defendant should not be allowed to excuse himself by saying he was unaw

1998Application of the first degree felony-murder rule is invoked by the perpetration of one of the felonies enumerated in section 189. . . . [T]he felonies that [can] support a conviction of second degree murder, based upon a felony-murder theory, [have been restricted] to those felonies that are ‘inherently dangerous to human life.’ We have explained that the justification for the imputation of implied malice under these circumstances is that, ‘when society has declared certain inherently dangerous conduct to be felonious, a defendant should not be allowed to excuse himself by saying he was unaw