7 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5390, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9185green2 sentences2017If instrumentality is proven, we must then examine whether the ordered forfeiture is "grossly disproportionate” to the offense.”); United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd„ El Dorado, Cal., 59 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir, 1995) (“Although any forfeiture must meet the instrumentality test, its potentially harsh results, when applied alone, make us hesitate to accept it as the sole test for applying the command of Austin. 2017If instrumentality is proven, we must then examine whether the ordered forfeiture is “grossly disproportionate” to the offense.”); United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., El Dorado, Cal., 59 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although any forfeiture must meet the instrumentality test, its potentially harsh results, when applied alone, make us hesitate to accept it as the sole test for applying the command of Austin. | 2 | 2 |
State v. REAL PROPERTY AT 633 EAST 640 NORTHgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Utah v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, 994 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 2000) ("We similarly hold that the threshold test in real property forfeitures is whether the defendant property is an instrumentality of the offense. 2017See, e.g., Utah v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, 994 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 2000) (“We similarly hold that the threshold test in real property forfeitures is whether the defendant property is an instrumentality of the offense. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized From Younggreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 184 (Pa. 2017) (“The instrumentality requirement [of the Eighth Amendment] necessitates the establishment of a ‘significant relationship’ between the offense and the property sought to be forfeited.”); id. at 183 n.23 (noting the overlap between the “significant relationship” requirement of the instrumentality test, the courts’ “substantial nexus” test, and the term “facilitate” in the Drug Act); Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222 , 227 & n.6 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Trayer, 680 A.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also In re $ 2018If it is grossly disproportional, the forfeiture is unconstitutional. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d at 191 . 9 Notwithstanding, the trial court explained that Herpin’s 5-year sentence is significant, and the lack of an accompanying fine is not unusual in Philadelphia since “[d]efendants seldom have the resources to pay these fines[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 7. 10 The trial court explained that it estimated the amount of the forfeiture at $15,000.00 because Herpin purchased the vehicle for $17,000.00, and its current value was between $12,000.00 and $19,000.00. 10 In addition to the instrumentality test d | 1 | 3 |
People v. ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidsongreen2 sentences2018Ct. App. 2016); People v. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 64 N.E.3d 716, 724-25 (Ill. 2018Ct. App. 2016); People v. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 64 N.E.3d 716, 724-25 (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
One Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars ($137,325.00) in United States Currency v. State Ex Rel. Pelahatchie Police Departmentgreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 184 (Pa. 2017) (“The instrumentality requirement [of the Eighth Amendment] necessitates the establishment of a ‘significant relationship’ between the offense and the property sought to be forfeited.”); id. at 183 n.23 (noting the overlap between the “significant relationship” requirement of the instrumentality test, the courts’ “substantial nexus” test, and the term “facilitate” in the Drug Act); Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222 , 227 & n.6 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Trayer, 680 A.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also In re $ 2018See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 184 (Pa. 2017) (“The instrumentality requirement [of the Eighth Amendment] necessitates the establishment of a ‘significant relationship’ between the offense and the property sought to be forfeited.”); id. at 183 n.23 (noting the overlap between the “significant relationship” requirement of the instrumentality test, the courts’ “substantial nexus” test, and the term “facilitate” in the Drug Act); Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222 , 227 & n.6 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Trayer, 680 A.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also In re $ | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Trayergreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 184 (Pa. 2017) (“The instrumentality requirement [of the Eighth Amendment] necessitates the establishment of a ‘significant relationship’ between the offense and the property sought to be forfeited.”); id. at 183 n.23 (noting the overlap between the “significant relationship” requirement of the instrumentality test, the courts’ “substantial nexus” test, and the term “facilitate” in the Drug Act); Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222 , 227 & n.6 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Trayer, 680 A.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also In re $ 2018See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 184 (Pa. 2017) (“The instrumentality requirement [of the Eighth Amendment] necessitates the establishment of a ‘significant relationship’ between the offense and the property sought to be forfeited.”); id. at 183 n.23 (noting the overlap between the “significant relationship” requirement of the instrumentality test, the courts’ “substantial nexus” test, and the term “facilitate” in the Drug Act); Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222 , 227 & n.6 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Trayer, 680 A.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also In re $ | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Chandler, IIgreen1 sentence2017Having addressed this threshold inquiry, we turn to the question of proportionality.27 26 See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1994). 27 Most courts have not limited the excessiveness determination to only the instrumentality inquiry, but have utilized both an instrumentality and proportionality test. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Von Hofe v. United States
