instrumentality rule in North Carolina

2022Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450 , 457–58 (1985) (“[A]lthough the instrumentality rule has, until now, been tailored to deal with ‘dominion and control’ as evidenced in a parent-subsidiary or sole dominant shareholder situation, the [instrumentality] rule is not limited to factual situations or resulting legal analysis afforded by those cases.”) The mere fact that the Entity Defendants are not shareholders of Medflow does not preclude application of the instrumentality rule — “[f]ocus is upon reality, not form.” Id. at 458 .

2022Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450 , 457–58 (1985) (“[A]lthough the instrumentality rule has, until now, been tailored to deal with ‘dominion and control’ as evidenced in a parent-subsidiary or sole dominant shareholder situation, the [instrumentality] rule is not limited to factual situations or resulting legal analysis afforded by those cases.”) The mere fact that the Entity Defendants are not shareholders of Medflow does not preclude application of the instrumentality rule — “[f]ocus is upon reality, not form.” Id. at 458 .

2022North Carolina has adopted the instrumentality rule, under which “a corporation which exercises actual control over another, operating the latter as a mere instrumentality or tool, is liable for the torts of the corporation thus controlled.” B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 N.C. 1, 8 (1966) (citation omitted).

2021North Carolina has adopted the instrumentality rule, under which “a corporation which exercises actual control over another, operating the latter as a mere instrumentality or tool, is liable for the torts of the corporation thus controlled.” B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Spencer, 268 N.C. 1, 8 (1966) (citation omitted).

2008Application to the Instant Case Under the instrumentality test, if the plaintiff is able to pierce the corporate veil, the shareholder and the corporation are shown to be, to quote our holding in Henderson , “one and the same.” Id.

2008Application to the Instant Case Under the instrumentality test, if the plaintiff is able to pierce the corporate veil, the shareholder and the corporation are shown to be, to quote our holding in Henderson , "one and the same." Id.

2022Estate of Hurst v. Moorehead I, LLC, 228 N.C.

2019Indeed, under the instrumentality rule, the alter ego “and the shareholder [are] treated as one and the same person.” Estate of Hurst, 228 N.C.

2022See, e.g., Ridgeway Brands Mfg., 362 N.C. at 440–43 (explaining that piercing doctrine predates Glenn and covers dominant shareholders, and applying the instrumentality rule to a dominant shareholder).

2019Cooper, 362 N.C. at 440 , 666 S.E.2d at 113 ; Glenn, 313 N.C. at 458 , 329 S.E.2d at 332 (“[T]he theory of liability under the instrumentality rule is an equitable doctrine.”); see Insight Health Corp., 2018 NCBC LEXIS 56 , at *26–32.

2008Strawbridge v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 472, 478-79 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (applying North Carolina law and discussing the instrumentality rule and relation back doctrine).

2008Strawbridge v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., 243 F.Supp.2d 472, 478-79 (W.D.N.C.2003) (applying North Carolina law and discussing the instrumentality rule and relation back doctrine).

2018On the other hand, our Supreme Court has also stated that the purpose of the instrumentality rule is to achieve “uniformity and predictability,” Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 362 N.C. at 440 , 666 S.E.2d at 113 , that “the issue is one of fact,” Glenn, 313 N.C. at 459 , 329 S.E.2d at 333 , and that “the fact finder determines that the corporate veil should be pierced,” Green, 367 N.C. at 145 , 749 S.E.2d at 270 .4 Whether, or to what extent, the Court may elect not to pierce the corporate veil as a matter of equity—as Defendants urge it to now—when the jury has found the elements of the instrumen

2018On the other hand, our Supreme Court has also stated that the purpose of the instrumentality rule is to achieve “uniformity and predictability,” Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 362 N.C. at 440 , 666 S.E.2d at 113 , that “the issue is one of fact,” Glenn, 313 N.C. at 459 , 329 S.E.2d at 333 , and that “the fact finder determines that the corporate veil should be pierced,” Green, 367 N.C. at 145 , 749 S.E.2d at 270 .4 Whether, or to what extent, the Court may elect not to pierce the corporate veil as a matter of equity—as Defendants urge it to now—when the jury has found the elements of the instrumen

2025Nicks v. Nicks, 241 N.C.

2021Unlike the plaintiffs in Ridgeway, Plaintiffs here assert their claims based on an agency theory—that Foss 2014 acted at all relevant times as GEICO’s agent. 6 The Court notes that “[a]gency, like piercing the corporate veil, is not itself a cause of action[.]” Green v. Freeman, 233 N.C.

2015See Waff Bros., Inc. v. Bank of North Carolina, N.A., 289 N.C. 198, 210 (1976) (recognizing that ownership of all outstanding stock of two corporations by a single person who served as chief executive officer of both corporations did not destroy their corporate identities). 29.

2014See id. at 650 , 689 S.E.2d at 147 (discussing three elements of the instrumentality test).

2014See id. at 650 , 689 S.E.2d at 147 (discussing three elements of the instrumentality test).

2014See Glenn, 313 N.C. at 454–55, 329 S.E.2d at 330–31; Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453 , 457–59, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984). {61} Courts in North Carolina employ the “instrumentality rule” to pierce the corporate veil: The instrumentality rule allows for the corporate form to be disregarded if the corporation is so operated that it is a mere instrumentality or alter ego of the sole or dominant shareholder and a shield for his activities in violation of the declared public policy or statute of the State.

2014See Glenn, 313 N.C. at 454–55, 329 S.E.2d at 330–31; Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453 , 457–59, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984). {61} Courts in North Carolina employ the “instrumentality rule” to pierce the corporate veil: The instrumentality rule allows for the corporate form to be disregarded if the corporation is so operated that it is a mere instrumentality or alter ego of the sole or dominant shareholder and a shield for his activities in violation of the declared public policy or statute of the State.

2008Strategic Outsourcing, 176 N.C.App. at 253 , 625 S.E.2d at 804 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450, 455 , 329 S.E.2d 326, 330 (1985)).

2008Strategic Outsourcing, 176 N.C.App. at 253 , 625 S.E.2d at 804 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450, 455 , 329 S.E.2d 326, 330 (1985)).

1966See also Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F. 2d 231 (1960).