aggrievement test in Connecticut

1997Primerica v. Planning Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85 , 92 , 558 A.2d 646 (1989).

1997Primerica v. Planning Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85 , 92 , 558 A.2d 646 (1989).

2024See Lazar v. Ganim, 334 Conn. 73 , 84–92, 220 A.3d 18 (2019); Monroe v. Horwitch, 215 Conn. 469 , 472–73, 576 A.2d 1280 (1990); Kelly v. Dearington, 23 Conn. App. 657 , 662–63, 583 A.2d 937 (1990). 8 The majority’s conclusion as to the scope of relief available under § 9- 368 cannot be reconciled with its assertion that ‘‘questions of statutory intent’’ are ‘‘outside the scope of the aggrievement inquiry presented by the parties in this appeal . . . .’’ Footnote 6 of the majority opinion.

2024See Lazar v. Ganim, 334 Conn. 73 , 84–92, 220 A.3d 18 (2019); Monroe v. Horwitch, 215 Conn. 469 , 472–73, 576 A.2d 1280 (1990); Kelly v. Dearington, 23 Conn. App. 657 , 662–63, 583 A.2d 937 (1990). 8 The majority’s conclusion as to the scope of relief available under § 9- 368 cannot be reconciled with its assertion that ‘‘questions of statutory intent’’ are ‘‘outside the scope of the aggrievement inquiry presented by the parties in this appeal . . . .’’ Footnote 6 of the majority opinion.

2024See Lazar v. Ganim, 334 Conn. 73 , 84–92, 220 A.3d 18 (2019); Monroe v. Horwitch, 215 Conn. 469 , 472–73, 576 A.2d 1280 (1990); Kelly v. Dearington, 23 Conn. App. 657 , 662–63, 583 A.2d 937 (1990). 8 The majority’s conclusion as to the scope of relief available under § 9- 368 cannot be reconciled with its assertion that ‘‘questions of statutory intent’’ are ‘‘outside the scope of the aggrievement inquiry presented by the parties in this appeal . . . .’’ Footnote 6 of the majority opinion.

2024See Lazar v. Ganim, 334 Conn. 73 , 84–92, 220 A.3d 18 (2019); Monroe v. Horwitch, 215 Conn. 469 , 472–73, 576 A.2d 1280 (1990); Kelly v. Dearington, 23 Conn. App. 657 , 662–63, 583 A.2d 937 (1990). 8 The majority’s conclusion as to the scope of relief available under § 9- 368 cannot be reconciled with its assertion that ‘‘questions of statutory intent’’ are ‘‘outside the scope of the aggrievement inquiry presented by the parties in this appeal . . . .’’ Footnote 6 of the majority opinion.

2011The trial court also relied on a more recent case, Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402 , 788 A.2d 1239 (2002), in which our Supreme Court further explained that the aggrievement principle set forth in Sheridan v. Planning Board, 159 Conn. 1 , 266 A.2d 396 (1969), “stands for the proposition that a prospective, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a zoning commission’s decision does not satisfy the first prong of the test for classical aggrievement.” Harris v. Zoning Commission, supra, 414 n.12.

2011The trial court also relied on a more recent case, Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402 , 788 A.2d 1239 (2002), in which our Supreme Court further explained that the aggrievement principle set forth in Sheridan v. Planning Board, 159 Conn. 1 , 266 A.2d 396 (1969), “stands for the proposition that a prospective, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a zoning commission’s decision does not satisfy the first prong of the test for classical aggrievement.” Harris v. Zoning Commission, supra, 414 n.12.

2003For example, in Jolly, Inc., we stated: “In O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, [ 140 Conn. 65, 71-72 , 98 A.2d 515 (1953)], we interpreted the aggrievement requirement for zoning appeals relying on the court’s reasoning in an earlier decision, Beard’s Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 534 , 30 A. 775 (1894).

2003For example, in Jolly, Inc., we stated: “In O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, [ 140 Conn. 65, 71-72 , 98 A.2d 515 (1953)], we interpreted the aggrievement requirement for zoning appeals relying on the court’s reasoning in an earlier decision, Beard’s Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 534 , 30 A. 775 (1894).

1993Id. therefore, the plaintiff has satisfied the aggrievement standard.

1991The plaintiffs cite to Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Conservation Commission, 212 Conn. 710 , 714 , 563 A.2d 1339 (1989) as authority for the proposition that because of their proximity to the OTB facility, they meet the traditional aggrievement test.