green
2 sentences2017Specifically, Appellee points to the Second Circuit’s decision in von Hofe in which the court required that, when considering “the property’s guilt, then, one needs to examine the relationship between the property and the criminal offense.” von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 184-86 . 2017Specifically, Appellee points to the Second Circuit’s decision in von Hofe in which the court required that, when considering “the property’s guilt, then, one needs to examine the relationship between the property and the criminal offense.” von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 184-85 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
In Re King Properties
green
2 sentences2017The instrumentality requirement necessitates the establishment of a “significant relationship” between the offense and *290 the property sought to be forfeited—the property was “significantly used in the commission of the offense.” King Properties, 635 A.2d at 133 . 24 This significant relationship is what “taints” the property and renders it “guilty,” such that it becomes subject to in rem forfeiture. 2017The instrumentality requirement necessitates the establishment of a “significant relationship” between the offense and the property sought to be forfeited — the property was “significantly used in the commission of the offense.” King Properties, 635 A.2d at 133 .24 This significant relationship is what “taints” the property and renders it “guilty,” such that it becomes subject to in rem forfeiture. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms
green
2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 184 (Pa. 2017) (“The instrumentality requirement [of the Eighth Amendment] necessitates the establishment of a ‘significant relationship’ between the offense and the property sought to be forfeited.”); id. at 183 n.23 (noting the overlap between the “significant relationship” requirement of the instrumentality test, the courts’ “substantial nexus” test, and the term “facilitate” in the Drug Act); Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222 , 227 & n.6 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Trayer, 680 A.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also In re $ 2018See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet, 160 A.3d 153, 184 (Pa. 2017) (“The instrumentality requirement [of the Eighth Amendment] necessitates the establishment of a ‘significant relationship’ between the offense and the property sought to be forfeited.”); id. at 183 n.23 (noting the overlap between the “significant relationship” requirement of the instrumentality test, the courts’ “substantial nexus” test, and the term “facilitate” in the Drug Act); Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222 , 227 & n.6 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Trayer, 680 A.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also In re $ | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Bajakajian
green
2 sentences2014Nevertheless, it agreed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that Bajakajian’s cash was not the instrumentality of his failure to report offense; rather, it was simply the “subject of the crime of failure to report.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 n. 9, 118 S.Ct. 2028 . 2014Nevertheless, it agreed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that Bajakajian’s cash was not the instrumentality of his failure to report offense; rather, it was simply the “subject of the crime of failure to report.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 n. 9, 118 S.Ct. 2028 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
green
1 sentence1974Supp. 62 , affirmed in 272 N. Y. 360 (1936), where the court outlined the three elements that must be shown to establish liability of a parent corporation on the “instrumentality” theory, upon which the plaintiff appears to be proceeding: “Restating the instrumentality rule, we may say that in any case, except express agency, estoppel, or direct tort, three elements must be proved: “(1) Control . . . but complete domination [by the parent] etc. “(2) Such control must have been used ... to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a disho | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Commonwealth ex rel. Derry v. Rundle
green
1 sentence1974In Botwinick v. Credit Exchange, Inc., 419 Pa. 65 , 213 A.2d 349 (1965), the court said: “Neither the similarity of names between the parent and subsidiary corporation . . . , nor the total ownership of the stock of the subsidiary by the parent . . . nor the fact that a single individual is the active chief executive of both corporations . . . will per se justify a court in piercing the corporate veil if each corporation maintains a bona fide separate and distinct corporate existence. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Botwinick v. Credit Exchange, Inc.
green
1 sentence1974In Botwinick v. Credit Exchange, Inc., 419 Pa. 65 , 213 A.2d 349 (1965), the court said: “Neither the similarity of names between the parent and subsidiary corporation . . . , nor the total ownership of the stock of the subsidiary by the parent . . . nor the fact that a single individual is the active chief executive of both corporations . . . will per se justify a court in piercing the corporate veil if each corporation maintains a bona fide separate and distinct corporate existence. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.