1987The issue of standing, however, concerns apart from the aggrievement test the question of “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” (Emphasis added.) Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 139 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971), quoting Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 , 90 S. Ct. 827 , 25 L.

1987The issue of standing, however, concerns apart from the aggrievement test the question of “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” (Emphasis added.) Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 139 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971), quoting Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 , 90 S. Ct. 827 , 25 L.

1987The issue of standing, however, concerns apart from the aggrievement test the question of “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” (Emphasis added.) Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 139 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971), quoting Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 , 90 S. Ct. 827 , 25 L.

1987The issue of standing, however, concerns apart from the aggrievement test the question of “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” (Emphasis added.) Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 139 , 285 A.2d 318 (1971), quoting Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 , 90 S. Ct. 827 , 25 L.

2024Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 8 ,0 0 Conn. 1 In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant §§ 51-197a and 52-263; see, e.g., Clinton v. Aspinwall, 344 Conn. 696 , 698–99, 281 A.3d 1174 (2022); a ‘‘writ of error . . . is a concept deeply rooted in our common law . . . [and] the right to bring a writ of error . . . exists independent of [any] statutory authorization.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492 , 499– 500, 811 A.2d 667 (2002); see also Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 331 Conn. 711, 720 , 207 A.3d

2024Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 8 ,0 0 Conn. 1 In re Criminal Complaint & Application for Arrest Warrant §§ 51-197a and 52-263; see, e.g., Clinton v. Aspinwall, 344 Conn. 696 , 698–99, 281 A.3d 1174 (2022); a ‘‘writ of error . . . is a concept deeply rooted in our common law . . . [and] the right to bring a writ of error . . . exists independent of [any] statutory authorization.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492 , 499– 500, 811 A.2d 667 (2002); see also Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 331 Conn. 711, 720 , 207 A.3d

2020A party who fails to establish standing and to pursue the action before the trial court; e.g., Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Anson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford- New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 26, 1998) ( 23 Conn. L.

2019We conclude that Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 93 Conn. App. 719 , 891 A.2d 25 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 902 , 896 A.2d 104 (2006), provides a more instruc- tive aggrievement analysis.

2019We conclude that Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 93 Conn. App. 719 , 891 A.2d 25 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 902 , 896 A.2d 104 (2006), provides a more instruc- tive aggrievement analysis.

2019We conclude that Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 93 Conn. App. 719 , 891 A.2d 25 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 902 , 896 A.2d 104 (2006), provides a more instruc- tive aggrievement analysis.

2019We conclude that Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correc- tion, 93 Conn. App. 719 , 891 A.2d 25 , cert. denied, 278 Conn. 902 , 896 A.2d 104 (2006), provides a more instruc- tive aggrievement analysis.

2014At such hearing, any person or persons may appear and be heard and may be represented by agent or by attorney. . . .’’ As our courts repeatedly have noted, a ‘‘fundamental reason for the requirement of notice [in § 8-7d]’’ is to ‘‘enable parties having an interest to know what is projected and, thus, to have an opportunity to protest.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Gaida v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 108 Conn. App. 19 , 29–30, 947 A.2d 361 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 922 , 923, 958 A.2d 150 , 151 (2008). 13 At the aggrievement hearing, the court specifically inquired as to what remed

2014At such hearing, any person or persons may appear and be heard and may be represented by agent or by attorney. . . .’’ As our courts repeatedly have noted, a ‘‘fundamental reason for the requirement of notice [in § 8-7d]’’ is to ‘‘enable parties having an interest to know what is projected and, thus, to have an opportunity to protest.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Gaida v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 108 Conn. App. 19 , 29–30, 947 A.2d 361 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 922 , 923, 958 A.2d 150 , 151 (2008). 13 At the aggrievement hearing, the court specifically inquired as to what remed

2014At such hearing, any person or persons may appear and be heard and may be represented by agent or by attorney. . . .’’ As our courts repeatedly have noted, a ‘‘fundamental reason for the requirement of notice [in § 8-7d]’’ is to ‘‘enable parties having an interest to know what is projected and, thus, to have an opportunity to protest.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Gaida v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 108 Conn. App. 19 , 29–30, 947 A.2d 361 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 922 , 923, 958 A.2d 150 , 151 (2008). 13 At the aggrievement hearing, the court specifically inquired as to what remed

2014At such hearing, any person or persons may appear and be heard and may be represented by agent or by attorney. . . .’’ As our courts repeatedly have noted, a ‘‘fundamental reason for the requirement of notice [in § 8-7d]’’ is to ‘‘enable parties having an interest to know what is projected and, thus, to have an opportunity to protest.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Gaida v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 108 Conn. App. 19 , 29–30, 947 A.2d 361 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 922 , 923, 958 A.2d 150 , 151 (2008). 13 At the aggrievement hearing, the court specifically inquired as to what remed

2011The trial court also relied on a more recent case, Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402 , 788 A.2d 1239 (2002), in which our Supreme Court further explained that the aggrievement principle set forth in Sheridan v. Planning Board, 159 Conn. 1 , 266 A.2d 396 (1969), “stands for the proposition that a prospective, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a zoning commission’s decision does not satisfy the first prong of the test for classical aggrievement.” Harris v. Zoning Commission, supra, 414 n.12.

2011The trial court also relied on a more recent case, Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402 , 788 A.2d 1239 (2002), in which our Supreme Court further explained that the aggrievement principle set forth in Sheridan v. Planning Board, 159 Conn. 1 , 266 A.2d 396 (1969), “stands for the proposition that a prospective, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a zoning commission’s decision does not satisfy the first prong of the test for classical aggrievement.” Harris v. Zoning Commission, supra, 414 n.12.

2010Accordingly we conclude that the plaintiffs have not established statutory aggrievement for their appeal under the UAPA.” The plaintiff argues that Branhaven Plaza, LLC v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 251 Conn. 269 , 276 n.9, *27 740 A.2d 847 (1999), supports her aggrievement argument.

2010Accordingly we conclude that the plaintiffs have not established statutory aggrievement for their appeal under the UAPA.” The plaintiff argues that Branhaven Plaza, LLC v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 251 Conn. 269 , 276 n.9, *27 740 A.2d 847 (1999), supports her aggrievement argument.

2008The plaintiffs contend that a requirement that they demonstrate that they have suffered an injury that is “unique” is contrary to standing jurisprudence, wherein “the concern is to distinguish those who have suffered some individual injury from those asserting only the common right of the entire public that the law be obeyed.” William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 203 , 346 A.2d 269 (1975).

2008The plaintiffs contend that a requirement that they demonstrate that they have suffered an injury that is “unique” is contrary to standing jurisprudence, wherein “the concern is to distinguish those who have suffered some individual injury from those asserting only the common right of the entire public that the law be obeyed.” William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 203 , 346 A.2d 269 (1975).

2003We concluded, however, that, “ [although § 22a-16 abrogates the aggrievement requirement for bringing an action directly in the Superior Court”; id.; under Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co., supra, 192 Conn. 595 , and Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, 192 Conn. 247 , “the plaintiffs must pursue their claim by intervening in an administrative hearing before the department pursuant to § 22sl-19.” Fish Unlimited^.

2003Under those doctrines, “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 58 , 808 A.2d 1107 (2002).

2003Under those doctrines, “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 58 , 808 A.2d 1107 (2002).

2003For example, in Jolly, Inc., we stated: “In O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, [ 140 Conn. 65, 71-72 , 98 A.2d 515 (1953)], we interpreted the aggrievement requirement for zoning appeals relying on the court’s reasoning in an earlier decision, Beard’s Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 534 , 30 A. 775 (1894).

2003For example, in Jolly, Inc., we stated: “In O’Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, [ 140 Conn. 65, 71-72 , 98 A.2d 515 (1953)], we interpreted the aggrievement requirement for zoning appeals relying on the court’s reasoning in an earlier decision, Beard’s Appeal, 64 Conn. 526, 534 , 30 A. 775 (1894).

2002Additionally, "[t]o further its goal of protecting the environment, the EPA waives the traditional aggrievement requirement in . . . § 22a-19 , [which] authorizes any citizen or other entity, without having to first establish aggrievement, to intervene in an existing proceeding." Hyllen-Davey v. Plan Zoning Commission , 57 Conn. App. 589 , 593 , 749 A.2d 682 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 926 , 754 A.2d 796 (2000).

2002Additionally, "[t]o further its goal of protecting the environment, the EPA waives the traditional aggrievement requirement in . . . § 22a-19 , [which] authorizes any citizen or other entity, without having to first establish aggrievement, to intervene in an existing proceeding." Hyllen-Davey v. Plan Zoning Commission , 57 Conn. App. 589 , 593 , 749 A.2d 682 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 926 , 754 A.2d 796 (2000).

2002In so holding, we found the reasoning in Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 , 105 S. Ct. 2757 , 86 L.

2002In so holding, we found the reasoning in Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 , 105 S. Ct. 2757 , 86 L.